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ARMY ROLES, MISSIONS, AND DOCTRINE IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ARMLIC)


PRECONFLICT CASE STUDY 5--KENYA

15 APRIL 1970

PREPARED BY OPERATIONS RESEARCH, INC.
UNDER CONTRACT NO. DAAG 25-67-C-0702 FOR
US ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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Prepared by Carlisle Research Office
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PREFATORY NOTE


1. This case study of the preconflict period in Kenya is one of a series undertaken by the Carlisle Research Office of Operations Research, Incorporated for the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies (USACDCIAS), now designated Institute of Land Combat (USACDCILC). The purpose of the case study is to develop a better understanding of the political, economic, social, psychological, public health, scientific-technological, and military factors conducive to low intensity conflict and change of indigenous governmental control. A total of seven such studies has been completed and placed on file at the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) for authorized users.
2. The seven case studies were used as basic research for the USACDCIAS study of Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC). No assumptions are made as to whether Army actions are either desirable or necessary in connection with any given conflict. It is recognized that Army capabilities to give military or civilian assistance are among those that the US Government may use or not, in furtherance of US policy and national interests, and that they should be designed and maintained to best serve the purposes of national authorities with the greatest effectiveness at the least cost.
3. The data in this report were drawn from open sources, published and unpublished, available through public institutions and Government agencies. No field work is involved, and no policy recommendations are made. The data have been checked against selected classified sources and with knowledgeable individuals. Modified systems analysis methods, aimed at determining points of tension or dysfunction conducive to low intensity conflict, were used. Basic assumptions and study method for the ARMLIC study are on file at USACDCILC.
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Map 52850-1/705

Figure 1. Physical and Political Map of Kenya

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TABLE 1. FACTORS CONDUCTIVE TO VIOLENCE IN KENYA

Principal factors.

1. Domination of the self-interest of the white settlers.
2. Culture clash between Africans and European settlers, administrators, missionaries, and traders.
3. Lack of unity on basic policy among Europeans inhibited effective administration.
4. British loss of power and prestige after World War II.

Contributing factors.

1. The land issue--failure of Europeans to recognize African emotional attachment to land and the African system of land ownership.
2. Mobilization of African labor for European enterprise disrupted African family and social customs.
3. Ill-advised European efforts at social reform--the issues of clitoridectomy and polygamy.
4. The impact of culture change--erosion of traditional African society; rise of a nascent, middle-class, partially detribalized body of Africans facing limited social and economic opportunities.
5. Lack of African political participation.
6. Presence of Indian community blocked Africans from midlevel occupational and social positions.
7. Failure of high-level administrators to recognize the danger signs preceding Mau Mau.
8. Presence of a large number of African tribes with little commonality, no ability to act in a community of interest.
9. Dependence upon African labor in the European white highlands was a continual tension-provoking situation.

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TABLE II. CHRONOLOGY OF SALIENT PRECONFLICT EVENTS IN KENYA

1895	British Government establishes Protectorate in Kenya, replacing East Africa Company.
1901	Uganda railroad completed.
1903	Arrival of Lord Delamere; formation of Settlers Association.
1914-18	World War I; hostilities with German East Africa.
1920	Kenya changes from Protectorate to colony of the United Kingdom.
1920	Young Kikuyu Association founded by Harry Thuku; protests registration and taxing of Africans.
1922	Riots in Nairobi; Thuku deported.
1925	Suppression of Kikuyu elders' replacement cycle by colonial administration.
1926	Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), successor to the Young Kikuyu Association, founded by Joseph Kangethe.
1928	Jomo Kenyatta founds "Mwigwithania," the KCA paper.
1929	Jomo Kenyatta travels to England and visits Moscow.
1930	Secession of independent schools association from missions.
1931	Dissension in Church of England and African Inland Missions regarding female circumcision. Harry Thuku released. Jomo Kenyatta and Parmenas Mukeri travel to United Kingdom to represent KCA before Joint Parliamentary Committee.
1933	Publication of Kenya Land Commission Report (The Carter Commission). Cleavage in KCA between Thuku's moderates and Kariuki's extremists.
1935	Arrival of "Archbishop" Alexander to establish the African Orthodox Church. Foundation of Kikuyu Provincial Association by Harry Thuku (committed to work within constitutional framework).
1939	Peter Mbiu Koinange returned from American and England and founded Githunguri Teachers' Training College. World War II; many Kenya people serve in British forces.

x

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TABLE II (continued)

1940	KCA declared an illegal society.
1941	Attempts to revive KCA under Solomon Memia.
1944	Nomination of Eliud Mathu, first African member to the Legislative Council. Kenya African Study Union inaugurated in October. KCA leaders released from detention.
1945	Collection of funds for Jomo Kenyatta's return.
1946	Reorganization of colonial Government. Kenya African Study Union renamed Kenya African Union (KAU). Kenyatta returns with Semakula Mulumba and commences political agitation. Initial attempts to amalgamate KKEA and KISA.
1947	Opening of attack by KCA on soil conservation methods. Kenyatta elected president of KAU.
1948	Prosecution of oath administrators, Ngata Farm, Njoro, where Mau Mau first mentioned. Squatter unrest and oathing in Rift Valley Province. First reported oathing ceremony in Nyeri district at Mungaria Independent School. Kenyatta convened meeting of KCA leaders in Githunguri. First report on KCA/Mau Mau by Director of Intelligence and Security.
1949	Strike of Transport and Allied Workers Union. Petition opposing "Kenya Plan" sent to the King by KAU.
1950	Leading Kikuyu politicians took Mau Mau oath at Banana Hill. First prosecution for administering KCA oath. General strike in Nairobi; arrest of Makhan Singh. Mau Mau declared an illegal society. Nonracial Kenya Citizens Association formed.
1951	Kenyatta accorded interview by the Governor to discuss constitutional changes. Memorandum on Kikuyu grievances presented by KAU.
1952	First oathing ceremony reported from Nairobi. Opening of Mau Mau murder campaign in May. Proclamation of State of Emergency, 21 October 1952. Arrest and detention of Kenyatta, Fred Kubai, and 81 others.

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SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS: FACTORS CONDUCTIVE TO CONFLICT

1. Overview.

a. The British occupied Kenya as a byproduct of empire. Their difficulties there reflected in part the postwar tensions of liquidating the empire, and in part the interplay in Kenya of forces relating to a larger and rapidly changing postwar world.

b. Kenya was originally seen as the site of a railroad to provide access to the strategic Central African territory of Uganda and the headwaters of the Nile. Discovery of the temperate and fertile highlands along the railroad route suggested agricultural exploitation by white settler pioneers as a way of paying for the railroad. Building of the railroad offered an opportunity for the use of cheap Indian labor. Additionally, British idealists saw a civilizing mission--the gradual development of the African natives, whose life was plagued with poverty, disease, ignorance, and intertribal violence.

c. British colonization superimposed upon Kenya a permanent resident white elite with a pioneer spirit and a philosophy which included self-interest, pride of empire, and the white man's burden, at a time when the empire was in its last years, and the burden was becoming an anachronism. The importation of Asians added to social stratification, leading to a three-caste society with Africans at the bottom, deprived of most opportunity to participate in the newly emerging national society and economy despite growing exposure to Western culture and ideas of equality. Aggressive settler pursuit of their interests led to controversy over land

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and labor mobilization practices. Ill-advised attempts at social reform focused African--particularly Kikuyu--resentment upon the unsettling impact of European culture and encouraged nationalism.

d. The British administration was a just and effective one within its policy limitations, and never wholly unmindful of African, along with European and Asian, welfare. However, it was not until during and after World War II that aggressive action was taken to meet African needs. Action got under way slowly and was hampered by reluctance to realize that the old society was no longer viable. By then there was an accumulation of resentment, sharpened by wartime experience, and British power and prestige were declining. The colonial administration did not fully assess the danger signals until the violence of Mau Mau erupted.

2. Underlying issues.

a. Self-interest of settlers. The immediate economic and social interest of the European settler group dominated the affairs of Kenya throughout its history as a colony and overshadowed or displaced any effort to meet the needs of the African population. The settlers saw Kenya as their country, which they had developed by their energy and skill. They saw the native population as a lesser breed, whose labor and service they needed, but who were not and would not be equal citizens. In consequence, the influence of the settlers both in Nairobi and in London was directed at maximizing their own economic opportunities and dominant social position, seeking to gain political control of the colony's affairs, and minimizing the allocation of resources for purposes they did not see as relevant, such as native development. Aggressive

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taking of land, labor mobilization, and exclusion of the natives from political and economic power were all concomitants of this view.

b. Culture clash.

(1) The British when they entered Kenya at the height of their empire's glory--settlers, administrators, missionaries, traders--were profoundly and genuinely convinced of their superiority and virtue. They saw the white man's burden as the administration and guidance of lesser peoples until they, too, became civilized as the British understood civilization. This required, not British understanding of the natives' culture, but the learning of the ways of civilization by the natives over a long period of time. Clashes of culture were not adequately recognized nor their seriousness perceived. The British did not understand the way the Kikuyu valued land or his system of land tenure. They did not see the traumatic degenerative effects of crudely executed reforms like the banning of female circumcision and polygamy. They did not understand the true causes of alleged native laziness. They did not realize the extremely disruptive social effects of labor mobilization, which broke up the families on which Kikuyu social organization depended. They arbitrarily suppressed the traditional Kikuyu rotation of elites as subversion. Educational policies challenged traditional culture without equipping people for a new society.

(2) At the same time, the British were agents of inevitable social change. The Africans themselves perceived European material and social accomplishment as desirable and set out to find the secrets of British power and magic. Once this process began, the trauma of

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social change could not be avoided, but with better understanding on both sides it could have been alleviated. The British, as the self-constituted administering authority, naturally had the greater responsibility.

c. Divergence of European views. Lack of unity on basic policy among Europeans both inhibited effective administration of Kenya and aroused growing doubts among Africans as to European omniscience. The colonial administration and the missionaries tended to espouse the cause of native welfare and development, but the settlers resisted it. The settlers generally favored an approach involving white supremacy, total segregation, and native coercion; the administration and colonial office resisted it. The missionaries were divided among themselves. Views in the British Government also were mixed, and by 1945 the Africans in Kenya, recognizing this fact, could interpret a Labor Party victory as a sign of better times. Needed programs of economic and social development were delayed, and the administration of the colony was neither entirely coercive nor fully democratic. Either of these approaches, in terms of maintaining order for the short run, would have been better than neither.

d. Loss of power and prestige. The erosion of British power and prestige in Kenya began with World War I, in which many Africans were exposed to the sight of European shooting Europeans. This experience was repeated in World War II. After the War, the British were materially and emotionally exhausted from its strains. Their problems were reflected in Kenya, particularly in shortages of administrative

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personnel. The unwillingness among high officials in Kenya to see the indicators of mounting trouble may also have reflected this exhaustion. Achievement of self-government in Ghana and the independence of India and Pakistan signaled to the Africans the end of the empire and new opportunity for power. Unchanged continuation of the prewar system of colonial control and African subordination was, therefore, increasingly challenged at a time when the British were less able than before to meet the challenge or to direct individual white-settler opinions.

3. Contributing factors and specific issues.

s. The land issue. The Kikuyu, a sedentary agricultural people, attached high symbolic as well as economic value to land. A small proportion of their land was mistakenly alienated to Europeans. Additionally, they were blocked by European-imposed boundaries and restrictions from clearing additional land as their dense population grew and aggravated by European attempts to lease more land in accordance with European law rather than African practice. They saw in vivid contrast the almost uninhabited stretch of the adjoining white highlands under European control. "Stolen lands" became an emotional issue for the Kikuyu which combined real with constructed grievances and frustrations and lent itself to manipulation by dissident leaders.

b. Labor mobilization. European settlers' pressure for labor for their farms led to tax and other Government policies, occasionally coercive and all resented, to force young Africans off the reserves and into wage labor. Most objectionable was the registration system "kipande." At the same time, although labor on European farms was

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rationalized as a desirable agent of social change, the Europeans wanted to avoid social contact with Africans. The result was a compromise system of transitory labor, restricted tenancy, surveillance, and separated families which was frustrating and socially destructive to both Europeans and Africans. After World War II, administration pressures to perform soil conservation work and other development projects in the reserves aroused African resentment.

c. Social reforms. In 1931, the Church of Scotland proscribed its African adherents from the traditional practices of polygamy and of female initiation by clitoridectomy. Some local African councils were also encouraged to prohibit them. Both practices were intricately interwoven with the entire fabric of Kikuyu life. The result was the formation of independent schools and churches which became incubators of anti-European feeling.

d. Impact of cultural change. By the end of World War II, the cumulative effects of labor on European farms and in towns, education, travel, military service, and contact with the British administration had eroded traditional culture and society, particularly among the Kikuyu, and aroused new expectations. There was a nascent African middle class, and large communities of partially detribalized young African men lived in substandard conditions in Nairobi and other towns. However, economic and social opportunities for these "marginal men" were very restricted; their expectations were answered with unemployment, menial labor, contempt by the Europeans, who preferred the traditionally oriented Africans, despite the proclaimed mission of

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civilizing the heathen. Such marginal men, largely cut off from the security of traditional family and community solidarity, turned to substitute organizations like tribal organizations and trade unions. Some of them, including many embittered veterans of World War II, became a Nairobi underworld. It was of such raw material that the Mau Mau was formed.

e. Political participation. Beginning in the 1920's, the more sophisticated Africans demanded representation on the Legislative Council and formed political associations. But they were represented only by nominated Europeans until 1944, and elected only the members of local advisory councils through 1951.

f. Role of the Indian community. Indians, whose community owed its origin largely to British importation of labor for the Uganda Railroad, filled the midlevel occupational and social positions in Kenya. Their presence therefore blocked the Africans from positions which might have been a bridge to more participation in the national society. Moreover, the Indians succeeded in winning a measure of political and economic recognition by 1931 while the Africans did not.

g. Communication. During the postwar years, the police intelligence branch was overly bound to Nairobi. More seriously, high-ranking administrators seem not to have seen the political implications of reports they received, either from the police or from district officers, not to have understood the significance of those danger signals which were clearly in evidence.

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h. Tribalism. The inability of the Africans to support their own interests effectively was due not only to their lack of political comprehension, but also to their division into a large number of tribes that had little in common. Although education, travel abroad, and service in two world wars had increased intertribal contact, none of the British political institutions encouraged the development of an African community until after World War II. The striking tribal differences within Kenya helped to hide from the white elites the extent of postwar ferment and change.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

4. Nature of the study.

a. Kenya is one of seven nations selected to provide a data base for analysis of the factors which lead to low intensity conflict and loss of Government control. Study of the preconflict period, defined for research purposes as 1920-51, was conducted on an interdisciplinary basis, examining political, economic, sociological, psychological, public health, scientific-technological, and military aspects of the period. Definitions, assumptions, and study methods which are common to all the countries examined are on file at the Institute of Advanced Studies.

b. The data were drawn from an exhaustive perusal of published works on Kenya and some unpublished sources, especially for statistical purposes. The Center for Research on Social Systems of the American University provided information for compiling the bibliography and furnished certain statistical information. The findings, where possible and appropriate, were checked against the classified Government information as to their validity. The results are summarized in the following sections of this chapter and are presented at more length, by discipline, in the succeeding chapters on political, economic, sociological (including cultural and public health), and military factors.

c. Descriptive information is included in this report only to the extent necessary for coherent analysis. Brief descriptive notes on Kenya are given in 5 below for general background purposes. More complete data

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are available in the US Army Area Handbook for Kenya and in other works cited in the bibliography.

5. Descriptive background.

a. Geography.

(1) Predominantly an agricultural country, Kenya lies on the east coast of Africa and is bounded on the north by Ethiopia and the Sudan, on the south by Tanzania, and on the west by Uganda, and on the east by Somalia and the waters of the Indian Ocean. Principal cities are Nairobi the capital, and the port of Mombasa.

(2) Kenya has a total area of 224,960 square miles (slightly less than the area of Texas). The northern three-fifths of the country is arid and almost waterless. The southern two-fifths, where 85 percent of the population and nearly all economic production are centered, comprises a low-lying coastal area and a plateau varying in altitude from 3,000 to 10,000 feet. It is better endowed with water resources. Included in this latter area are Mount Kenya (17,040 feet), Mount Elgon (14,000 feet), the Aberdare Range (12,000-13,000 feet), and part of the great Rift Valley. The valley is some 30 to 40 miles wide and often 2,000 to 3,000 feet lower than the surrounding country.

(3) Kenya generally has two rainy seasons, the "long rains" from April to June and the "short rains" from October to December; however, in the high areas west of the Rift Valley and north of the railway the wettest months are April to August. With the exception of the coast and the immediate interior, where the average temperature is 80°F, the climate of Kenya is cool and invigorating. At Nairobi, the capital, the

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mean temperature is 67° F, the mean maximum being 77° F and the mean minimum 57° F.

b. The people.

(1) Kenya's population was estimated to be 9.95 million in mid-1967, of which about 277,000 were non-Africans (Asian, Europeans, and Arabs). In 1952, following the preconflict period, the total population was estimated at 5.76 million of which 199,000 were non-Africans. The annual rate of population growth is estimated at 3 percent. Approximately 192,000 Asians are engaged mainly in marketing, distribution, and transportation; most of the 42,000 Europeans are in large-scale farming, business, the professions, and public services. The overwhelming majority of the Africans are farmers or pastoralists; most do some cash cropping as well as subsistence agriculture. The principal ethnic origins of the African population are Kikuyu (20 percent of the total), Luo (14 percent), Luhya (13 percent), Kamba (11 percent), Kisii (6 percent), and Meru (5 percent).

(2) Accurate figures on religious affiliations are difficult to obtain. However, based on sampling during the 1962 census, the African population was estimated to be 37 percent Protestant, 22 percent Roman Catholic, and about 3 percent Muslim. The remaining 38 percent were largely followers of traditional religions.

c. History.

(1) The region now known as Kenya was visited at an early date by the Arabs; its proximity to Arabia invited colonization as long ago as the 8th century. An Arab community of about 39,000 individuals

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exists in Kenya today. The Arabs were followed seven centuries later by the Portuguese, then by the British. Until East Africa was partitioned among the European powers toward the end of the 19th century, much of the coast was under the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Trade at the principal ports was controlled by British and Indian merchants during this period. Later, German agents acquired concessions in the region. A series of frontier agreements concluded between 1886 and 1893 fixed the boundaries of the respective East African spheres of influence of Germany, Italy, and Britain. In 1887 the Sultan of Zanzibar granted to what later became the Imperial British East African Company a 50-year concession covering his mainland possessions not falling within the German sphere. In 1895 the British Government purchased the company's rights and appointed a commissioner to the area, thereafter designated the East Africa Protectorate. The name was changed to Kenya Colony and Protectorate in 1920.

(2) A Colonists' Association to look after settler interests was founded by the Europeans who came to Kenya in the first years of this century. In 1907 a nominated Legislative Council was established, and in 1919 the selection of most of its members was placed on an elective basis. Until 1944, when the first African was nominated to the Legislative Council, Africans had no direct participation in the central Government's legislative or executive institutions. The first direct elections for Africans, under a restricted multivote franchise, occurred in 1957. From October 1952 to December 1959, Kenya was under a state of emergency arising from the Mau Mau rebellion.

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(3) Partly because of the emergency and partly because of the important political role played by the European settlers, Kenya's constitutional development lagged behind its East African neighbors. Tanganyika and Uganda became independent in 1961 and 1962, respectively; but Kenya did not achieve independence until December 1963. Moreover, the internal political quarrels and tribal distrust that have long plagued Kenya's politics made cooperation among African politicians exceedingly difficult. The vexing constitutional issues were not finally settled until early in March 1963.

d. Economy.

(1) While Kenya is primarily an agricultural country, only about 12 percent of the total land area, or 16.8 million acres, is considered to have a high agricultural potential. Another 5.5 percent, or 7.8 million acres, has a medium potential, mostly for stockraising. The rest is arid or devoted to nonagricultural uses.

(2) Land pressure in certain areas is strong. It has been aggravated by the traditional system of reserving certain areas for certain tribal groups. Some relief has been achieved since independence by the Government's program of purchasing land from farmers of European origin.

(3) The predominance of agriculture in the nation's life is reflected by Kenya's export statistics. Excluding trade with Tanzania and Uganda, more than 80 percent of exports are agricultural. In recent years, the main exports have consisted of coffee (30 percent); tea (12 percent); sisal (10 percent); pyrethrum, a flower used in the manufacture of insecticides, (4 percent); and meat and meat products (4 percent).

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Imports are slightly more varied, but emphasize the products of heavy industry: industrial machinery accounts for 11 percent of the total, crude oil 9 percent, motor vehicles 7 percent, fabrics 6 percent, iron and steel 5 percent, paper and paper products 4 percent, agricultural machinery 2 percent, and fertilizers 2 percent.

(4) A wide range of light industries has, however, come into existence since World War II. These involve for the most part small-scale consumer goods, agricultural processing, and oil refining.

(5) In 1966 Kenyan exports to the United States were valued at \$15 million; imports from the United States at \$32 million. In this same year, total Kenyan exports were worth \$259 million and imports \$346 million, for a trade deficit of \$87 million. This was covered in part by grants and loans from various aid donors, private foreign investment, and earnings on invisible exports of which tourism was by far the most important. In 1967 tourism was second only to coffee as a foreign exchange earner.

(6) Kenya has meager mineral resources; mining and quarrying contributed only \$2.35 million to its gross domestic product in 1965. No coal or oil deposits have been found. However, the output from imported crude petroleum of the new oil refinery at Mombasa has become an important export item.

(7) In 1966 the gross national product (GNP) of Kenya was \$1,085 million, or \$113 per capita. From 1962 to 1966, the average annual increase in the per capita GNP in constant prices has been 3.1 percent.

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e. The East African Community.

(1) The seeds of economic cooperation in East Africa were planted in 1917 when free trade between Kenya and Uganda began. After World War I, Tanganyika was added to the free trade area in 1923, when Britain became the mandatory power over Tanganyika, formerly held by Germany. Tanganyika maintained its own customs department, however, until 1949. Common services developed concurrently with the market area, and the two concepts were institutionalized in 1948 with the creation of the East Africa High Commission, which was headed by the colonial governors of the three countries.

(2) With the advent of Tanganyikan independence in 1961, the High Commission was replaced by the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) which was headed by the Prime Ministers of the three countries. In June of 1967, a Treaty for East African Cooperation was signed, creating an East African Community headed by an Authority consisting of the Presidents of the three countries. At the time of the treaty signing, EACSO was operating with an annual budget of \$252 million and had 60,000 employees.

6. Political factors in the preconflict period, 1920-51.

a. General. Four main problems dominated British policy in Kenya: trusteeship for native welfare, the demands of the white settlers, the problem of the Asians, and the economic development of the colony.

b. African welfare. Both home and colonial administrations from around 1920 on were firmly committed to look after the welfare of the Africans and provide for their gradual modernization. So, in their way,

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were the missionaries. However, four factors seriously limited their performance.

(1) The goals to be achieved by African society were defined by the British in British cultural terms, with little reference to the Africans. In the case of the Kikuyu, some of the customs and practices deemed abhorrent by the rulers were basic elements of the traditional culture, and their arbitrary proscription both aroused hostility and weakened the whole culture pattern.

(2) The role of trustee for the Africans sometimes conflicted with white settler demands, and the settlers were powerful in the councils of both Nairobi and London, while the Africans were virtually unrepresented except by European proxies.

(3) The system of government imposed by the British had little compatibility with the African political system, although the British system was by no means a bad one, and although it was necessary for the Africans, if they were to modernize, to have a modern system of government. A specific example of incompatibility was the British suppression of the periodic replacement of Kikuyu tribal elders in the 1920's.

(4) The Africans were given little meaningful opportunity or encouragement to participate in the political system, even though African service to Europeans was rationalized as part of the modernization process. Those Africans who were the furthest separated from traditional ways by the European impact--the detribalized youths in the cities and towns, and the newly-educated who were denied meaningful roles, both

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largely Kikuyu--were the ones least admired or accepted by the European elite.

c. Settlers. The white settlers, unlike the Africans, were represented in the highest councils of government. They wanted freedom to run the colony themselves, and campaigned hard for it during the entire period. They believed that the British Government had encouraged them to find their new home and had undertaken to see that they could have it as a European area. They needed plentiful cheap labor and believed the Government should help them get it. In a number of respects, settler demands and attitudes limited what the colonial Government could do for the Africans. Prior to World War II, the Asians were a major target of settler opposition and concern. The ambivalence of settler attitudes on Africans is brought out in 8c below.

d. The Asians. Though a tiny minority in comparison with the Africans, the Asians were nonetheless vocal in their demands for equality of opportunity and treatment. They never established full equality, but with the backing of the Government of India they did win communal representation. More skilled and better educated than the Africans, they were preponderant in urban commerce and trade, Government and private clerical positions, and in rural trade with the Africans. They were far more accustomed to British rule. Their attitude and skills gave them access to social and political positions which Africans might otherwise have had. In this way, even though they sometimes spoke for African grievances, the Asians added to African frustration and segregation. At

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the same time the Asian served the Africans as an example of political action.

e. Economic development. Until after World War II, the economic development process centered around the agriculture of the white settlers, who were seen--with reason--as the nucleus of the colony's development potential, but whose interests conflicted with the Africans, whose gains were extremely limited. This topic is treated in 7 below.

f. Government. In dealing with all these problems, the governmental system itself, while efficient, honest, and sincere, was not very flexible or innovative. Its key elements were the Colonial Governor, with wide executive powers; the career colonial administration in Kenya; the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London; and the Colonial Office. Both governors and colonial administrators tended to keep their heads down, to avoid Parliamentary debates and commissions. The Colonial Office in London did not attach high priority to Kenyan problems, and Colonial Secretaries changed very rapidly. At certain times Kenya was offered up to solve other imperial problems, such as Indian emigration and the resettlement (never implemented) of the Zionists. The Colonial Government faced a constant lack of funds, aggravated by the world depression and by the reluctance of both the settlers and the London Government to spend money on Kenyan development. There seems to have been a certain disinclination to take African needs and problems seriously. (The white settlers in earlier days raised the specter of an ultimate revolt, but they got no encouragement from the Government in their extravagant demands for protection.) A concomitant of this attitude was the failure of higher

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level administrators to heed the danger signals sent them by their own local officers over a period of some years and a failure to realize the seriousness of many indicators of African unrest and discontent or to make adequate response to them. British policy, because of many conflicting interests and views, reflected neither rapid movement toward Africanization nor thoroughgoing coercion, either of which, in the short run at least, might have averted violence. Nevertheless, the colonial service had many devoted and able members, whose constructive ideas were more often submitted than acted upon.

g. Justice. The judicial system of Kenya followed British usage except in civil matters concerning Africans, which were handled by native courts of elders. The British-staffed magistrate and appeal courts were careful to maintain British standards of justice, evidence, and process, even in the late 1940's when to do so added to the difficulties of Government attempts to stop illegal dissent and violence. Customary law was supposed to apply in cases involving Africans, but this requirement was poorly observed.

h. European interest groups. The white settlers organized themselves early in the century. Their Convention of Associates (called Elector's Union after 1944) represented their interests with considerable effectiveness under the leadership of Lord Delamere and Major Grogan, both through the elected representatives on the Legislative Council and through various informal pressures in Nairobi and London. Although the group was not successful in its aim of achieving full power over the colony's administration for the resident Europeans, it did enlarge

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European control, and protected settler interests along quite frankly racist lines in matters of land and labor, often against the opposition of the colonial administration and the missionaries. The latter also had a grouping to represent their interests, which included protection of the Africans against the extremes of settler pressure. Although settler and African interests conflicted at many points the central one was the land issue, on which both settlers and Kikuyu strongly asserted their respective claims, and the settlers for the most part had their way (see 7e below).

i. African interest groups; development of dissidence.

(1) There was no group representing the African community as a whole until after World War II, since sunratribal consciousness developed slowly. The Kikuyu, however, organized shortly after World War I, following the example of the Indian community, which had organized to work for equality of political and economic rights with the Europeans. Tribal associations and trade unions were formed in the cities. The Kikuyu Central Association became steadily more active and aggressive, with the allegedly "stolen lands" as a central issue, until it was banned by the British in 1940.

(2) In 1944, the Kenya African Studies Union, a nominally all-African organization, was established, in which the first appointed African representative on the Legislative Council was a leader. The activists of the former Kikuyu Central Association, however, quickly assumed leadership roles, and the word "Studies" was dropped from the

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Kenya African Union (KAU). African goals were at first quite modest but became steadily more ambitious and hostile to the Europeans.

(3) The increase in African dissidence was primarily a result of two trends.

(a) African frustrations were aggravated during and immediately after World War II by wartime shortages, the experiences of Kenyans in the British Armed Forces, growing exposure to ideas of racial and national equality, and the hopes for a better deal which were aroused by the victory of the Labor Party in Great Britain, only to be dashed by continued dominance of European interests and a further influx of European immigrants. For the first few postwar years, moderate Africans continued their efforts to secure a larger African political and economic role through peaceful means. Their failure set the stage for violence.

(b) The image of European omniscience and omnipotence faded with the experience of two world wars, the Italian venture in Ethiopia, the attainment of self-government in Ghana and India, and the differences among Europeans in Kenya and between Nairobi and London. Moreover, the British administration reflected the material and emotional exhaustion of the war; personnel and funds were short.

j. The Mau Mau. A wholly indigenous movement, Mau Mau appeared in the late 1940's as a result of a generation of accumulated tensions. Outside influences, in the sense of foreign support and guidance, were unimportant. It was foreshadowed by the Kikuyu Central Association, with its unsuccessful demands for restitution of lands and for African rights and

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opportunities; by the nativistic churches and independent schools, which sprang up in the wake of the 1931 controversy over female circumcision; and by the fledgling trade union movement and native associations in urban areas. The Kikuyu provided most of the leadership and following, although efforts were made to proselytize other tribes.

(1) During the preemergency period, through 1951, the Mau Mau movement (though at this time never referred to as such by its leaders) developed covertly within the KAU, independent schools, trade unions, and tribal associations. It developed a paragonovernmental organization paralleling both the colonial administration and the tribal councils. Below a Central Executive Council was a flexible and largely autonomous hierarchy of councils which passed on orders and instructions, recruited and administered oaths to members, collected funds, spread propaganda, and gathered intelligence. They had groups of "police" associated with them, often recruited from the Nairobi gangster underworld, who protected clandestine meetings and performed ceremonial functions (and later enforced punishments and gathered intelligence). A system of courts paralleled those of the colony. Later, when an "army" developed, the foregoing organization became its supporting base for recruits, money, supplies, and intelligence. Preemergency acts of violence were perpetrated by individual members in the rural areas or among the squatters on European farms--probably out of personal frustration channeled by the anti-European character of their Mau Mau oaths and indoctrination--and the premature onset of violence caught the leaders unprepared.

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(2) The preemergency Mau Mau leadership differed from that during the emergency, because the rapid and unexpected eruption of violence and swift British counteraction left the earlier leaders exposed, so that they could be arrested. Jomo Kenyatta is credited with a preeminent role by both the British and the Africans. In fact, however, he may have played a somewhat passive role with respect to Mau Mau, as distinguished from other African political activity, and may have acquiesced in the need for violence as other forms of action failed, rather than taking the lead in inciting violence. His position of many years' standing as principal figure in the African nationalist movement would have obliged him to accept the mantle the Mau Mau gave him, once the Mau Mau established themselves as a major element of that movement and its power. Other Mau Mau leaders of the period were, like Kenyatta, young men who had attended mission schools. Many of them had traveled abroad, some while serving in the British Army. Only one, who had grown up in Mombasa, was truly detribalized and not a member of an age group.

7. Economic factors.

a. Background. Economic considerations underlay the original British interest in Kenya. The Uganda Railway, at the turn of the century built for military strategy reasons to provide access to the center of the African Continent, turned out to be very expensive. Agricultural exploitation of the empty temperate highlands adjoining the right-of-way was seen as a means of making the railroad pay. The affairs of the Colony for the next generation were largely dominated by the interests of the small but energetic group of white settlers in the highlands, to whose success was tied

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both the retirement of the railroad debt and the economic development of the territory. It was not until after World War II that balanced national development, emphasizing industry and essential infrastructure as well as agriculture, became a major administration goal; prior to that time, development was largely left to the free play of private interests, although official attention to the economic requirements of the African community dates from the early 1930's.

b. General policies. The Kenya administration was under strong, conflicting pressures throughout the period from the settlers, who sought policies favoring their economic interests, and from those in the administration itself, or among the missionaries and in London who sought--sincerely but sometimes misguidedly--to promote native welfare and development. Settler interests tended to dominate during the 1920's. During the 1930's, steps to benefit the natives included establishment of reserves, an income tax on Europeans, and curtailment of the influence of settler boards and committees. During World War II, however, there was a resurgence of settlers' influence, as "unofficials" entered the Nairobi administration. In earlier years, the settlers combined to resist Asian incursions; after the war, they opposed African political pressures and economic advance. State-aided planning and investment in Kenya began as early as 1919 but did not have large-scale effect until after 1945.

c. Development planning. A 10-year development plan was adopted in 1948, giving heavy emphasis to social services--notably health and education--and to agriculture, roads, and buildings. Implementation of the plan was slow, partly for political and administrative reasons and partly

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because of postwar inflation. Nonetheless, it did represent a new direction in colonial policy and a serious implementation of the long-declared policy of the "paramountcy"--or at least parity--of native welfare and development needs. Many of the specific goals had been recognized as early as the 1930's and became targets for specific pilot projects or expanded programs. It seems strange that, in the event, these programs met continuous African resistance; the explanation lies partly in the constraints of tradition, but more in the fact that many of the programs involved some measure of official coercion.

d. Agriculture. Staple crop exports were the basis of Kenyan economic development up to 1940. European production of maize, coffee, tea, and sugarcane provided a growing city population, primarily engaged in commerce, finance, and services. Little of this growth involved the Africans. The result was the creation of a typical colonial economy, with rigidly stratified social and occupational positions. The Africans were engaged in inefficient subsistence agriculture. Yet white settlers, with some success, sought to control African crops and keep them from competing with European production, particularly during the world depression which cut sharply into exports and farm profits. During World War II, Kenya food exports were disappointingly low because of military mobilization of the Europeans, African labor shortages, and a 1943 drought. Exports and profits revived after the war. A mixed farming pattern which had developed by then gave official encouragement to small-scale African producers to raise a variety of cash crops.

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e. The land problem.

(1) Alienation of land to Europeans proceeded rapidly from 1903 to 1915, as a conscious British Government policy. Most of the land was taken peaceably from the pastoral Masai, who had used none of it intensively and some of it not at all. However, the prime alienated regions adjoined Kikuyu holdings, and in some instances overlapped them, close to Nairobi.

(2) The early settlers' view of Kenya's economy saw land as a free good in plentiful supply, while human labor was scarce and unreliable. The Kikuyu tradition was somewhat similar; but landholding customs were very different. For the Kikuyu, while cultivation rights belonged to the man who cleared the land, its ownership was a separate, subclan matter. Leasing or sale of subclan lands was largely limited to members within the subclan, and the elders' approval of transactions was required. Land had symbolic significance as part of the clan's corporate identity. For the European, all land theoretically belonged to the British Crown, and was leased or "alienated" as an economic transaction to individual holders--first for 99-, then for 999-year terms, with 33-year leases of lands permitted in African reserves.

(3) Although the colonial administration secured the Kikuyu and other tribes in the lands they held by establishing the "native reserves," the Kikuyu were increasingly pressed by natural population increase; they did not understand the barriers established by the Government, such as the Forest Reserves which bordered Kikuyu territory; and they had the findings of the Carter Commission of 1932-35 as proof that at least some

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of their land had been illegally taken without recompense. Thus arose the pressure for restoration of the "stolen lands," which embraced the entire European holdings, for the most extreme. The problem was aggravated, also, by well-intentioned but coercively executed Government programs for terracing and for consolidation of fractionated holdings.

f. Manpower.

(1) Among the Kikuyu and other tribes, there was a traditional division of labor under which the women did most routine agricultural work. Introduction of British law and order deprived the young men of one of their chief functions, that of warrior. Thus, early European observers found many able-bodied men, apparently idle but without enthusiasm for wagework away from their homes. The settlers pressed for official action to drive these men into the labor market, with varying success. The labor registration system instituted after World War I became a principal focus of African resentment, as did tax policies aimed at the same purpose.

(2) Such measures, coupled with growing education and the growth of modern cities, nonetheless attracted men into the towns, where they became an economic and social problem. After World War II, additional labor and security controls were imposed upon Africans in Nairobi. The Kikuyu, in particular, suffered restriction both in moving their families to the city and in their travel back to their nearby reserves; they were made keenly aware of the limits on economic opportunities available to them in either place. These trends were aggravated by the postwar boom in Nairobi and by mobilization for erosion control in the reserves.

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(3) The Europeans' attitude toward Africans was ambivalent: they needed the labor and wanted Government controls to get it, but they simultaneously objected to any permanent status for the laborers. The result, arbitrary and frustrating for both Europeans and Africans, was a system of constant supervision of the African "resident labor" in the white highlands, a system of written labor contracts, and an insistence that tenant farming and grazing rights existed only at the pleasure of the white owner.

g. Industry. By 1952 Kenya was still a stronghold of laissez-faire policies toward industry, commerce, and banking; but the modern sector made rapid strides after the war, assisted by large investment from outside Kenya.

(1) The first large modern economic venture was the Uganda Railway. The original line, from Mombasa to Kisumu on the shore of Lake Victoria, was built by 1901. A major branch was built in 1921, traversing the white highlands to Nakuru. Traffic grew steadily, especially during and after World War II; the railroad was both an indicator of Kenya's rapid growth and a key factor in it. Throughout the period, it was the only large-scale transport medium in Kenya; roads and motortruck vehicles were a minor factor until 1952, except in the cities.

(2) Except for soda-ash and gold mining, there was virtually no industry in Kenya until after World War II (a brewery, cigarette factories, and repair shops were minor exceptions). Official encouragement was given to industry for the first time during the war, and it grew thereafter at a rate slightly greater than the whole economy. However,

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manufacturing units were small, processed a wide variety of materials, and served a narrow local market; there were few export industries. In construction, where there was active Government encouragement, postwar expansion was very rapid, but it did not greatly relieve the African housing shortage. Electric power expanded after 1948 at a rate of 15 to 20 percent yearly, but it was based on local plants and was small in total output until 1954. Growth in this sector had little effect on African employment. In 1952, 30 percent of registered African employment was divided between commerce and industry (130,300) and Government and public services (101,600).

h. The overall economy. The net product of Kenya grew from UKL8.74 million in 1930 to UKL60.9 million in 1948, a fairly rapid increase even after allowing for currency depreciation. In the following 3 years, growth was even more rapid as industrialization got under way, and net product reached UKL102.9 million in 1951. Exports formed a large share of product--almost 40 percent in 1930, and nearly a quarter in 1951; imports consistently exceeded export earnings, by varying margins. In 1930, primary production (mainly agricultural) made up 63 percent of national income, over half of it non-African. By 1951, the primary output proportion had fallen to 46.6 percent. Although the African share of this figure was smaller than in 1930, the proportion of total African primary output which was marketed, as contrasted to subsistence home-consumption, had recovered from depression levels to reach 14 percent in 1947 and 18 percent in 1951. Mining and manufacturing accounted for 11 percent of income in the latter year.

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i. Income levels. Per capita income levels of the European, Asian, and African population groups throughout the period showed sharp disparities: in 1930 they were estimated to be in the ratio of 1 to 17 to 189, respectively. Similar ratios for 1947 and 1951, though not strictly comparable, show that the disparities were still great, but markedly less for Africans than in 1930. The income differentials were twice as great in agriculture (the sector in which most Africans were engaged) as in the urban and modern sector. Industrialization after World War II benefited the European and Asian communities considerably more than the African, as indicated by the growth in African employment of about 15 percent between 1946 and 1952, compared with increases of 43 percent and 70 percent respectively, for the Asians and Europeans. The latter group grew rapidly, reflecting a large postwar influx of European immigrants.

j. Banking and credit. Nairobi banks and trading companies were branches of UK firms, and their policies reflected their primary interest in the exports and imports of the European community. Credits were secured by land or property; they were not available to African farmers or tenants. Credit facilities inside the reserves depended upon the personal credit extended by Asian traders and storekeepers. The Government's Land and Agricultural Bank, founded in 1931, had only 785 loans outstanding in 1952, with annual interest costing less than the rate of inflation at that time. The most widely available banking service was the postal system, under which, in the three East African territories, 323,000 depositors held balances of UK£12 million. While the postwar period saw much financial expansion, there were still only a few Africans

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who could get credit. On the other hand, postwar inflation had a limited impact on the traditional African import commodities, particularly cotton cloth; and rising African demands and expectations were among the factors behind the steadily growing import levels.

8. Sociocultural factors.

a. Demography.

(1) The first inclusive census of Kenya was taken in 1948; data on non-Europeans prior to that time are partial or estimated. It appears, however, that between 1926 and 1951 the population, both African and non-African, more than doubled. Total population reached almost 5.8 million in 1952; the non-African elements during this period increased more rapidly than the African, especially in the last few years. The increase in African population markedly increased the proportion of young men, on whom the impact of social change was greatest. The prominence of the "forty" age-set among the postwar dissidents was one reflection of this trend.

(2) Among Africans, there were from 40 to 70 distinct ethnic groups. Depending upon the method of classification, they could be categorized broadly into Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushite peoples. They were independent of one another and their languages were not mutually intelligible. Of these groups, the Bantu were most numerous; among them were the Kikuyu, the largest single group of Africans, who for three or four centuries had practiced sedentary agriculture in densely settled areas of the fertile central highlands. The Nilotic peoples were mostly pastoral; among them were the warlike Masai, who had kept the Kikuyu out of their grazing

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lands until the British colonists took over a portion, the fertile highlands, at the turn of the century. The Moslem Cushites were related to the people of Somalia.

(3) British administration led to urban growth, which added to the concentration of population in specific areas. By 1962, almost three-fourths of Kenya's population lived in one-eighth of the total land area; a similar situation probably also obtained in earlier years. In 1948, there were 17 towns of over 2,000 inhabitants. Of these, two--Nairobi and Mombasa--were of conventional city size, with about 119,000 and 85,000, respectively; others ranged from about 18,000 downwards. Most of the non-African population (about 80 percent) was concentrated in these towns; but their aggregate African population was nevertheless greater, with 162,000 against 124,000. However, the African population was predominantly rural throughout the period. Concentration of some tribal groups in their agricultural lands had long been quite high and increased during the period. The Kikuyu, in particular, showed a density of well over 500 per square mile in 1948, in the three districts of Kiambu (777), Nyeri (536), and Fort Hall (515), which pushed hard against the production limits of their subsistence agriculture.

(4) The rapid population increase was due, for the non-Africans, to immigration; for the Africans, to reduction in death rates and increase in birth rates. Death rates fell in response to the simple public health measures introduced by the British. Birth rates rose in part because the impact of Western culture lessened traditional methods of birth control. In the Kikuyu areas, population pressure on the land was one of the factors

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impelling movement into the European farm areas and into the cities and towns.

b. Education.

(1) Each of the principal ethnic groups--European, Asian, Arab, African--had its own schools, which ranked in that order with respect to quality and quantity. European schools were Government-run; those of the other groups were Government-supervised and aided or financed through local taxation, but at a very low level compared with the European schools. Independent African schools, without Government supervision or financing, appeared in 1931 as a protest to resented social reform, and became breeding grounds for dissidence. Even in African schools operated under Government or missionary supervision, however, the quality was limited by the general lack of training of teachers as well as the lack of funds, and the curriculum was not geared to realistic social opportunities and needs. Literacy in 1948 was probably around 15 percent; in 1952, probably no more than 30 percent of school-age children were in school, and up to half the African children entering first grade did not go on to the second.

(2) Secondary school or higher education opportunities for Africans were few. Moreover, the new style schools, many of which were boarding schools, interfered with the traditional socialization process and family life in home and village. The total effect was to promote the process of detribalization without truly equipping the Africans for a place in modern society. Many with primary school training flocked to the cities and towns, hoping for nonmanual employment; not finding it,

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they swelled the ranks of disaffected urban unemployed, to the concern of both Europeans and tribal leaders.

c. Social organization.

(1) The Kikuyu, numbering over a million in 1948, were organized into a number of autonomous lineages and clans tracing from common male ancestors, and into age sets, cutting across the clans, composed of men initiated during the same time period. There were complementary groups for women. The age sets moved together through a series of ranks from junior warrior to senior elder, taking on new roles and responsibilities. There were no hereditary or appointed chiefs; power was exercised by councils of elders. To a large extent, similar organization prevailed among other African peoples, none of which had recognized any authority beyond the tribe before the coming of the British. There were trade and intermarriage among tribes, and peaceful relations, although there were also armed raids for cattle or other economic goods, such as between the Kikuyu and the neighboring Masai. (The ferocity of intertribal warfare deeply impressed early European observers.) The British brought all the tribes under their control, often by exploiting divisions among the tribes, as well as by selective use of direct force. This process was complete by World War I; however, only after 1945 were many Africans aware of a Kenya-wide community of interest, and the country took long to develop a significant national policy despite continuing deep divisions.

(2) The Europeans, largely British, included agricultural settlers, often of English "country" or military background, who were

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mostly in the highlands region adjoining Kikuyu lands; others were Government and military officials, businessmen and bankers, and professionals, including missionaries. Government service and agriculture accounted for almost half the total. The values and mode of life of the British aristocracy and upper middle class dominated this small European community, which constituted the elite of the country. Relations between Europeans and Africans blended major elements of a noblesse oblige spirit and sincere (if often misguided) efforts at reform and development, on one hand, with the conscious exploitation of cheap labor and explicit feelings of racial superiority on the other. Segregation was not embodied in law, but was almost universally practiced throughout the period. Some early settlers, English and a few Boer, came to Kenya from South Africa.

(3) The Asian community, though largely of Indian origin, had considerable religious and caste diversity; nevertheless, it was fairly cohesive. Some Indians had been in East Africa for centuries as traders; numbers were brought to work on the railroad, and others followed. They lived primarily in the cities and towns, and were excluded--despite their protests--from the white highlands. They engaged in commerce (where they far outnumbered Europeans), skilled trades, and lower clerical positions and transportation and largely monopolized these fields at the expense of the Africans. Though discriminated against by the Europeans, they fought with some success for their rights, and to some extent supported African efforts at improvement of status. The Africans, however, resented the Asian monopoly of trade.

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d. Religion.

(1) The traditional Kikuyu religion combined three basic elements: belief in an all-powerful God; in the power of spirits, both ancestral and animistic; and in magic and medicine men. It reinforced the communal quality of Kikuyu life. Medicine men were consulted in case of misfortune as to proper action, which was taken by the group under leadership of the elders. Magic to heal, protect, or bring love or purification was also the province of the medicine man, who often extracted an oath of secrecy from his client to prevent disclosure of the magical knowledge witnessed. Sorcery, to bring injury or death, was also practiced. Oaths were commonly used by the Kikuyu in judicial matters, land transactions, purification rites, conflicts, and initiations; they had strong religious reinforcement. The entire body of religious belief and practice supported collective, rather than individual, action and responsibility.

(2) The Europeans were almost all Christian; missionary interest in Africa was in fact one of the reasons for the original British involvement, and mission activity was strong from the beginning. By 1910, 18 different societies were in the field, with different traditions, beliefs, levels of commitment, and techniques. After a slow beginning, the missionaries by the early 1960's claimed from 40 to 60 percent of Africans as converts, though some "converts" prior to 1930 were persuaded chiefly by educational or other opportunities available through the missions. The conflict between Christian teaching and Kikuyu customs and beliefs was very great; the tension was aggravated by differences among the

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missionaries themselves. Consequences were the erosion of the traditional culture because of missionary opposition to key elements of it, the alienation of converted children from their traditional families, and the early formation of African separatist or independent churches, which later became foci for both nationalism and the Mau Mau. Principal among these sects were the Kikuyu African Orthodox Church and the Kikuyu Independent Pentecostal Church. Substantial numbers of African Christians, however, abjured such groups.

(3) Over 40 percent of the Asians were Hindu; 30 percent of the Asians and 99 percent of the Arabs were Muslim. These religions, however, seem to have had little influence beyond their own communities.

e. Communication. Word of mouth was the principal communications medium among Africans throughout the period, limited by tribal linguistic differences. A monthly Kikuyu language newspaper appeared in 1928 and a Government Swahili language paper began publication in the 1920's. There were 18 newspapers and periodicals in circulation in 1938, but presumably most of them were for the English or Asian community. The African press grew rapidly after World War II. Circulation of the seven papers and various news sheets in 1951 was limited--the 10,000 circulation of one weekly was considered high--and readership was limited by illiteracy. Nevertheless, the growth of African publications was considered responsible for fostering urban political action and for an increase in hostility toward the Government and European settlers, particularly among the Kikuyu, who were closest of all the tribes to Nairobi. There was substantial press freedom until 1952. The influence of radio was small: there

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were only 17,000 receivers by 1953, principally in urban areas. The colonial administrators depended primarily on their headmen, on tribal representatives, and on occasional large public meetings for communication. The use of Swahili--native neither to Europeans nor to almost all Africans--limited understanding and accuracy. The various tribes had different languages. While the restricted communications retarded growth of civic consciousness, they also constrained the spread of unrest, including Mau Mau.

f. Class structure. The three sharply distinguished, caste-like groupings of Kenyan society were largely ethnic in composition: the European elite, the Asian "middle," and the African lowest. There was virtually no social contact among the three. European assumptions about Asians and Africans, particularly those relating to dirt, immorality, and dishonesty, made it easy to rationalize a rigid color bar in practice, though not in declared policy. Once established, the caste-like structure was extremely resistant to change and blocked upward mobility for Asians and Africans. However, the rapid growth of the European community, particularly after World War II, and the increasing heterogeneity of background and occupation, made it increasingly difficult to preserve the European elite image, especially before the more educated Africans and Asians. Some of the Europeans, moreover, called the caste structure into question--for example, the European Civil Servants' Association in its 1949 plan called for a unified civil service with unrestricted opportunity for advancement. It is possible that the absence of a firmly united European front encouraged the Africans to increase their activity against it.

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g. Kikuyu family and village life.

(1) The Kikuyu ethnic group was divided into subclans of people claiming descent from a single male ancestor; the subclans, into sub-subclans or mbari, and these in turn, into polygamous families. The subclans, each numbering a thousand or more adults at the time the British arrived, and the mbari, were regulated by councils of elders acting on the basis of consensus, one of whom was chosen as a sort of chairman. The family was headed by the father (actual or as defined by custom). The lineage groups were custodians of land, religion, and law, and traditionally there were no other institutions for these purposes. The mbari controlled the territory jointly held by the constituent households and had to approve all land transactions. Members of the warrior age grade were responsible for law and order.

(2) In Kikuyu custom, terms like "father," "grandfather," "wife," "brother," applied not only to the individual so designated in European usage but also to a class of people of a specified relationship. If the natural father of a family died, his next senior brother assumed the responsibility. A man would include certain relatives' wives, along with his own, in the term, "wife," but he was permitted to cohabit only with his own. This usage confused Europeans, who thought the number of wives a man might take was far greater than it actually was. Such customs were manifestations of the Kikuyu collective view of the family--a view which also led family members jointly to pay fines imposed by the tribunals after the British Government was organized.

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(3) Eligibility for marriage was established through initiation ceremonies, some aspects of which the British missionaries found highly repugnant, but which were regarded by the Kikuyu as essential to their life. Europeans also opposed the custom of bride price, which the Kikuyu saw as means of insuring success of marriage and thus promoting social stability. The polygamous family, with its associated customs providing for birth control and the minimization of friction, was a stable, intricate social pattern to meet social and environmental requirements. However, the British set out to change those usages they found morally repugnant, without fully understanding them or their relationship to the whole of Kikuyu family and social life. In addition, various British administrative measures wittingly or unwittingly undermined the Kikuyu family and culture. The resulting family disorganization led to tensions, uncertainties, resentments, and lack of social control and created a dangerous ferment in which Mau Mau could grow.

(4) The traditional polygamous family, with a hut and plot of land for each wife, was the rural economic unit. The family groups of hut homesteads were spread over the land, grouped loosely into "ridges" in Kikuyu country, but there was no communal village life with its usual specialized activities. All family members had customary roles in agricultural activity, although the routine functions fell mainly to women. The colonial administration introduced a money economy and instituted head and hut taxes, largely as a deliberate policy to oblige Africans to work for European settlers. The hut tax was also intended to discourage polygamy. These policies forced some movement onto European estates and

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into the towns and gradually encouraged African demand for the products of the money economy, such as European clothing. Male movement into wage labor and the shift in housing patterns adversely affected rural family life, obstructed the traditional socialization process, and resulted in deterioration of traditional customs and beliefs.

h. Urban life.

(1) Except for Arab port towns such as Mombasa, there had been no real population concentrations in Kenya until the founding of Nairobi as a railroad center in 1899. Nairobi was close to the territories of the Kikuyu; and their immigration there gradually increased, at first on a transitory basis to earn money for taxes, later for better economic opportunities or for higher status. Most immigrants were men, and few brought their families. Even in later years, when they might have wished to remain, available housing--usually single rooms in municipal barracks--was inadequate for families, and expensive. Hence most Kikuyu maintained ties with the land as tenants or landowners, inhibiting the growth of a stable urban African population. African housing areas in the larger towns were segregated and had the worst housing and sanitation.

(2) As immigration grew, shacks, slums, and overcrowding increased; wages and opportunities were at low levels, even for those who considered themselves educated for better things. The Africans in these areas were thus isolated from their families and rural tradition, exposed to new ideas but deprived of tribal status and ranked at the bottom of the urban social hierarchy. Doubtful of their tradition, unprepared for assimilation into the European society and value system and unwelcome in

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it, these people were prey to insecurity, stress, anxiety, and frustration. The experience of many Africans in the British Armed Forces during World War II, and the disappointments and frustrations after their return, aggravated these feelings. Nevertheless, the urban Kikuyu formed various organizations to advance their rights and to substitute for traditional groupings. Among a fortunate few, a middle class began to emerge of people who had successfully adopted European life forms, and had largely broken with their tribal origins except as a myth of a glorious past.

1. Culture. Kikuyu culture emphasized collective loyalty to family, clan, and age group, and the subordination of the individual. It also established a strong relationship between the extended family (*mbari*) and their land as a prime source and symbol of spiritual as well as material support. The economic, social, and religious life of the community all revolved around these themes. The age-group progression insured that no Kikuyu would remain always in subordinate status. There was considerable equality within the various corporate groupings, but positive value was also given to individual achievement through differences in wealth and skill. With the coming of the Europeans, individual achievement was increasingly emphasized, and various European institutions were imitated and adapted. The lack of equal opportunity for Africans was therefore more keenly felt. Kikuyu interest in education, land, and wealth was transferred to the European equivalents. European values, however, were accepted unevenly and most rapidly by those close to missionary stations and cities or by those more educated or more mobile. In the midsixties, even after independence, tribalism remained a Government concern. (It

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was recently manifested in recent Kenyan elections and the death of Tom Mboya.)

j. Health and nutrition. Among Africans health and nutrition were very poor throughout the period, as they had been before the arrival of the British. However, the Kikuyu in general did not manifest frustration or resentment over these deficiencies. Disease and death were attributed to supernatural causes or to sorcery; and land shortages (or, in the case of the Kamba tribe, efforts to reduce cattle herds) were resented primarily as loss of wealth rather than of food.

(1) Although the British administration had established a department for medicine in 1903, the impact of both Government and missionaries was minimal throughout the period. As late as 1966, only one-fourth of the African population were considered to accept modern medicine. Insufficient funds, inadequate staff, insufficient preparatory education of Africans, and--in the case of the missionaries--African hostility to attempted social reforms, severely limited progress. There was no official program for birth control, although some African customs served to limit births; but infant death rates were very high--as high as 400 to 500 per thousand live births in 1947 among the Kikuyu, and 184 for Kenya as a whole in 1948. Debilitation and early death due to malnutrition and overwork were common; only 8.7 percent of the African population survived past the age of 45; exhaustion and congestive heart failure were common among women of 40. Many diseases were endemic, particularly

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malaria and respiratory ailments. After 1930, plague and yaws were brought under control, but venereal disease increased.

(2) All diseases were complicated by widespread malnutrition and worm infections. Diet was deficient in quality as well as quantity, particularly in protein (due in part to dietary taboos) and in vitamins (notably A and C) and fats. Quantity may have declined from 1930 to 1951. There was famine as late as 1931. In 1951, the Kenya Medical Department reported that malnutrition was producing serious results at all ages. Apart from nutritional diseases, malnutrition had the more insidious consequence of subnormal physical development and reduced disease resistance.

(3) Drugs and alcohol were generally not social problems. However, consumption of alcoholic beverages and tobacco among African workers in Nairobi in 1962 took 7 percent of income, compared to 6.7 percent for housing.

(4) Sanitation was inadequate throughout the period, although some progress was made. Nairobi did not gain an uncontaminated water supply until after World War II, and rural water supply was still an unsolved problem in 1950, although district councils were supplying funds to improve them. Disposal of waste in urban areas was by primitive methods; the only covered sewers in the colony were those for certain sections of Nairobi. Urban housing progressively worsened as population increased.

(5) Medical facilities and personnel were exceedingly scarce for the Africans; rural health services depended principally upon a relatively few small and poorly staffed dispensaries until 1951, when the first rural

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health center, a more sophisticated type of institution recommended in a 1946 10-year plan, opened its doors. However, by 1951 there were five provincial hospitals and 48 district hospitals, plus nine mission hospitals, with a total of somewhat less than one bed per thousand population. Although more people received treatment in 1951 than in 1930, the medical system was grossly inadequate, and trained medical personnel were in exceedingly short supply. Health education was weak; but in a sense this condition was stabilizing, since higher expectations of health and medical care were not aroused.

9. Military and security factors.

a. General. The establishment of law and order throughout Kenya by the beginning of World War I was recognized by Africans as well as by Europeans as a major achievement. Thereafter, the British maintained order by means of an African police force with European officers, supplemented by tribal police at the disposal of local headmen, recruited from among young warriors. Although the military unit of the colony, the King's African Rifles (KAR), was originally organized in 1888 (under another name) to maintain order along the railroad right of way, its internal role after World War I was minimal until the Mau Mau period. The establishment of law and order itself was, paradoxically, a social problem in that it deprived the African warrior class of its principal purpose without substituting other socially acceptable occupations for the young men (see 7f and 8g above).

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b. Army.

(1) The KAR in World War I had Europeans and Asians as combat troops, but 150,000 Kenyan Africans served the British forces in Africa in supporting roles, most of them in the Carrier Corps. Some 1,700 were killed and 45,000 died of disease. During the 1930's, Africans were gradually integrated into the ranks of the KAR--largely from the coastal Kamba tribe--and saw duty along the northern frontier as Eritrean deserters and refugees crossed over from the Italian campaign in Ethiopia. By 1940, the KAR had reached a strength of seven battalions and contributed 75,000 men to the East African force under Major General Dickerson. Some of these saw duty in Asia. Following World War II, three battalions of the KAR were stationed in Kenya--a very modest force for a territory of such size. It took less than 1 percent of the colony's manpower and about 4 to 5 percent of its budget. During the emergency the KAR, heavily reinforced with British troops and the European settlers' Kenya Regiment, fought loyally against the Mau Mau.

(2) Although the KAR as a military force had little influence in the colony's affairs before 1952, the military and supporting service of many Africans undoubtedly contributed to social change and unrest. Inter-tribal contacts, the sight of European overlords fighting one another, the leveling effect of communally endured hardship and danger, and witness at close hand of the power of organization, made an impact upon the unsophisticated Africans in World War I, and contributed to the growth of African political organization in the 1920's.

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(3) By World War II, the African soldiers had a smattering of education, and they were more influenced by their experiences and contacts with other peoples than their fathers of World War I. Some of the World War II veterans became leaders of dissident organizations against the colonial administration. Many veterans, given equal pay with other races during service and gratuities when mustered out, tried small businesses or other means of bettering their status; most failed, and the experience, together with the contrast of their treatment in the Army and afterward, embittered them. Many entered the Nairobi underworld and then the Mau Mau. Few of the Kikuyu or Luo entered the security forces in peacetime--a fact which may have augmented tensions. Yet in general the public attitude toward military and police forces was favorable.

(4) A reserve unit known as the Kenya Regiment was reactivated in 1937. It was composed exclusively of Europeans, most of whom had spent their whole lives supervising Africans. In 1951 it was mobilized against the Mau Mau, and was one of the most formidable military forces facing them. It had little direct influence on the rise of violence in the preconflict period, but was one more exclusive white European organization tending to polarize the white and black societies in Kenya.

c. Police.

(1) The Kenya Police were first organized (under another name) in 1904. The force, with a total of 6,039 men in 1950, consisted of a headquarters in Nairobi and contingents for each of the seven provinces, plus mobile units, an air wing for reconnaissance and intelligence, and reserve units. The provincial headquarters in turn had varying numbers

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of subordinate division units, and these were divided into stations. The outlying rural units had a considerable degree of autonomy. The tribal police, as auxiliaries of the regular police, were recruited in the areas where they were stationed. They conducted area patrols and handled routine matters of law and order, supported by the regular police in case of major disorder.

(2) The Corfield report listed four deficiencies of the regular police force: the intelligence section was Nairobi-oriented, with few people in the provinces and insufficient downward dissemination of intelligence; the police were too thinly scattered in the Kikuyu areas to be effective; headquarters officers were overburdened with administrative details; and the police did not have control over firearms until 1952. However, the African and Indian members of the force were generally reliable, loyal, and courageous; corruption was not a major problem.

d. Security threats.

(1) Except for the Italian campaign in Ethiopia and the years of World War II, there was no major external threat to Kenya during the preconflict period. Somali tribesmen raided northeastern Kenya from time to time, requiring police reinforcement and military deployments up to battalion size. Such raids increased in 1950; they bore no relation to the mounting internal violence, but added to the heavy burdens of the security forces. Internally, there was no real security threat until early in World War II, when leaders of the Kikuyu Central Association collaborated with the Italians, and homemade weapons were produced in the native reserves for use in resisting conscription or aiding an

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invasion from the north. After World War II came the threat of the Mau Mau, whose organization is discussed in 6j above.

(2) The colonial administration had ample warning of the rising Mau Mau threat. Leaders of the proscribed Kikuyu Central Association, also heading the legal KAU, openly proclaimed their aims. There was no domestic manufacture of weapons; hence the Mau Mau had to steal them, and there were growing thefts of firearms and ammunition from the Army, police, and private sources. Yet the Government did not appear to be greatly concerned, or to realize fully what was happening.

e. Command and control. Lower level cooperation among the security forces in Kenya was demonstrated on many occasions to be excellent and effective. Normally, the police had primary responsibility for internal security with the Army in reserve. Command and control arrangements, however, showed deficiencies in emergency conditions. The principal ones were the failure to make adequate political assessment, at policy level, of intelligence received; the failure to develop the intelligence arm adequately; and the merging of judicial and internal security responsibilities in the Attorney-General under the 1946 reorganization. Until arrangements were worked out during the emergency by trial and error, there was no formal coordination; the Attorney General controlled the police, the Governor had operational command of the military, and the Middle East Command in the Canal Zone had administrative command. Adequate logistical support arrangements were lacking. Thus in the early stages of the Mau Mau revolt, military units improvised means of cooperating with police, district officers, and settlers.

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CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL FACTORS

Section I. Government Administration and Political Culture

by Donald S. Macdonald

10. Background.

a. Reasons for British involvement in Kenya.

(1) The main original British interest in Kenya was as a line of communication. In the mid-19th century, Britain was primarily concerned with Uganda, as a strategic central African spot controlling the headwaters of the Nile, and as an important locus of the slave trade. The best route to Uganda ran from Mombasa, an old Arab entrepot on the east coast of Africa, through the country now called Kenya to Lake Victoria.

(2) There was also a British trading interest in Kenya, and there was the challenge of uncharted territory. Additionally, as explorers, missionaries, and traders in the area, there was an urge to assume the "white man's burden" of administration in order to lead the people to a better life.

(3) Still another interest soon emerged. The need for communication with Uganda led to construction of a railroad from Mombasa to Lake Victoria. This proved to be an exceedingly costly project, but it attracted British attention to the highlands area along the route. The highlands, despite their situation at the equator, had a temperate climate and conditions generally favorable to agriculture. The area therefore appealed

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to adventurous settlers, and white settlement appealed to the sponsors of the railroad as a means of making it pay. The Government subsequently needed money for development, which added another incentive for attracting white settlers.¹ Immigration was therefore encouraged, after some early hesitation, and the highlands became an exclusive white preserve.

b. The process of colonization.

(1) Originally the coming of the settlers was virtually unchallenged, for the highlands had been dominated by a warlike pastoral and hunting tribe, the Masai, with whom the British early established good relations and whom they managed to move into other locations. Moreover, both the Masai and the Kikuyu, a far more numerous sedentary agricultural people, had been decimated by disease at just about the time the British undertook to administer the area. The land taken for white exploitation in the early 20th century thus appeared practically uninhabited.

(2) On the strength of treaty arrangements with the Germans and with the Arab Sultan of Zanzibar (a large island off the east coast), and with what (like Stuyvesant in Manhattan) they regarded as arrangements with the native peoples, the British in 1895^{*} assumed a protectorate over Kenya, which included a 10-mile-wide coastal strip under the Sultan's suzerainty. For the latter, the British paid an annual fee to the Sultan (who was also under British protection).

*Previously, administration and the exploitation had been left to the British East Africa Company, which had gradually set up posts along the caravan route into Uganda and extended from these the area of effective British control; but trade was not profitable enough nor British public interest strong enough, to support the Company's expensive operations.²

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(3) From the outset, the "protectorate" was administered essentially as a British colony. In 1905 jurisdiction was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. In 1920, Kenya was officially annexed as a crown colony, except for the coastal strip technically belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar. Virtually no administrative distinction was made between the two constituent areas, but the official style throughout the period under review was "Colony and Protectorate of Kenya."

(4) Beginning with British assumption of a League of Nations mandate over Tanganyika, various efforts were made toward "closer union" of the three British East African areas (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika). Some progress was made with respect to common interests like customs and transport; regular conferences of the three colonial Governors began in 1926; and in 1947, largely to spur badly needed economic development, an East African High Commission composed of the three Governors was established, with a Legislative Assembly having powers in certain economic areas and its own executive arm.³ There was no progress whatever toward political union, because of the conflicting aspirations and fears of the Europeans, Indians, and Africans. For purposes of political analysis, the legal relation of Kenya to the metropole was virtually unchanged from 1920 to 1951.

(5) Except for the threat of the Germans in Tanganyika in World War I, and the Italians in Ethiopia in World War II, the British faced no major opposition to their control of Kenya, internal or external, until the Mau Mau uprising. When they first occupied the country, they found a large number of tribes, largely separate, fighting among themselves,

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most of them without any form of political organization as the West commonly understands the term. With their primitive armament they were no match for the British, who were able to assert themselves with relatively little bloodshed, and to maintain control with relative ease.

(6) It is clear that when the British arrived, the peoples of Kenya had no semblance of political unity beyond units of a few thousand people at most. Although cultural affinities were somewhat more inclusive, the area was still divided among four major ethnic groups. There were dozens of languages and dialects, with Swahili as a lingua franca where trading contracts existed.

(7) This situation changed somewhat in the latter years of British administration: British-maintained peace and order eliminated some intertribal barriers; education both in Africa and abroad brought young men of various tribes together; improved communications and transport produced more intermingling; and some deliberate efforts were made at "interpenetration." The four African nominated members of the colony's Legislative Council by 1951 were endeavoring to speak for African interests as a whole. However, African consciousness and loyalty generally was still basically tribal. At the same time, the British conquest brought in two new "tribes": the British themselves, divided among settlers, missionaries, and administrators; and the Indians, who controlled much of the colony's retail trade and filled many of the administrative and clerical posts. Many of the colony's most serious political problems involved the triangle of relations among the European, "Asian" (i.e., Indian), and African groups, with the Arabs a less important but nonetheless vocal element.

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11. Government organization and performance. The basic principles of Kenya's Government were laid down by Royal Orders in Council of the United Kingdom, enacted at various times over the period but relatively little changed after 1906. These orders were not enacted by the British Parliament, but Parliament was an important factor in Kenya government. Other important governmental elements were, in London, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and his staff, reporting to and sometimes overruled by the Prime Minister; and in Nairobi, the Governor, and Executive Council, the Legislative Council, the colonial administration, and the courts. This section will discuss the executive chain of administration; the Legislative Council and the role of Parliament are discussed in section II.

a. Governor.

(1) The position of Governor was legally a very strong one. He headed the colonial administration in name, and, insofar as he pleased, in fact. (Until 1946 he conducted the administration through a Chief Secretary.) He presided over both Executive and Legislative Councils, convened and prorogued them, and had both original and deciding votes in them. He could veto any enactment of the Legislative Council, appointed the nominated members, and could suspend certain of them. He had sweeping powers over the internal administration of the country, and could appoint and suspend subordinate officers. He convened the Supreme Court of the Colony, could pardon offenders, and had to approve death sentences before they were carried out. He himself was exempted from court jurisdiction. He was required to consult with the Executive Council in his

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official actions, but not necessarily to take the Council's advice (although minutes of Council meetings were submitted to London annually, an appeal of the Governor's decisions to London was possible).⁴

(2) There were, however, important restraints on the Governor's actual exercise of his powers. He was an officer of the Crown, and subject to the direction of His Majesty's Government through the Colonial Secretary. He was at the head of a largely professional administrative service, with its own conceptions and procedures, and which had its eyes on the next Governor as well as the present one. He was confronted with the British settler community, many of whom were aristocrats, some of whom could sit in the House of Lords in London, all of whom expected the Governor to look out for their interests. Moreover, he had burdensome social and protocol responsibilities, which competed with his executive responsibilities. Sir Philip Mitchell speaks of the "heavy and continuous round of social functions, meetings, conferences and Government House entertaining, for Nairobi had become a centre of air travel from many countries and distinguished visitors continuously arrived."⁵ In addition, toward the end of the period, numerous interest groups were clamoring to be heard, both in Government House and in London.

b. Executive Council.

(1) In British colonial practice, the Executive Council filled in some measure the place occupied by the Cabinet in the United Kingdom; but in most colonies, the Council was only consultative or advisory, and it was not responsible to the legislature. In Kenya, the Executive Council until 1945 was made up principally of senior officers of the

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Administration, organizationally subordinate to the Governor; for these men, the Council seat was another official burden, but it did guarantee them direct access to the Governor. From a fairly early period, the council also included unofficial members appointed by the Governor. Eventually, these members included representatives of the major racial communities: the British settlers, the Indians, the Arabs, and the Africans. It was not until 1944, however, that the Africans were represented by an African, and through 1951 the African representatives were appointed, not elected. The official members outnumbered the unofficials.

(2) In 1946, however, a major reorganization gave the Council members jurisdiction over the principal departments of the Colonial Government, so that the Chief Secretary no longer intervened between the Governor and his senior executives. The major racial groups continued to be represented on the Council. Their representatives, however, had no real power or responsibility. Corfield criticizes this arrangement on two counts: first, such a major organizational change caused a great deal of confusion, while all the members of the administration were sorting out their new interrelationships; second, some of the allocations of responsibility were unfortunate--he cites specifically the combination under a single Member for Law and Order of the functions normally handled by Ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice. In addition, he notes that the presence of nonresponsible representatives of racial groups inhibited the free discussion of major incidents such as preceded the Emergency of 1952.⁶

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(3) To these difficulties, Sir Philip Mitchell adds another: that the lack of responsibility of the nominated unofficial members meant that they could and did indulge in free criticism of the administration without any requirements to do anything about it. In this respect, the Council acted more like a deliberative or legislative body than like the Governor's cabinet.⁷ Mitchell had earlier apparently contemplated a form of organization under which the Council would become an upper legislative house, in the sense that it would pass on all legislation enacted by the Legislative Council, but nothing of this sort apparently was ever done.⁸ Such an arrangement might have been a way around some of the objections to permitting elected African representation in the Legislative Council.

c. Colonial administration: the Central Government.

(1) During the 1920-51 period, there were three successive organizational systems. Prior to 1929, the central Government of Kenya, under the Governor, consisted of a Colonial or Chief Secretary who was the senior administrative officer, a Chief Native Affairs Commissioner who headed the local administration in the African areas, and several department heads having to do with agriculture, police, public health, transport, and the like. In 1929, the lines of authority were changed so that the officers responsible for native areas of the field reported directly to the Colonial Secretary, who then referred the reports to the various department heads for action. The Chief Native Affairs Commissioner lost most of his executive responsibilities, becoming a senior adviser to the Governor and Chief Secretary. In 1946, the departments were put in charge of members of the Executive Council, who reported

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directly to the Governor. The Chief Secretary became Member for the Development and Reconstruction Agency.

(2) A major problem of the administration during much of this period was that the European settler community was able to exercise disproportionate control over governmental policies particularly through its grip on the budget. This was accomplished by means of a committee in the Legislative Council, with an unofficial European majority, which reviewed the colonial Government budget and on several occasions was able to effect major economies. During the earlier part of this period, the settlers were by no means the chief source of the colonial revenues, and in terms of numbers, they were a tiny minority. Their political power was based on their ties of nationality with the administration, on the political and social influence they wielded at home in the United Kingdom, and on the recognition that they were the mainspring of economic activity and development.

d. Colonial administration: local government.

(1) When the British first arrived in Kenya, they sought to exercise control in local areas through locally recognized chiefs. The country they controlled was divided into districts, each in charge of a British administrative officer, who sought out men among the various tribes and localities to assist him in maintaining law and order, adjudicating disputes, collecting taxes, and obtaining labor for Government projects or for European farmers.

(2) It was soon discovered, however, that in Kenya very few of the tribes had concentrated political authority in one man; Mumia of the

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Wanga, and the chiefs of the two Masai tribes, were the major exceptions. Other tribes had councils of elders, largely concerned with adjudication of disputes. Although prominent personalities were recognized, and had some specialized social functions having to do with religion, land, and the conduct of war, they had no generalized political function.

(3) Faced with the choice of recruiting native personnel or importing a legion of foreign functionaries, the British chose to establish a headman, later called a chief, in each African locality. They generally tried to designate persons of some note by reason of personal abilities, family, or position in the tribe. Some headmen, however, were chosen on the basis of service rendered to the district officers concerned. The powers of the headmen were gradually increased, while after 1920 they largely ceased to perform judicial functions. Although the native local councils, established in 1925, had limited powers of local taxation, the salaries of the headmen continued to be paid by the central Government. The headmen had small staffs to assist them, as well as so-called tribal police recruited from the young men--who in most tribes had warrior status.

(4) Kenya as a whole was divided by 1946 into 10 provinces and the special district of Nairobi (which received its charter as a city from the Duke of Gloucester with much pomp in 1950). Each Province had a Senior Provincial Commissioner, who reported to the Colonial Secretary, and an administrative staff. The Provinces were divided into varying numbers of districts, along both geographical and ethnic lines; as a rule, the Europeans had their own districts. District Commissioners and

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their staffs, reporting to the Provincial Commissioners, had charge of the districts. These, in turn, were divided into locations and (in European areas) also into townships with varying degrees of self-government.

(5) By 1951, most districts, European and native, had District Councils with limited legislative and taxing powers--all elected, in the case of European districts, and with varying proportions (mostly over 50 percent) of elective seats, in the case of African districts. Provision was made after World War II to organize advisory elective councils at the location level--partly to improve the local headmen's communication with their communities, but also to provide electors for the District Councils, which were beginning to show signs of domination by nationalist African associations (section II).

(6) From the emphasis on the development of the team concept among officials at district level, it would appear that before World War II the various central Government departments were independently represented at district level, and that cooperation among the representatives left something to be desired.

(7) Except for clerical personnel, the record indicates that no African was an administrative official above the level of location headman*, noncommissioned officer of police, or agricultural inspector, until 1944, when the first African Assistant District Commissioners were

*The British at one time tried installing an African-staffed level of command between location and district, but abandoned it. The title of "senior chief" became purely honorific--an aging headman's good-conduct medal.

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appointed. Published government reports cannot for obvious reasons be relied upon to indicate the Africans' effectiveness, but the indications are that they performed for the most part with entire satisfaction. However, the number of such officers seems to have been very small up to 1951. Some of the clerks apparently had access to important Government papers, however; at least one Mau Mau escape, according to Corfield, elicited the comment that anything that went on in the Government was known in the African community.

(8) Lord Hailey describes the division of duties between Government (including the District Officers) and the Local Native Councils (subsequently renamed African District Councils) in 1949, which formed the basis of the estimates of revenue and expenditure in that year:

The Government has made itself responsible for all Medical and Health Services except the provision and maintenance of dispensaries, and for the general direction of all Agricultural and Soil Conservation Services other than those which might be provided from special war-time Betterment Funds. The construction and maintenance of markets will remain with the Local Native Councils. The Government will be responsible for all expenditure on Veterinary Services, save for the provision of dips or measures for improving the quality of hides. A reclassification of roads is in preparation, in order to define the limits of Government and Council responsibility The Government assumes responsibility for all expenditure on Education other than that embraced in a new definition of Primary Education, which is to be purely a Local Native Council responsibility

(9) The Local Native Councils and the Chiefs of the Locations both occupied politically difficult positions, because they were the interface between the African population and the British administration. In the case of the Councils, their presiding officers were the British District Officers although the practice was often followed of leaving

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most of the meetings to the presidency of the African vice-chairmen. The Councils depended upon the District Officers and the location chiefs to implement their decisions. In Central Province, "the only important matter retained by the Councils under their own management is, as a rule, that of Roads and Buildings."

(10) The location chiefs had a difficult row to hoe for several reasons. In the first place, they had no traditional precedent or authority for the executive functions they were supposed to carry out; most of these were performed for their master, the British Government, and a number of them were inherently unpopular--notably the collection of taxes, facilitation of labor recruitment, and levying of labor for Government works. On the other hand,

to the African mind, the most significant evidence of the possession of chiefly authority is the discharge of judicial functions, whereas the accepted policy of excluding the Headmen from the Native Tribunals is directed primarily to emphasize his position as a subordinate officer of the administration . . .¹⁰

(11) In "the more advanced districts" of Central Province, which is of primary concern for this study because it included most European settlers and most Likuyu, the chiefs were facing three difficulties in 1950: they were expected to carry out the decisions of the Native Local Councils as agents of the District Officer, yet the Councils were becoming critical of the administration; the Tribal Police, a principal support of the chiefs' authority, were losing prestige because the central police force was then beginning to post men in the native areas; and the political agitation was often focused on the position of the chiefs. Nevertheless,

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there is evidence that in some Districts the Chiefs possess a very considerable measure of authority, . . . and they have been particularly effective in areas where they can rely on the support of village officials who themselves are part of the indigenous native organizations.¹¹

e. Legislature. The first Legislation Council, established in response to white settler pressures, met in 1907. In line with English practice of gradual development of self-government in the colonies, it was made up of six "official" members who represented the Government of Kenya and two "unofficial" members who represented the people, all nominated by the Governor for virtually automatic appointment by the Government in London. "It was over the number, distribution and manner of selection of the unofficial members that many of the preindependence political battles were fought."¹²

(1) At first only representatives of the European settlers occupied the unofficial seats but in 1909 a prominent Indian, A. M. Jeevanjee, was appointed. In 1920, the same year in which the East African Protectorate was made into a colony, the first elections for the Legislative Council were held. Only Europeans voted and the settlers were represented in eight of the 11 constituencies. The Indians, who outnumbered the Europeans three to one, demanded greater representation and elections based on a "common roll."

(2) A Colonial Office proposal for a qualified "common roll" brought terrific repercussions from the settlers. The Government yielded to their pressure. A new law in 1923 expanded the membership of the Council and provided for elections on the basis of a "communal roll," each group to be represented and elected separately. Europeans were assigned

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11 seats; Indians, 5; Arabs, 1. Africans were to have one appointed representative. Until 1944, the African seat was held by a white missionary. In view of their denial of both a common roll and equal representation with the Europeans the Indians boycotted elections and refused to pay their taxes from 1924 until 1931.¹³ In the latter years they accepted the principle of communal representation.

(3) In the 1930's and 1940's the Africans replaced the Indians as the chief political competitor of the Europeans. This was reflected in changes in the composition of the Legislative Council. By 1950 the Legislative Council consisted of 11 elected European members, five elected Indian members, one elected Arab member, one Arab nominated to represent Arab interests, four nominated unofficial members (all Africans) to represent the interests of the African community, seven ex-officio official members, and nominated official members not exceeding nine in number with the Governor as President and a Speaker who was also Vice President.

(4) The Legislative Council was by no means an autonomous body with independent legislative authority, but within the limits prescribed by the Government it did exercise considerable influence and even power. A bill had to be introduced by a member of the policy-making Executive Council and approved by the Governor in Council before it was presented to the Legislative Council for debate. If passed by the Legislative Council, the bill then became law on the Governor's signature. If the Governor disapproved of the legislation, on its introduction, he could veto its presentation. In this case, however, he had to report his action to the Colonial Secretary. If, after a bill had been passed by the Legislative

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Council, the Governor declined to sign it, he again had to report to the Secretary of State for Colonies. Such instances were rare.

f. Colonial administration: court and legal system.

(1) As with local administration, the court system had both British and native components, but the latter component had a larger share of the action in the African sphere. The highest court was the Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and four justices. Subordinate courts at important centers were conducted by resident British magistrates. Elsewhere they were conducted "in every District and at every administrative station in the Colony by officers of the Administrative branch of the Government upon whom judicial powers have been conferred."¹⁴ (This must have been confusing to intelligent headmen, who had suffered the loss of their judicial authority.) They had both civil and criminal jurisdiction, and could impose corporal punishment up to 24 strokes. There were Muslim subordinate courts in the Protectorate area along the coast. Native courts, established by warrant of the several provincial commissioners, had limited criminal and generally unlimited civil jurisdiction. "Native courts normally consist of a panel of elders sitting under the chairmanship of a President, and in the more advanced districts Native Appeal Courts are established at the administrative centres."¹⁵

(2) Originally the intention was to recognize the judicial or arbitral customs of the various tribes as they stood, since these were generally well developed. After early misconceptions about chiefs and headmen were resolved, the councils of elders were left with their

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traditional responsibilities. However, an ordinance of 1930 gave the Provincial Commissioner authority to prescribe the constitution of any tribunal.

The constitution of the Tribunals has tended increasingly to become that of a "permanent" President and Vice-President, with a bench taken by rotation or by roster from a panel appointed after consultation with local opinion While in some /districts/ the choice falls by preference on Elders who traditionally have a recognized position . . . , in others the tendency has been /to choose/ . . . persons who by education, trade, or experience in Government or similar employment, have acquired a position of prestige in local society The progressive reduction in the number of Tribunals or their groupings to establish the "Divisional Tribunals" has further diminished the possibility of securing indigenous judicial authorities for membership of the benches.¹⁶

(3) In Central Province, the tribunals had all been consolidated by 1950 into divisional tribunals, with more or less permanent personnel.

In Kiamu District (a Kikuyu area),

the members of the tribunals are selected by the District Commissioner at Locational or Divisional Meetings; as usual, they include no Chiefs or Government employees, and comprise a number of traders and farmers as well as some Elders. Nearly all are literate.¹⁷

In the less sophisticated areas /of Central Province/, the native community has obviously had difficulty in accepting any departure from the traditional system In the more advanced Districts, the adjustments made in the system appear to have carried satisfaction in the community generally, and there seems to be little justification for the attack made on the Tribunals by some of the Kikuyu Associations, a part of their political campaign against the Government.¹⁸

Hailey also notes, however, that the new system "is likely to be more successful if the Tribunals make a regular practice of consulting /the/ traditional authorities . . . regarding land rights or matrimonial issues."¹⁹

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(4) Major criminal cases, whether natives or Europeans were involved, came before the British-run subordinate courts, and could be appealed to the Supreme Court. Appeals from native tribunals could be taken to the District and Provincial Officers and to the Supreme Court. The Kikuyu were inclined to litigiousness, and made full use of these procedures. The British justices were zealous in their careful construction of the law, and this fact has been cited by Corfield as one of the difficulties in dealing effectively with Mau Mau crimes. The legal system is described in the Kenya Annual Report for 1946 as follows:

The Law of the Colony consists of Imperial Orders-in-Council relating to the Colony, certain English and Indian Acts applied either wholly or in part, Ordinances of the local legislature and Rules made thereunder.

Civil and criminal jurisdiction is exercised in conformity with such enactments and in conformity with the common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application in force in England on the 12th August, 1897, so far only as the circumstances of the Colony and its inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as local circumstances render necessary. Procedure is regulated by Rules made by the Supreme Court with the approval of the Governor. In all civil and criminal cases to which natives are parties, every court is guided by native law as far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent with the laws above-listed In addition, Mohammedan law is applied in Muslim subordinate courts in matters relating to personal status, marriage, inheritance and divorce where Arabs and Mohammedan Natives are concerned.

(5) One qualified observer commented that the entire East African legal system was a dual one, in which customary law--left largely undisturbed by the British--governed "the personal everyday relations of probably 90 percent of the population of East Africa." But customary law, administered by the native courts, was "considered unimportant and given an inferior status as compared with the received English law."

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Appeals from native courts "lay to administrative officers" and in general did not reach the High Court. In this observer's view, despite the statement of the 1946 Report that "every court is guided by native law," the guidance provision was largely ignored in practice in the English courts which had little concern or interest in African affairs. It was not until 1950 that any serious official effort was made to record and if necessary modify customary law, and the Law Panels then constituted "worked very haphazardly and because they had no guidance in recording customary law, produced very little of value to a lawyer." Nevertheless, customary law was influenced indirectly by the colonial administration, particularly by the modification of the institutions for dispute-settling above described and by the ultimate "general overlordship of the local courts by European administrators." There was some direct modification: Africans were given the alternative of Western-style marriage, and a system of land consolidation and registration largely replaced customary land law in the affected areas.²⁰

g. Control by the Colonial Secretary in London.

(1) The colonial Governor's authority was extensive, but "in all cases he was responsible to the Home Government"²¹--in the first instance, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In one observer's view, however, the instructions given to Governors by the Home Government were rather vague and general; reliance was placed upon reacting to the Governors' despatches as they came in. Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor from 1944 to 1952, describes his experience:

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The Governor makes proposals--takes off in his experimental aircraft--one other, or several, groups reject them--shoot him down; there is much excitement for a while and then the proposals, usually with some sensible modifications, are accepted with or without a visit from a Minister.²²

(2) In the case of proposals for fuller racial representation on the Legislative Council in 1950, Mitchell notes:

There was, at this time, the usual change of holder of the office of Secretary of State, so it would be desirable to deal with these questions by personal discussions in London, where any points of difficulty could be explained more conveniently and quickly than by despatch.²³

(3) It seems probable, in view of the rapid turnover of Colonial Secretaries--20 men and 23 incumbencies from 1912 to 1952, and five from 1945 to 1952--that there would have been heavy dependence upon the permanent Colonial Office staff. Mitchell believed that "old-fashioned Colonial Office government is out of date and unworkable in the conditions of today . . ."²⁴ During one period, it appears that a middle-level Colonial Office official was in effect controlling policy for Kenya through the recommendations he made to the Colonial Secretary and the replies he wrote to the Governor's despatches in the Secretary's name.

(4) Since the Colonial Office had ultimate responsibility for the affairs of Kenya Colony, it had to answer for them to Parliament. Here it was subject to criticism both from the liberals, often of the Labor Party, who favored greater consideration of the Africans, and from the conservatives, often of the Conservative Party, who supported His Majesty's Empire and his white Christian subjects abroad. The consequence was to breed a certain caution and gunshyness into the Colonial Office, and presumably into the Colonial Service. This was hardly a

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climate to encourage innovation and experiment in colonial administration.

(5) In a sense, the entire colonial administrative system, from location headman to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was thus responsible only to the King-in-Council (i.e., to the British Prime Minister and his Cabinet) except insofar as Parliament raised embarrassing questions and questioned the spending of money. It was responsible to the Africans hardly at all, although it stressed its responsibility for them. Even with the best-intentioned and most capable of men, this arrangement was not calculated to afford maximum response to the Africans' desires, whether or not these desires were reasonable and proper.

h. Police and security.

(1) Military and security matters are dealt with in chapter 5. Suffice it to say here that the two principal agencies of law and order in Kenya were the Kenya Police, largely African but with British senior officers, controlled by the Member for Law and Order of the Central Government of the colony; and the Tribal Police, recruited from among the young men in the various locations to support the headmen, and controlled by them under the general supervision of the District Officers.

(2) Prior to World War II, there was for a time a militia composed of white settlers. Theoretically an Army reserve, it threatened to become an arm of the more militant supporters of immediate (white-controlled) colonial autonomy, and was disbanded. It was reactivated in 1937.

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(3) The Kenya Annual Report for 1946 notes that 2,307 major offenses, 5,795 minor offenses, and 33,629 offenses under Local and Special laws, were brought to court in that year. This was an increase of over 100 percent in major and minor cases (the offenses under local laws remaining about constant), continuing a steady increase since 1939. Convictions averaged 88 percent. The report attributed this increase in crime to

difficulties due to the war and the inevitable unrest of post-war years, accompanied by the shortage of supplies of consumer goods, the high cost of living, and the demobilization of tens of thousands of Africans, with the consequent reduction of their purchasing power. The task of maintaining law and order has been rendered more difficult by the shortage of European staff. ²⁵

12. Political attitudes, policies and problems.

a. British colonial problems. Throughout the 20th century, there were four main problems that dominated British policy in Kenya: the British trusteeship for the welfare and development of the African natives; white settler demands for support and preferential treatment; the problem of the Indians, most of whom had originally been imported by the British to build the Uganda Railway; and the question of the economic development of the colony. As these problems interacted or came to the forefront, the attention of the Home and Colonial Governments was turned to them, and a long series of commissions and investigations, by experts, Government officials, and members of Parliament struggled with their implications. Strategic and military considerations also affected policy at times, but they are not of immediate concern here.

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b. Trusteeship.

(1) So far as the British Home and Colonial administrations were concerned, there was no wavering in their intention to fulfill the trusteeship for the Africans that they had assumed, first by treaty and conquest, then by annexation. This trusteeship included at least three elements: protection of the native against loss of his birthright; elimination of the internecine warfare and "barbaric practices" which, in the British view, had made his life miserable before the Empire brought light into darkness; and the gradual development of native society into the full glory of Western civilization.

(2) The missionaries, some of whom had arrived even before the British East India Company, in general vigorously supported the cause of justice for the Africans. Missionaries represented African interests in the Legislative Council for some years. However, they were divided among themselves along sectarian lines, and their conception of the goals for African progress were often at variance with what the Africans wanted for themselves.

c. White settlers.

(1) The settlers--meaning primarily the farmers of the white highlands--in general were frank to state their belief in the virtue and inevitability of white supremacy. They wanted to be able to control their own affairs, following the example of other British colonies, and to this end demanded an ever larger role in the Legislative and Executive Councils and in determining the colony's policies. They objected to any form of taxation, pointing to their contribution to the colony's economic

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growth. They expected the Government to protect and foster their interests. Living in isolated and exposed locations, largely dependent on African labor, they were in fear of being swamped by the Africans and even of being massacred by them, and criticized the Colonial Office--particularly during Labor governments--for its pampering of them.

(2) The settlers saw in the Africans a resource to be exploited, in the form of cheap labor, and sought to maximize it. In general, they were not cruel or inhumane, despite the famous incident of 1907 in which a prominent member of the colony publicly flogged two African rickshaw drivers for allegedly insulting white women (and was himself punished for the act). However, the dominant elements in the white settler community were British from South Africa, with South African ideas on how to handle natives; aristocrats or aristocratic younger sons, who saw the master-servant or overseer-worker relationship as a natural extension of old class lines in England; and retired officers and public servants, who saw things somewhat the same way. The tone of early settler utterances, as reflected in legislative council proceedings and the columns of the "East African Standard," illustrate this white-domination point of view.

(3) The white highlands, even up to and after World War II, was an anachronistic survival of 19th-century views of the white man's burden, social Darwinism, unilinear cultural evolution, and laissez faire economics. These views, moreover, dovetailed nicely with economic advantage, since they were consistent with settler desires to take as much as possible of the high, temperate farmlands which the Kikuyu also claimed (a small amount of the alienated land eventually turned out to be rightful

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Kikuyu property--see chapter 3), and to keep wages low and labor plentiful.

d. Indians. The third problem, that of the Indians, is only peripherally relevant to present concerns. In the early twenties, as a result of wartime promises of greater self-government for India, the thousands of Indians in Kenya demanded to be enfranchised, to have free immigration for their fellows, and to have the right to hold property in the exclusively white highlands (the latter for financial rather than residential reasons). They also protested the segregation then common for "sanitary" reasons in the urban areas. The settlers stoutly resisted these claims, and hit upon the doctrine of British responsibility for protection of the natives as a reason for keeping the scheming, profiteering "Asiatics" out. The end result was a communal roll and five Council seats for the Indians, a White Paper which announced the British doctrine that native interests were "paramount" over all others, and an exhibition to the few literate Africans of what vigorous protest could do. Subsequently, the Indians continued to agitate for equal status with the Europeans, but do not seem to have involved themselves deeply in African politics. Nevertheless, Indian members of the Executive and Legislative Councils sometimes defended African interests.

e. Native paramountcy and dual mandate. The question of economic development, which is discussed in more detail in chapter 3, became involved with the native and settler questions because both groups were essential to it. Partly as a result of continued settler pressures, the doctrine of "paramountcy" was somewhat softened and redefined, and a new

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"dual mandate" emerged, meaning that both white and native areas should be developed. Some of the conflicts of the thirties--aggravated by the depression--concerned the extent to which scarce money should be spent for betterment of native areas, and to what extent natives should be encouraged to work on their own lands or on Government development projects rather than on the settler farms. To some extent, the settlers managed to bias the conflict to favor their side, although the administration stuck by its self-perceived mission of protecting the nurturing native development.

f. British official attitudes.

(1) In carrying out its basically enlightening and well-intentioned policies for furthering African progress, the colonial administration was considerably handicapped by both subjective and objective factors. On the subjective side, it had to struggle, not only with settler criticism, but with its own concept of its mission. It would appear that most British administrators at least before World War II would have agreed with the statement that, the British having taken 900 years to evolve their democratic and modern society, it would take the Africans at least that long. Thus there was no great hurry.

(2) Moreover, there seems to have been considerable prejudice against the transitional Africans, mostly in the cities, who were no longer held in the firm grip of their traditional culture, but who were not fully a part of the British-style society of the ruling classes, either. British regarded them as uncouth and deceptive, aping Western society without understanding it, and generally far inferior to their dignified

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relatives on the reserves. Yet these were the people who represented-- faster than the British were prepared to see it--the very transition from traditional to modern which the British claimed to be promoting.

(3) Indications also are that the British judged African men and groups in terms of their absolute loyalty to the British Crown and to the British-maintained status quo in Kenya. Thus any African acceptable to the British was likely to be unacceptable to his own people, in the event of sharp differences of opinion--as on the land issue--and vice versa. In consequence, political communication may have been significantly retarded.

(4) Moreover, the British vision of the good society in Kenya made little compromise with British social and cultural values, expecting the Africans to take them over in toto because that was what was right. An extreme example in the religious field was the attempt by the Church of Scotland to stamp out polygamy and female circumcision, because they affronted British ideas traditionally associated with Christianity, without realizing the intimate involvement of these customs with the cultural fabric of Kikuyu. On the other hand, the rewards open to the native who completely espoused British politics, society, and culture were basically few. Only a handful of really responsible jobs were open to Africans through the entire period reviewed, although numbers of Africans obtained higher education, and with it an enlarged view of their rightful share of society's benefits.

g. Kikuyu attitudes.

(1) When the British first came to Kenya, it would appear that the peoples of the land regarded them as another conquering tribe, doing

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what tribes had done since time immemorial. They submitted to superior force and accepted the consequences. Unlike the British, who from the beginning thought of Kenya as a political entity of national scope, even with some of its members in inferior status, the Africans had no such concept at all, and no way of including the British in a territorial unit to which they owed allegiance. The benefits of British rule apparently outweighed these considerations for a great many people. Yet the political institutions which went with a nation--labor, taxes, headmen, and the rest--were at considerable variance with their own culture, and the tensions sorely tested their newly emerging allegiance to a foreign king and his empire.

(2) Probably one of the biggest reasons for Kikuyu (and other African) acceptance of British rule and British ways of doing things was the impression of British omniscience and omnipotence which derived from their weapons and their modern life and implements. But British omniscience was somewhat strained by the observed differences between Government and settlers, between missionaries and Government, and among the missionaries themselves. British omnipotence was undermined by both World Wars, in which white tribes fought each other, and by the Italian adventure in Ethiopia. The grants of self-government to Ghana and other British territories were also noted.

(3) The keen desire of the Kikuyu for education seems not to have been so much for the sake of knowledge as to find out what gave the British their power. Numbers of Kikuyu joined up with Christian missions,

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not so much because of the Christian message, but because the missions could provide education.

13. Political culture.

a. British political culture.

(1) The principal features of British political culture--such as belief in representative government, deference to the Crown and to appointed authority, respect for law and impartial justice, readiness to resolve disputes through compromise, and pragmatism rather than doctrine as a basis for solving problems--are generally understood. They seem to have guided British political behavior in Kenya, with three major modifications. First, the British did not consider that all the constraints and principles of their own political culture applied to their relations with the Africans in the present, even though they might in future (cf. Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law"). Second, they were profoundly convinced of their cultural and national superiority. They viewed the Africans as culturally deprived or depraved--as children whom it was their duty to bring up to Western standards.²⁶ Their feeling could be (and was) interpreted as one of trusteeship. It had a considerable element of race-consciousness. Third, the settlers had a lusty pioneer viewpoint, admirable in its spirit of courage and adventure but difficult in its impact on Africa: the land was theirs by right of hard work at considerable personal risk and sacrifice, and their rights should be protected against ignorant, lazy savages who had never made the land pay nor even occupied much of it. Related to this view was the feeling--on the part of settlers and officials alike--that they had a duty to exploit the country's

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potential and develop it economically. This feeling served to justify the exploitation of African labor. In the words of an official report of 1924, "The Europeans in East Africa have the position, and therefore the dangers and responsibilities, of any aristocracy."²⁷

(2) Despite these qualifications, the administration of formal British justice, insofar as it applied to the African population, was strictly constrained according to British principles. It was often difficult for the security forces to get convictions of offenders apprehended in the early phases of Mau Mau activity. Lord Hailey cites cases in which serious charges were thrown out by British magistrates--on grounds that the charges were improperly phrased. Thus, paradoxically, the one area in which British political culture was most completely extended to cover the Africans was that in which immediate British interests were more obviously ill-served. The British feelings of exclusiveness and superiority moderated somewhat over the period studied, but seem to have been much present right up to 1951.

b. Kikuyu political culture.

(1) The various ethnic groups in Kenya had their own separate cultures and traditions, all of them greatly different from the British, but differing also among themselves. Since the Kikuyu were the principal actors in the conflict under study, attention will be confined to this group. (A discussion of Kikuyu culture is given in chapter 4.)

(2) Like many other peoples in Africa and elsewhere, the Kikuyu had no separate, identifiable political system or institutions. They had a social system and culture which functioned very well to meet their needs

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until they encountered British civilization. The system and culture included elements responding to the modest political needs of the people, but these elements functioned intermittently and more or less independently. Most basic needs were met by the extended family groups, under the guidance of the senior active family member. Conduct was regulated primarily by group pressure to conform to traditional patterns, and these had long since developed to meet virtually every exigency. The principal political problems above family level involved disputes between families, offenses against the community, disputes between communities, and group defense against other tribes--chiefly the Masai. These matters were handled by councils of elders and of warriors.

(3) A unique feature of Kikuyu culture was the arrangement for peaceful rotation of the dominant roles. Every 30-40 years, according to tradition, the elders honorably retired from their positions, and younger men took their places. The process involved several years of training, negotiation, ceremonial, and payment of entrance fees. Such a cycle began in 1925, but was suppressed by the British, who apparently did not understand its significance and saw in it a threat to their control.

(4) Much of Kikuyu life was traditionally dominated by the constant threat of the Masai, who controlled the adjoining territory and defended it against any attempt by others to utilize it. Although the Kikuyu attitude toward land tended to force constant expansion (see chapters 3 and 4), they seem to have avoided pitched battle with the Masai, preferring to protect themselves behind a forest screen. They had a reputation for stealth and guile, rather than bravery. Their entry

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into the area of another tribe, according to Kenyatta, was arranged by negotiation rather than conquest.²⁸ The coming of the British materially changed the Kikuyu environment by stopping intertribal warfare and establishing general peace and order. In consequence, the young men were deprived of their principal function (since women carried on most of the economic activity). British organization of tribal police, utilizing some of the warriors, was perhaps partially inspired by the need to give them a substitute responsibility. Some few were also utilized as staff for the British-appointed headmen. The bulk of them however, were encouraged to leave their tribal areas and work for the white community--largely because the British needed the labor and were unable (or unwilling) to perform hard work under tropical conditions themselves; but also because the British, as a matter of principle, believed that contact with white civilization would hasten the natives' progress toward becoming civilized themselves.

(5) As a result of British rule, new political institutions were imposed upon the Kikuyu--notably the headmen, the native local councils, the tribal police, and the native courts described above--and new political obligations came with them: the poll tax, the hut tax, obligatory labor on Government projects, stronger sanctions against violence to persons, and strong encouragement, bordering on coercion at times, to provide labor for the white settlers. Public works, improved health and sanitation, and elimination of intertribal violence all evidenced the benefits of the new order. But there is considerable question whether the Kikuyu equated the benefits to their costs. Some observers believed that in the

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thirties, development work in the African areas lagged far behind desirable levels; yet by this time some Kikuyu were well aware of the vastly higher standards of living enjoyed by the white community, and either aspired to these standards for themselves or resented the inequities, or both.

(6) There is even more question as to whether Kikuyu political culture was changing in such a way as to accommodate or legitimize the new institutions. Jomo Kenyatta's book, Facing Mount Kenya, which was written in the mid-thirties, suggest that one Kikuyu reaction to change was a form of atavism: the emergence of a myth of the perfection of traditional Kikuyu society, and the fastening of blame upon the British for having destroyed its fundamental values and usages.

(7) Kenyatta suggested that Kikuyu traditional political forms were superior to those of the British. In terms of the relatively modest political requirements of precolonial Kikuyu society, this may well have been true; but in the face of virtually irresistible pressures to achieve the benefits of modern civilization, the idea of a return to the institutions of the past could be no more than an inspiration for rebellion. It could not be a realistic goal. On the other hand, a myth of an ideal past could have provided inspiration and confidence amid changing circumstances. No evidence was found as to whether it did so on any scale during the period under review; it seems doubtful, in particular, that the British authorities encouraged any such concept.

(8) Nevertheless, there are some indications that the Kikuyu were accommodating to the new institutions. For one thing, the native

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councils were surprisingly willing in the mid-1930's to impose taxes on the local population for financing improvements. A major restraint on their enthusiasm was British unwillingness to allow excessive native financing of projects for fear of losing control of them, coupled with the insufficiency of central Government funds to contribute a share sufficient to justify control. Another indication was the strong desire of the Kikuyu for more and better education--not for its own sake, but as the avenue for advancement. School construction was one of the chief foci of native council attention, as well as of British concern to maintain control.

(9) Neither the Kikuyu, nor any other African tribe in the area, thought of Kenya as either a geographic or political entity prior to the British entry, since no such entity existed. Each tribe had a general territory in which it was active; in the case of the Kikuyu, large portions of the territory were fairly intensively cultivated, although the cultivated portions shifted as the soil was exhausted. The Masai cultivated very little, and dominated more territory than they used for grazing. No evidence was noted in this study as to the intensity of tribal attachments to the territories they occupied, although the Kikuyu strongly identified themselves with their ancestral lands and attached religious significance to certain terrain features--especially Mount Kenya. In any event, it is doubtful whether any of the tribes had a political attitude or belief comparable with European nationalism, although all of them certainly had a sense of ethnic identity; and it is virtually certain that there were no intertribal political relationships of a nationalistic sort.

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(10) Whatever Kenyan nationalism existed by 1951 would have been the result either of British indoctrination and example (since by then a full state machinery existed) or of the examples of other states (like Ghana) that had achieved self-governing status, or of the unifying effect of revulsion against white domination. Positive emotional feeling for Kenya as a motherland was undoubtedly stronger in 1951 among the long-time white settlers than among most of the African population.

(11) The Kikuyu had had experience in dealing with a stronger tribe, and the British initially fell into this classification. However, the Kikuyu had no previous experience with a tribe which sought to assert its power and values permanently. The continued British pressure there obliged modifications in the political culture, which were inherently unsettling, whether or not the British had set out to bring about change.

14. Political socialization and participation.

a. Upbringing and education.

(1) The European population had been brought up in the European political tradition, either in their home countries before emigrating, or by their families and in school, with the same three qualifications noted above in discussing British political culture. Presumably the socialization and education process could have produced a gradual broadening of the Europeans' views and a greater willingness to accept the Africans as citizens and equal partners in national development, but the indications are that such broadening proceeded very slowly up to 1951--more slowly, it would seem, than among persons of comparable status and education in the home country.

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(2) Traditionally, Kikuyu socialization--i.e., conditioning and training the individual to play an effective social role--came through oral transmission of tribal lore from elders to juniors, committed to memory, reinforced by ceremonial repetition and usage, and given supernatural sanction. Emphasis was placed on accuracy and precise conformance. Change was possible--for example, in some observers' opinion, the Kikuyu age-group customs were borrowed from the Masai--but the emphasis was on continuity and conformity. As already pointed out, political and other aspects of traditional culture were not clearly separated; thus political socialization was part of the general process.

(3) With the arrival of the British, there were added influences on the socialization process:^{*} the missionaries, with their preaching, schools and medical facilities; the white settlers, who directed the work and to some extent controlled the welfare of their squatters, laborers, and servants and their families; the Government representatives, particularly the District Officers and other local officers; and, to a very limited degree, the Government and private schools in Kenya and abroad. However, all these influences were related to the strangers and their values, and were thus inherently disruptive of the traditional fabric. Moreover, they were not entirely consistent among themselves. Their consequence was

*A distinction should be made between socialization, as defined above, and mobilization, meaning the incorporation of the locally-oriented traditional communities into the political affairs of the larger society. Some of the foreign influence had more to do with mobilization than socialization. In the Kenyan situation, however, it is difficult to draw a line between the two.

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primarily the emergence of a more or less detribalized population, mostly in the towns, which was fully socialized in neither the traditional Kikuyu culture nor the culture of the foreigner.

(4) The establishment of independent Kikuyu schools, beginning in 1930, (see chapter 4) probably reflected in part an endeavor to reassert indigenous control of the socialization process. Although there was debate and skepticism about it at the time, it seems likely that these schools early began to inculcate antiforeign ideas along with their ostensible objective of educating young Africans in the things they needed to know in modern society. In 1949, the colonial Government decided to allow the local native councils to control primary schooling, thus placing the formative years of Kikuyu education largely under Kikuyu control.

b. Political mobilization and participation.

(1) There seems to have been little if any effort by the British to encourage African political mobilization. Following World War II, an Englishman (who must have had official acquiescence if not support) helped establish an African Studies Association, but it was quickly taken over by the banned Kikuyu Central Association and used to advance the Kikuyu view of Kenya's destiny, with Kikuyu dominating the principal positions (see section II). Except for this abortive effort, the British sought to promote political development on the base of the local councils, devising a hierarchy of indirectly elected advisory councils which would ultimately reach the national level.

(2) On the other hand, certain aspects of British rule brought about some political mobilization as a byproduct. Large numbers of Kenyans

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served in the British Armed Forces both in Africa and in Europe in both World Wars. The consequence was to enlarge their horizons and their awareness of modern political activity. In addition, the large number of resident laborers ("squatters") on European farms--largely Kikuyu--was exposed to Western ideas and ways of living. Africans resident in the cities, as already pointed out, had continuing contacts with their families in the reserves to whom they could transmit the new ideas acquired in their contacts with Western-style urban life, even though most of them were able to participate only on the outer fringes of it.

(3) It seems likely that the example of the Indian community in pressing its demands for elected representation on the Legislative Council after World War I, with partial success, was not lost on those Africans who were then aware of events at the national level. Although there was no love lost between Indians and Africans (witness the recent expulsion of Indians from Kenya), the two groups were in contact with each other to some extent, and Indians on the Legislative Council occasionally worked for African interests.

(4) Higher education perhaps was the most potent form of political mobilization, when it did not result in permanent expatriation. The most conspicuous example is of course Jomo Kenyatta, who lived for years in Europe, returned to Kenya after World War II to lead opposition to the European influence, was imprisoned by the British, and emerged to become President of the new Republic in 1963. It may have been Kenyatta's insights which led to the combination of modern organizational ideas with

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ancient tribal tabus and ceremonial to produce the Mau Mau, thus mobilizing tens of thousands of Kikuyu in an anti-European movement.

(5) As for actual African participation in political affairs, there was virtually none at the central government level up to 1951. At the village level, it was limited to supplying the tribal police, electing members of the African district councils (beginning in 1924), meeting central Government and local demands for taxes and labor, and seeking redress of grievances in the courts--almost always the local native courts. A privileged few sat in or near the higher councils of government and economic life, but they and their associates were a tiny fraction of the African population--even a small proportion of those who were detribalized or literate.

(6) Thus it would appear that the extent of African political awareness considerably exceeded the opportunity for participation. The situation of the Europeans was completely different. Virtually all of them had the franchise. They voted for their city and county councils and for their provincial representatives in the Legislative Assembly. They were organized into a Convention of Associations (before World War II) and an Elections Union (after the war). They were generally educated, literate, fully aware of what was going on; some of them had lines to the British Government in London. Their chief complaint was that they did not entirely control the affairs of the colony, which they regarded as their proper preserve.

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15. Popular expectations.

a. Leakey's summation of the aims of the Mau Mau amounts to an expression of Kikuyu desires in their extreme form:²⁹

- (1) To recover land stolen (sic) by the white man,
- (2) To obtain self-government,
- (3) To destroy Christianity,
- (4) To restore the ancient customs whenever possible,
- (5) To drive out, or subjugate, all foreigners,
- (6) To abolish soil conservation (a plank included in the Mau Mau platform to win female support, since women did the labor on terracing and other conservation projects),
- (7) To increase secular education.

b. It is uncertain how many of the Kikuyu fully supported these objectives; chances are that the urban and literate people had some degree of sympathy with the idea of establishing African control in Kenya, but that many of them did not favor the more extreme aims. Many of those joined the Mau Mau, either willingly or by coercion, probably had only the vaguest comprehension of its political purposes. Certainly among the better informed, the idea of a Kenyan nation had taken firm root, and with it the concept of nationalism.

c. Other African tribes also resented white domination, but opposition to the Europeans was the main common element among them and with the Kikuyu. There was no great love between tribes, and the sophisticated members of the various peoples must have recognized the danger that elimination of British control would likely result in the substitution of Kikuyu control, which was hardly a pleasing prospect to them.

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d. Another summation of African desiderata, quoted by Corfield in his report on the Mau Mau movement, appears in a Church Missionary Society publication of December 1952³⁰:

A passionate desire for material progress with education as its means; The frustrations of dawning national consciousness; Envy, and so hatred of the white possessor; Intemperate self-confidence and ambition--i.e., the confidence and aspirations born of insufficient knowledge.

e. Colin Wills, in Who Killed Kenya, comments:

The existence of economic difficulties, and of social hardships, was not the cause of the rise of African nationalism. It merely provided a field for the activity of the extreme nationalists. The movement itself had its origins in the natural desire of active, forward-looking leaders to achieve the best possible future for their people /and so, of course, for themselves/.³¹

f. It seems quite clear that the expectations and feelings of the Kikuyu who had been in close contact with the European community were quite different from those of their brethren in the reserves. The latter, also, had their problems: forced labor on Government projects (cf. the conservation question cited above); the changing attitude toward land; the increasing pressure of population on the land. But they still had the reassurance of their traditional families, culture, and institutions, even though these were being weakened by the inroads of the colonial administration and by the relentless (and related) imperatives of modernization. For the squatters on European farms, for the laborers and the urban residents, for the educated men, the cultural base was weakened:

When thousands of young men began to drift away from their old homes to work in the cities, or in other parts of the country, many of them who had not become Christians and had not any longer the continual pressure of tribal custom to govern their behavior became completely "detribalized" and often quite rootless.

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They nearly always planned to return to their homes eventually But they could do this only if they possessed, or were likely to inherit, land. For possession of land was their sole insurance against destruction in their declining years

As the population increased more and more rapidly . . . a growing number of the young men found themselves landless

The Government, the missionaries, and others interested in the welfare of the African . . . were concerned about this situation The sad thing is, that little could be done to inform and guide the people concerned, and to make them feel that they were the object of the community's concern. Therefore their multiplying masses remained, as far as their own experience went, almost an outcast community, only tenuously attached to the tribes to which they belonged

It was among these masses that discontent arose, and it was to them that the more extreme and irresponsible of African politicians made their appeal³²

g. In other words, these detribalized people needed psychological security. Lacking it, they had little to lose by revolt, if the revolt offered redress of grievances and the security of group action in a common cause.

h. The European residents, even in 1951, still seemed to have many of the same expectations they had always had: they wanted the perpetuation of their favored position in the white highlands, supported by African labor under proper control, assurance of their security and privilege, and the right to control the affairs of Kenya and its Government without interference from London. As indicated below, there seems to have been an almost total gulf between black and white communities, despite the white feeling of trusteeship and despite the existence of men of wisdom and good will on both sides.

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16. Political communications.

a. The British authorities were early aware of the need for political communication. At the same time that local native councils were established in 1924, the Chief Native Commissioner expressed the hope that they would "provide an avenue of expression for the educated natives, a safety valve to check disloyal organizations, and a means for responsibility in financial matters."³³ Yet as late as 1947, although "reports were continually coming in from administrative officers" in the districts,

No one took them seriously; most Europeans were so completely out of touch with the penurious (sic) Kikuyu masses that they gained no inkling of the frustration and resentment seething beneath the surface.³⁴

b. Corfield's investigation showed much the same thing: the channels for communication were available, and to some extent at least were functioning at lower levels, but were not heeded by the top command. Both insensitivity and unawareness of conditions on the part of the colonial administration are demonstrated in the following comment in the Annual African Affairs Report of 1950, speaking particularly of Nyanza and Central Provinces (the latter being the principal area of both Kikuyu and white settlers):

In far too many instances crimes of violence and murder are committed as a result of some petty dispute which arises during the course of a beer party. It is indeed tragic that social occasions of this sort should be marred by intemperance which could be controlled by the elders of the tribe.³⁵

c. In view of the fact that there was only about 15 percent literacy in Kenya by 1952, it is clear that for the great majority of the Africans, political communication was by word of mouth. Circulation of newspapers

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was relatively small, largely in English or Swahili. Content was either shaped by European proprietors or controlled by the Government, although some degree of press freedom was maintained. Radio was in its early stages of development. Nevertheless, political news traveled widely. For example, as early as 1923, the Chief Native Commissioner said in his report that "the natives did have opinions":

He said that the more enlightened tribes were taking a keen interest in politics; they had watched the course of events, following every phase and episode of the Indian controversy, and had received the White Paper enunciating inter alia the doctrine of paramountcy of native interests with delight

After World War II, it was observed that

. . . The Kikuyu have, for years, paid a great deal of attention to world news and they awakened, during the war years and in the years that followed, to the world-wide movements of peoples toward self-government. India and Pakistan "obtained self-government" and "threw off the English yoke." The Gold Coast obtained self-government, so did Burma. Abyssinia had been helped by the British (and by many East African nations, including Kikuyu, who served in the campaign) to return to self-government and throw off the Italian yoke. Self-government was in the air and was a much talked-of subject among all that section of the Kikuyu that was literate enough to read the English, Swahili, or vernacular press.³⁶

17. Summary and conclusions.

a. From the beginning, British administration of Kenya was handicapped by the need to serve a variety of interests which were not harmonious. Kenya was first taken over to provide a route to Uganda; the railroad constructed to meet this need was unexpectedly expensive, and led to colonization as a means of making it pay. The colonists sought to establish themselves in an all-white preserve, founded on 19th century

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principles of aristocracy, white supremacy, and cheap labor, at a time when such concepts were being discredited in England itself as well as in the developing world. At the same time, the British administrators had a sense of trusteeship for the natives which led to basic conflicts of interest with the settlers. An additional conflict was the status of the Indian community, most of whom had been brought in to build the railroad. As subjects of a British dominion with growing rights of self-government, they campaigned for equality with the Europeans in Kenya, and their partial success helped inspire the Africans to do likewise. The wisest of administrators would have found it difficult, if not impossible, to meet all these interests or to set priorities among them.

b. Administrative policy, moreover, was not controlled by the colonial authorities in Kenya; although they enjoyed wide latitude, they were subordinate to the British Cabinet in London. The Secretary of State for the Colonies did not have the exclusive interest in Kenya's affairs that his Governor did; policy was therefore frequently shaped by subordinates in the Colonial Office. Policies were subject to questioning in Parliament by men who, while they might be well-informed on affairs in Kenya, did not have the same awareness of the problems involved as did the men on the spot. Hence the tendency of the administrators was to avoid actions which would lead to Parliamentary questioning, and to be influenced far more by English public opinion and that of the well-connected European residents of Kenya than by the interests of the Africans who comprised the vast majority of the population.

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c. The British administrators sincerely endeavored to carry out the policy of trusteeship for the African population while seeking gradually to educate them for modern civilized society. Their intentions were good, and numbers of them seem to have succeeded well in administering their assigned areas. Dishonesty and speculation were carefully controlled and not a major issue. On the plus side, the British established law and order and virtually eliminated intertribal warfare--an accomplishment that was generally welcomed. They improved health, sanitation, and communications. The British presence brought awareness of the benefits of Western civilization, and some of its fruits. On the negative side, administrators, missionaries, and settlers, in varying degrees, shared the conviction that British civilization with all its trappings was the universal standard of perfection to which the natives should aspire; that native society and customs were not only backward but largely undesirable; that the process of acculturation would take a very long time; and that in the meantime, the British had the position and privileges of aristocracy. The consequence was that a series of measures were taken in ignorance of their full impact on traditional society, and in a spirit of condescending superiority which also characterized political and economic relations between whites and Africans. Such measures, and such spirit, added insult to the real injuries suffered by the Africans for the benefit of the settlers.

d. Although the colonial administration of Kenya has been criticized for seeking to "rule through native chiefs" when no such roles existed, the fact is that the British had little real alternative, once they set out to rule and enlighten the heathen, unless they brought in an entire

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corps of petty civil servants. The Kikuyu and other tribes had no established political institutions of the sort necessary for raising labor, collecting taxes, and accomplishing the local works of health, welfare, and community service which were demanded, not only by the British, but increasingly by the Africans themselves. To have placed Europeans in each of the thousands of African villages would have hardly been a better solution, and it certainly would have been more expensive and troublesome. The imposition of alien institutional forms on the Kikuyu and other Africans created strains and tensions; but these strains were certainly no more serious, and probably less so, than those which were caused by the suppression of customs the Europeans considered undesirable, or by the processes of Western education, labor for European enterprise, and urbanization.

e. Some of the strains in Kikuyu society came from positive British accomplishments. The elimination of intertribal warfare, for example, took away much of the rationale for the warrior class, who became virtually unemployed and who did not willingly turn to agricultural work because custom allocated it to women. Improved health and sanitation caused increased pressure of population on the land. Both factors led to a drift of young men into the cities. There, removed from the traditional constraints of family and tribal pressures, but generally unmoved by more modern cultural values, they became a social problem and then a political one.

f. Perhaps the most egregious failure of the British administration was its policy toward the "marginal men" of Kenya--those who had left

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their tribal areas and customs and who were aspiring to modernity. Such people were the obvious and inescapable consequence of the announced British policy of modernization; yet the British seem to have treated them largely as pariahs and as nuisances. Observers seem to agree that it was among these people that the most active followers of nativistic political movements were found, and that they were ready material for the designs of ambitious African leaders, as well as channels for transmitting discontent to the traditional society in the reserves.

g. The British seem also to have given no thought to a harmonization or synthesis of African political and social institutions with those of England. In general, the Africans were treated as a group apart (although there were no legal color or race barriers, as in South Africa), and it seems to have been expected that in the full sweep of time they would graduate from their protected and inferior status into the slots provided by the established European system, with all the adaptation on their side. Given the conviction of their superiority, and the primitive state of cultural or political anthropology in the formative years of British policy toward Kenya, this is hardly surprising. There were dissenting voices, but these expressed the simple opinion that the British system of representative government could not be applied in Kenya.

h. The processes of political socialization, mobilization, and participation in Kenya were faulty--in part because the British apparently expected the process to occur naturally and gradually over many years; in part because none of the social groups involved--settlers, missionaries, administrators, African tribes, Indians, Arabs--had any agreed concept as

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to the nature and objectives of a Kenyan nation; in part because the British were unwilling to facilitate African entry into the white-dominated modern sector, and in fact had some antipathy for those Africans most anxious to enter; and, obviously, because the traditional African socialization processes were not equipped to deal with the changes involved in modernization.

i. Like the defensive elites in other transitional societies--including the noncolonial ones--the British in Kenya at the ruling level were insensitive to the needs, aspirations, and frustrations of the masses they ruled. In large part this was doubtless for the same reason as with other elites; they did not want to see their comfortable position of superiority and control challenged. This elitist feeling was intensified by the color bar and the culture barrier. On the other hand, the British administration at lower levels was undoubtedly a far better communicator of political information than an indigenous administration, and more concerned with the welfare of the people in their charge, as they saw it. It would appear that the Africans were changing faster than the British realized, while the British themselves were to some extent living in the past.

j. It is probably fair to say that British policy and administration fell between two stools: neither active promotion of an integrated, multiracial nation with growing mass participation, on the one hand, nor rigid domination of the native population by the whites, backed by force and effective intelligence, on the other. Either of these approaches might have maintained stability, at least for a time. But the British,

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for various reasons, could not follow either of them. In the difficult years following World War II, the former British reputation among the Africans for omniscience and omnipotence had been dimmed by the passing of time and growing African sophistication. At the same time, the British had, if anything, fewer people to administer Kenya than before the War, despite growing population and growing demands; and their former sure convictions of imperial destiny were weakening. Accordingly, one might conclude that the activists among the Kikuyu, who had smarted for years under condescension, exploitation, and exclusion, and many of whom were suffering the insecurity of cultural breakdown, took advantage of relative British weakness to assert themselves in violence as the only way that seemed to offer a speedy access to power; and they found a considerable following among their discontented tribesmen, especially those in the urban areas and on white farms.

k. In sum, the political factors noted in this paper which were conducive to low intensity conflict are

- (1) conflicting policies of the colonial administration;
- (2) lack of political responsibility of any part of the administration to the majority of the people they controlled (responsibility being rather to British public opinion and, informally, to the white community);
- (3) European superiority feelings and condescension toward the Africans;

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(4) the strains and tensions of modernization, seemingly unrelieved by any major action of the administration, but exacerbated by some of its uninformed measures;

(5) the greater speed of political mobilization as compared with political participation;

(6) in particular, the rootlessness and frustration of the detribalized Africans;

(7) the unresponsiveness of the top levels of the colonial administration to the needs, aspirations, and frustrations of the African population; and

(8) the lessening of British power both psychologically and by administrative shortages.

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Section II. Political Parties and Interest Groups

by Eugene H. Miller, PhD

18. Background and European political activity to 1919.

a. It is difficult to differentiate between political parties and interest groups in Kenya. In the absence of self-government the main actors on the scene, the settlers, the Asians, and the Africans necessarily directed their efforts toward influencing the policies of authorities in London and Nairobi in regard to representation on the Kenyan Legislative Council. When the first elections were held for the Legislative Council in 1920 only Europeans voted and, as Marjory Perham has observed, they may have differed in their views, but in confronting the Colonial Office they took a common stand. There was in no real sense an opposition political party.³⁷ The Indians, protesting a "communal roll" did not participate in elections until 1931 while an African was not nominated to the Legislative Council until 1944.

b. In the absence of true political parties, clarity will be served by a separate consideration of the interests of each group and the techniques each used to attain its ends. In particular, a brief survey of European settlers' activities up to World War I helps to understand later events.

c. The long-range goal of the white settlers was a self-governing Kenya under their control. This obviously depended on attracting an increasing number of European immigrants. To foster such a movement the first arrivals realized the necessity for organization and as early as

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1902 a committee met at Wood's (a hotel opened by T. A. Wood in Nairobi in 1900 that became a favorite gathering place for Europeans) to form a Colonists' Association. (Later, with Lord Delamere as leader, it became the Planters' and Farmers' Association.) An early concern of the organization was the marketing of potatoes in South Africa, but it soon took up wider causes, in particular the reservation of the highlands for white settlement. In pursuit of this goal it organized a protest against a scheme to settle Jews in that area. The scheme fell through--Jewish representatives who visited Kenya rejected the idea--but Delamere's leadership in fighting to keep the area "for settlers of our own race" helped to solidify his position as spokesman for the settlers.³⁸

d. The Planters' and Farmers' Association regarded the Foreign Office as unsympathetic to their aim of a white dominated Kenya. They believed the Colonial Office would be more cooperative and lobbied to have the Protectorate transferred to the latter ministry. This was done in April 1905, but the settlers were quickly disillusioned. Instead of supporting an exclusive white highlands, Lord Lyttleton doubted that a white population would ever be numerically important and considered East Africa as "the natural outlet for Indian emigration." His staff also objected to the "happy-go-lucky" style in which the Foreign Office had made land grants.³⁹

e. In the face of this rebuff the Association (which had reassumed its original name, the Colonists' Association) published a manifesto in the 5 August 1905 issue of the London Morning Post, (so strong--largely through the influence of recent immigrants from South Africa--that

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Delamere withdrew his support). It demanded some form of representation on a Council; an end to the application of the Indian codes as East African law; and provision of forts, white police, imperial troops, and a burgher militia against an eventual native rising, which the settlers viewed as an "absolute certainty."⁴⁰

f. The settlers did win one point; in 1906 the new Liberal Government agreed to establish a Legislative Council. That this was a major concession was emphasized by the Under Secretary, Winston Churchill, who told the Colonists' Association in Nairobi, "Never before in Colonial experience has a Council been granted where the number of settlers is so few."⁴¹ The promulgation of a new Constitution, under which the Commissioner became Governor with an Executive Council and a Legislative Council that included nominated unofficial members, was a small step. It was nevertheless a real breakthrough for the settlers in their long-range goal of attaining political power in local matters.

g. The growing influence of the Colonists' Association was reflected in an additional concession, the appointment of a Land Board with five unofficial members. Through this body the settlers, who the previous year had staged the largest meeting ever held in Nairobi to pledge "the most determined opposition" to grants to Indians in the highlands, got a commitment from his Majesty's Government to the effect that although it was not official policy "to impose legal restriction on any particular section of the community . . . as a matter of administrative convenience grants in the upland area should not be made to Indians."⁴²

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h. The problem of labor was tied to that of land. The white farmers needed native workers to keep their plantation type crops in production. The latter had their own planting and harvesting to do and had little incentive to work for the Europeans. Government attempts to prevent abuses in labor recruiting resulted in a diminished supply of workers and in 1908 the Colonists' Association demanded that the "extraordinary labour rules" that had doubled the farmers' labor costs be withdrawn immediately. This time the Governor stood firm in the face of a demonstration. He refused to withdraw the rules and, further, removed Delamere and Baillie, who had led the protest march, from their positions as unofficial members of the Legislative Council. A Board of Inquiry was appointed to look into the problem of labor supply.⁴³

i. The Colonists' Association was the most powerful, but not the only pressure group in the white settler community. The Pastoralists' Association had been formed at Nakuru, "the capital of the Highlands" by Robert Chamberlain, who had constantly protested against "dummying" (applying for extra land in the name of dependents) and Delamere's large landholdings and influence. Other local associations also were founded. It was argued that the members of all these groups would have more influence with the authorities if they united. After several years of negotiation the various organizations were brought together in the Convention of Associations under the chairmanship of Grogan who described himself as "the baddest and boldest of a bold bad gang." The Convention, nicknamed "the Settlers' Parliament," convened in February 1911. It had a broad and aggressive program. One motion called for the Protectorate's

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representation at the Imperial Conference. Enforcement of the native Pass laws was demanded, the "Asiatic question" was discussed, and delegations were sent to see the Governor about elective representation.⁴⁴

j. The Convention did not at once gain elective representation. However, it won its point, over initial London objection, on moving the Masai out of Laikipia and granting the land in that area to white settlers. More land for Europeans inevitably brought forth the problem of more native labor. A native Labour Commission was appointed to investigate the question. Before Parliament could act on the Report, World War I intervened. However, in 1915, the main recommendation of the Commission was followed in a Native Registration Ordinance, designed to control the movement of labor. Even though its enforcement was delayed until after the war, the establishment of the principle of registration was regarded as a victory by the Convention of Associations. The Convention also hailed the 1915 amendment of the Crown Lands Ordinance that authorized 999-year leases instead of the 99 that the Colonial Office wanted. In particular, it celebrated the adoption of its recommendation that the Governor's veto should not apply to all land transfers but only to those between persons of different race--a potent device to keep the highlands white.⁴⁵

k. Under the leadership of Grogan, the European community was aroused, in the fall of 1915, to take an active part in the War. At his suggestion a War Council was appointed. It included, in addition to the Chief Secretary, who acted as chairman, three other officials, two military representatives and three settlers, one of whom was Grogan. Though the Council was only advisory its almost daily meetings "gave it a power

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and influence which was virtually executive." In addition to war and conscription problems it developed the idea of a postwar Soldier Settlement Scheme and when Delamere became a member in 1917 he tried to turn its attention to agricultural production. From the settlers' point of view the greatest gain was the concession of elections to the War Council. "Although the War Council was not formally part of the constitution, the settlers considered that the principle of elective representation 'was won'." A committee of the Legislative Council was appointed to work out details for election to that body, which was a formal part of the constitution. However, such proposed changes had to be deferred until after the war.⁴⁶

19. Political groups and activities to World War II.

a. In the decades after World War I, the Europeans had to compete with two other groups, both far greater in numbers, the Indians and the Africans, who in turn were to develop active organizations to impress on Westminster their views on land, labor, and representation.

b. The opening scene seemed to be a replay of prewar days. The Convention of Associations, which had been relatively quiet during the conflict, met in January 1919 and briefed Grogan, their president, on his speech of welcome to the new Governor, General Sir Edward Northey. Grogan, in the strongest language, attacked the Colonial Office and local officials, and explained the Convention's stand on land, labor, and Government organization. The main theme of his tirade was the Asian question: "the Europeans were 'the guardians of the back door' and owed it to South Africa to keep the Indians out." The Indian question was particularly

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heated at this time because of proposals that German East Africa be given to India as compensation for Indians being shut out from the self-governing Dominions. These proposals were taken seriously by the settlers and by the members of the Economic Commission that had been appointed in 1917 to survey the economic future of Kenya.⁴⁷

c. The Commission's report offended the Indians not only because of its immoderate language about them but also because of its consideration of the possibility of releasing more land from native reserves for white settlement. When a deputation from the Nairobi Indian Association protested, Governor Northey told them that "the principle had been accepted at home that this country was primarily for European development." He further confirmed this by letter: "European interest must be paramount throughout the Protectorate."⁴⁸

d. Just as the reopened question of extended white settlement moved an Indian interest group to protest to Governor Northey, so the taking of a large area from the Nandi Reserve for the Soldier Settlement Scheme and the "Northey Circulars" on labor recruitment brought two additional interest groups--the missionaries and the Kikuyu--on to the political scene. The bishops of Mombasa and Uganda along with the Reverend Dr. Arthur, the senior Church of Scotland missionary, succeeded, through their contacts in England, in causing a parliamentary debate on the labor issue. As a result, the Colonial Office ordered Nairobi officials "to take no part in recruiting labour for private employment."⁴⁹ In view of their traditional role as defenders of the natives against white exploitation, the missionaries, through their "Alliance of the Missionary Societies of British East

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Africa" suggested in 1919 and 1921 that they should represent native interests in the Legislative Council.

e. At this very time the Africans, provoked by the land and labor policies, began to stir politically and formed their own organizations, the Kikuyu Association in 1920 and the Young Kikuyu Association in 1921. The first, composed largely of chiefs and headmen, was concerned primarily with the defense of the Kikuyu land. A body committed to the recovery of "lost lands" had no difficulty in recruiting supporters. The Kikuyu Association not only got support from the landless members of the tribe but also from landed families who were patriotically prepared to support their less fortunate tribesmen.⁵⁰

f. The second African interest group, the Young Kikuyu Association (composed mainly of urbanized Kikuyu--clerks, office boys, and domestic servants), was concerned with the grievances of the laborers. Its secretary, Harry Thuku, a Government telephone operator, attacked two changes that had been introduced in 1920: the requirement for an adult male to carry a kipande or registration card bearing his fingerprints, and the doubling of the hut tax and poll tax from R5 to R10. The latter was reduced, in 1921, to R8 but the Africans again lost out when the European farmers, affected by the worldwide decline in agricultural prices, proposed a one-third cut in native wages. Thuku extended his agitation into non-Kikuyu country, visiting Kisumu and addressing large meetings of Kavirondo. On the ground that a prayer issued for Thuku introduced an element of religion which might lead to a dangerous situation, the Chief Native Commissioner ordered Thuku's arrest in March 1922 and deported him

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as "dangerous to peace and order" to Kismayu (than part of Kenya). His organization was proscribed and went underground. While Thuku was temporarily held in a Nairobi prison, thousands of his supporters gathered outside the jail and threatened to free him by force. The British fired on the crowd, 25 Kikuyu were killed, and Kenya had its first nationalist martyrs.⁵¹

g. At the same time that Thuku's Kikuyu Association was outlawed, a more militant body--the East African Association, which claimed to speak for all the Africans of East Africa--was founded. While Kikuyu associations marked the political appearance of younger men who were attracted to group membership by occupational ties ("office boys and decorative servants") rather than by kinship ties, the East African Association signaled the emergence of a transtribal consciousness. However, in Kenyan politics of the next three decades, individual tribes would prove to be a more potent political force than transtribal consciousness.⁵²

h. Again it was a Kikuyu group, the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), that moved to the center of the stage in 1925. Its leaders were Joseph Kangethe and Jesse Kariuki, later to be regarded as extremist politicians. They petitioned the Governor for the removal of restrictions on coffee growing by Africans, for the publication of the laws of the country in Kikuyu, for the appointment of a Kikuyu paramount chief, and for the release of Harry Thuku. The demands fell on deaf ears. Despite their failure to win these concessions the KCA continued to grow. The Native Affairs Department report for 1928 noted that there were four associations at work in that year. In addition to the KCA there were the Kikuyu

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Association, to some extent working in opposition to the KCA; the Progressive Kikuyu Party, confined to Nyeri; and the Catholic Association, whose "activities were not very apparent." Jomo Kenyatta, the able editor of the Kikuyu monthly newspaper "Muiguithania" became secretary general of the KCA in 1928, but he left the country the next year for England and was not in Kenya when the great controversy over female circumcision came to a head.⁵³

i. Up to this point recovery of Kikuyu land and protection of the native against forced labor had been the rallying cries of the KCA. However, they were quick to recognize missionary opposition to clitoridec-tomy as an issue over which they could attract additional support (see chapter 4).

j. Although the KCA was strengthened by its associations with the independent churches and schools, the depression and the intraorganization struggle for power caused complications. Harry Thuku was released in 1930. Before he gained his freedom he promised to oppose the Government by constitutional means only. In 1932 he defeated the more extremist candidates, Jesse Kariuki and Joseph Kangethe, for the presidency of KCA. However, Kangethe refused to give up office and in 1935 Thuku left to found the Kikuyu Provincial Association which offered cooperation with the Government. This new group could not compete successfully with the more radical KCA.⁵⁴

k. Other associations that engaged in some activity in the early 1930's included the Kikuyu Loyal Patriots, led by Chiefs Koinange and Waruhiu, which was primarily concerned with the land question in Kiambu,

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and the Progressive Kikuyu Party that supported the Church of Scotland in the circumcision controversy. The KCA definitely became the most powerful of the African interest groups after 1935. It revived its newspaper, kept close touch with Kenyatta in England, and set up branches outside Nairobi and beyond the borders of Kikuyu areas. It constantly opposed Government projects that worked to the disadvantage of the Kikuyu, particularly those that might lead to further European encroachment on the land. The KCA supported the Kamba in their fight against destocking cattle. It also assisted with agitation against land measures in the Teita hills. As a result, the Kamba Members' Association and the Teita Hills Association both affiliated with KCA. In Mombasa the organization began to develop some strength after supporting the dock strike of 1939. With the coming of World War II and the imminent involvement of East Africa in that conflict the Government, in May 1940, declared KCA an illegal society and arrested its leaders as seditious. The Kikuyu Provincial Association supported the war and was not proscribed.⁵⁵

1. By the outbreak of World War II, then, strong political movements had arisen among the Kikuyu. Kenneth Ingham charges the Kenya Government with poor judgment in regarding these organizations as unrepresentative of general feeling. They looked to the local councils for a true reflection of public sentiment, loyally supporting the chiefs whom the Government itself had created." Ingham further maintains that the authorities dismissed any associations which tried to work outside the councils "as consisting solely of dissident elements." He credits the Kikuyu chiefs with "a genuine attempt to encourage the younger men to associate

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themselves with the native councils in spite of the difficulties involved in mixing age-sets." However, the younger men wanted to move more quickly than their elders. Thus, in the decades of the twenties and thirties, politically conscious Africans tended to adopt an attitude of opposition to established authority whether that of the Europeans or of the elders who appeared to the younger men to be the tools of the European Government.⁵⁶

m. The Government did make an attempt to win wartime support from the nationalists by appointing the first African to the Legislative Council in 1944. However, it refused to name Peter Koinange, who was supported by the Kenya Farmers' and Traders' Association, an interest group that allegedly took over the work of the KCA when the latter went underground. Instead, the Governor nominated Eliud Mathu, a man thought by the British to be more moderate. In his public speeches Mathu tried to prove his nationalist credentials and in 1944, with the assistance of a British scholar, he founded the African Study Union. However, Mathu and his organization proved to be too moderate in the face of postwar nationalist developments.⁵⁷

20. Developments after World War II.

a. The postwar years were not a time for middle-of-the-roads. "The Atlantic Charter, returning servicemen, the coming to power of the labor government, and the independence of India and Burma" gave rise to great expectations among politically conscious Kenyans. The British did not respond. Instead they reopened the old wounds of land ownership. They not only failed to compensate African troops for war service, as the Kikuyu had some reason to anticipate, but 3.3 million acres were offered to the

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Zionists. At the same time Kenyan land was offered to British exservice-men. Such frustrations, acquisition of organizational skill in administering the independent schools' associations, and the coming of age of an important leadership group all contributed to a movement to establish a Kenya-wide political organization. The Kenya African Union (KAU) was founded in 1946 shortly before Kenyatta's return.⁵⁸ Its subsequent development is discussed in section III.

b. In addition to the primary political African associations such as KCA and KAU there were, in the period before 1945, many different types of African organizations: "occupational, tribal benefit, residential benefit, tribal recreational, residential recreational . . . trade union, class, tribal religious, and the national religious." None of these categories was exclusive: a tribal dancing club might have political overtones, a welfare or commercial association was "bound in time to become anti-European or anti-Indian or to loose its membership, and tribal or residential groupings often followed residential or tribal lines. Thus, in Mombasa after the war, associations of traders, barbers, charcoal sellers, and chicken and egg dealers tended to be Kikuyu. There were also "Meru snuff sellers, Lukya basketwork sellers, Kamba and Luo handicraft hawkers, and Luo domestic servants. Kamba tended to dominate technical jobs in the railway and post office. In Nairobi, the Kikuyu landlords of Pumwani location organized the Pumwani Housing Committee, while in Mombasa, faced with Indian expansion into formerly African quarters, they set up the Mombasa Landless Houseowners' Association.⁵⁹

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c. The end of the war in 1945 saw a significant increase in the number of African associations. An Army report of that year lists 200 associations (many ephemeral), of these 38 were tribal welfare and educational associations and 22 were commercial and cooperative groups. A list compiled 2 years later showed changes in emphasis. Of the further 130 African associations known, over 50 were restricted to Kikuyu. "Only twelve had education as their explicit aim and only nine were overtly religious--fifty being tribal welfare associations with various aims and fifty commercial and trading associations."⁶⁰

d. What were the goals of these numerous African interest groups? Until the end of World War II their aims were only vaguely defined. However, a study of the more highly politicized groups, such as the KCA, reveals definite evidence of immediate objectives:

To open the White Highlands to African use, to break the hold of the Asians on wholesale and retail trade, to rid the educational system of mission control and even to secure enough money and food to bring up a family in the material ways both elders and missionaries laid down as desirable.

The European enemy was there to serve as whipping boy for African grievances, but before 1945 the wider aims of a pan-African state were little discussed. Even after that date the more distant goals were difficult to achieve because of the continued appeal of tribal loyalties: "pastoralists against agriculturists, Bantu Kavirondo against Luo of Kavirondo, all other tribes against the Kikuyu." Nevertheless, if the tribalist were to become more than a local politician his movement had to appeal to a truly wide audience.⁶¹

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Section III. Subversion: Mau Mau History, Organization and Doctrine

by James E. Trinnaman

21. Introduction.

a. Mau Mau was first reported by British intelligence in September 1948. Its exact time of founding is unknown, but is believed to be sometime in 1947 or 1948. Although the membership grew rapidly in these early years, the beginning of the conflict in 1951-52 caught May Mau organizationally unprepared, its control networks weak and its leadership exposed. For these reasons, the Mau Mau of the preconflict period bears little resemblance to the fanatical and fratricidal collection of gangs and support elements which developed during the conflict period.

b. Most of the literature focuses on the Mau Mau of the conflict period and leaves the reader largely uninformed on many of the critical elements of information on the organization immediately prior to the outbreak of conflict. In addition, the Mau Mau discussed by African writers in books published in the 1950's and 1960's often bears little resemblance to the Mau Mau described by European writers during and shortly after the conflict. The Africans have tended to emphasize the nationalist, anticolonialist and heroic aspect of the movement, while many Europeans focused principally on what they regarded as the irrational and schizophrenic rejection of all things modern and European, the return to primitive barbarism and self-destructiveness.

c. The objective and subjective rationales underlying African frustrations had already largely developed in the early 1920's, and from this

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period on Africans gradually developed movements to deal with these frustrations. Perceived abuses of African land ownership, the expropriation of lands for European settlement and the lack of representation on colonial councils responsible for land policies gave rise to the Kikuyu political associations. Rejection of the Christian missions and missionary efforts to change traditional tribal customs led to the creation of a succession of separatist churches and religious cults. Inadequate educational opportunities and mission control of most educational facilities brought into being the African independent schools and educational associations. Forced labor and poor wage standards caused the African trade union movements to be created. Mau Mau was the extreme culmination of all these frustrations and corresponding organizations, and it voiced openly and actively pursued that which was often only implicit in its predecessor movements--that the Africans must unite at all costs to preserve their traditions and to drive the European out of their lands.

d. Although some form of separatist political or religious movement existed to some degree in most of the tribes of Kenya, Mau Mau was almost entirely Kikuyu in organization and membership. The Kikuyu had had the greatest contact with the Europeans on the farms and in the cities, and were perhaps best placed to perceive and express their frustrations. The Kenya African union, which developed after World War II, was originally designed to appeal to Africans of all tribes and much organizational effort was directed at achieving intertribal cooperation. However, as the idea for Mau Mau emerged, the decision was apparently taken to focus organizational effort on the Kikuyu. Most of the early leadership were

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Kikuyu tribal members, at least by birth if no longer by traditional upbringing and commitment.

e. During the conflict period there was also some official tendency to see in Mau Mau foreign influence and direction, from radicals in England, from revolutionaries in the Indian community in Kenya, and from Moscow-trained agents of the Comintern. Subsequent investigations have proved these accusations largely groundless. Mau Mau was overwhelmingly a Kikuyu movement, organized principally by Kikuyu in the face of grievances felt largely by Kikuyu.

22. History.

a. Early political movements.

(1) The development of the Kikuyu political associations following World War I has been discussed in section II, above. It was there noted that such issues as land alienation to whites, the eviction of Kikuyu from these lands, increases in hut and poll taxes, African wage reductions, and the labor registration system were the center of Kikuyu political concern in the post-World War I period. Later, the controversy over polygamy and clitoridectomy became a central concern of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). As World War II approached, the KCA began to make common cause with other tribes and their grievances, and was involved in the Mombasa dock strike of 1939.

(2) On 30 May 1940, the Kenya Government had had enough of the growing dissent of the KCA and proscribed the organization for establishing allegedly "a treasonable relationship with Italian Agents" in Ethiopia. By this time the KCA had a membership of 7,000. Its successive failures

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to elicit interest in Kikuyu problems either in London or in the Kenya administration, or to achieve some progress in alleviating grievances had led KCA leaders to increasingly radical stands. Although the leadership was imprisoned, the movement continued to exist as a more or less dormant underground. This remained the state of affairs through World War II until, in 1944, the KCA leadership was released and the Kenya African Union (KAU) was formed. The KAU was the last political association to develop before Mau Mau and is discussed at the end of this section.⁶²

b. The independent churches.

(1) Closely accompanying the rise of the political associations was the development of separatist or independent churches and cults, called "dinis." The principal reason for the creation of independent churches was the rejection of missionary efforts to modify or outlaw aspects of tribal custom and tradition.

(2) Four Protestant societies originally shared the Kikuyu missionary field: the Church Missionary Society (CMS), a moderate and gradualist group of the Church of England; the Africa Inland Mission (AIM), a fundamentalist group of American missionaries, primarily baptist and Adventist; the Church of Scotland Mission (CSM), with a rigid and puritan approach to missionary activity; and the United Methodist Mission (UMM), which was doctrinally less rigid than the CSM and more in sympathy with the gradualism of the CMS.⁶³

(3) The first breakaway church was the Nomiya Luo Church, founded by Joan Owalo in 1907. (Owalo was one of Kenyatta's teachers at

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the CMS school in Nairobi.) Owale led a strong attack on the mission system, and declared that God had sent a new word through him for the African people. His church practiced circumcision of both sexes and laid heavy emphasis on the prohibitions of the Old Testament. Other churches began to appear in fairly rapid succession. In 1927, Jakobo Buluku and Daniel Sande broke away from the American Friends in Kaimosi and formed the Holy Ghost Church; they advocated the expulsion of foreign missions. Also in the 1920's Alfayo Odongo formed another Holy Ghost church out of the CMS congregation in his area. He preached that God had informed him the Africans should found their own church in preparation for their own African Government. In 1942, Kivuli founded the African Israel Church (originally known as the Israel Uhuru (Independence) Church until the Government forced him to change the name), which also preached the expulsion of foreign missionaries.⁶⁴ None of the above churches was a rejection of Christianity as such, but a rejection of European mission control over religion (and concomitantly over education) and mission efforts to weaken tribal tradition, especially in the sensitive areas of female circumcision and polygamous marriage.

(4) Several other churches or dinis also arose after World War I which were more radical in their rejections of the missions, and secretive in their organization and anti-European aims. In large part these dinis displayed primitive forms of tribalistic nationalism and had direct influence on the subsequent religious aspect of Mau Mau.

(5) The strongest dinis after World War II were "Dini ya Msambwa" (Cult of the Spirits of the Dead, among the Suk); "Dini ya Roho" (Cult of

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the Holy Ghost, of the Luo); "Dini ya Mboja" (Cult of Prayer, of the Kipsigi); "Watu wa Mungu" (The People of God, among the Kikuyu); and "Dini ya Yesu Kristo" (Cult of Jesus Christ, also among the Kikuyu). The Kikuyu dinis lent themselves immediately to the purposes of Mau Mau. In the early days of Mau Mau (1947-48) the rites and oaths of these dinis were interchangeable with those of Mau Mau and contributed to the movement its subsequent aspect of religious fanaticism.

(6) Of the founders and leaders, the "arathi" or prophets, of the radically anti-European dinis or churches, only three are discussed in the literature in any detail: Elijah Masindi, Lucas Fkiche and Ruben Kihiko.⁶⁵ All three men shared very similar backgrounds: they were products of the Christian mission schools and were nominal Christians; at some point each broke away from the missions and, claiming divine appointment and supernatural powers, formed his own "church"; each preached a mixture of Christianity and traditional tribal beliefs; and all taught that the white man should be driven from Kenya.

(7) Elijah Masindi was born in 1910 of the Suk tribe. He was educated in Swahili and English by the Quaker Mission in Kimili, and in 1930 played on the Kenya African rugby team against Uganda. The Friends were proud of Masindi for his accomplishments and devoutness. However, in 1935 Masindi requested permission to take a second wife and the Friends threatened him with expulsion. Masindi left the mission, took the second wife and started a new religion, the Dini ya Msambwa (or Church of the Old Customs), a blend of tribal custom and Old Testament teaching, both of which supported his ideas of plural marriage. He began to gather

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adherents to him from among those who also shared mission disfavor for transgressions against Christian custom. Shortly thereafter he refused to pay his poll taxes on the grounds that he was subject only to the laws of God.

(8) In 1944 he refused to sign a bond to keep the peace and was sentenced to prison for a year. During the year he was declared insane and committed to the Muthari Mental Hospital.

(9) In May 1947 Masindi was released against the advice of the Provincial Commissioner. He immediately set about reorganizing his followers, and in July announced to a crowd of some 400 at Kimahiva that all Europeans must be driven from the country and an African king, governor and administration be appointed. In September he led a crowd of some 5,000 to the old fortified encampment near Lugulu where the last great battle with British forces had taken place two generations before. On each of these occasions Masindi whipped the crowd into a state of extreme frenzy, exhorting them to arm themselves to drive out the Europeans and invoking the spirits of the dead to aid them in the coming battle. In February 1948, after several clashes with his followers, the British were able to capture Masindi and deport him to Lamu. Although the Dini ya Masumwa was declared illegal, it continued to grow under its new prophet Lucas Pkiech.

(10) Lucas Pkiech, also a Suk, attended a Government school, was baptized at the Mill Hill Catholic Mission at Tarter, and was trained as a blacksmith at the National Industrial Training Department at Kahete. In 1946 Pkiech was converted by Masindi and was sent out to proselytize.

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After several arrests, Pkiech was finally sentenced in August 1948 to 25 years imprisonment for holding a prohibited meeting. After less than a year Pkiech escaped and assumed the leadership of the Dini ya Msambwa. To the rapidly swelling ranks of the dini, Pkiech promised eternal life, no European control, no sickness, relief from blindness, immunity from gunfire and capture, and fertility in the men and no sterility in the women. Doubters were threatened with the lack of the above benefits and the possibility that their animals would sicken and die. Finally in April 1950, Government forces were able to corner Pkiech and several hundred of his followers, and during a short but bloody clash, Pkiech was killed. The dini was disbanded but the pattern for Mau Mau, already in its early organizing stage, had been established.⁶⁷

(11) Among the Kikuyu, the first dini to lead to violence was the Wutu wa Mungu (People of God). It was organized in 1931 in response to the controversy over female circumcision; its leadership is not mentioned in the literature and is presumed to be unknown. The movement emphasized a return to traditional values and a rejection of all things European. A clash with the police in 1934 left several members dead and the dini was disbanded. After World War II a new dini developed among the Kikuyu, Dini ya Jesu Kristo, led by Ruben Kihiko. Kihiko was characterized as a real horror, brutal, fanatical and spiteful; his movement was regarded as rabid "Kikuyuism" to which was added Old Testament bloodthirstiness. Like Masindi, Kihiko had a mission school background and broke with it over differences between mission teachings and Kikuyu tradition. Kihiko rejected all things European, and insisted that his

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followers wear animal skins and denounce the use of any European tools or goods. In December 1947 Kihiko led his followers in several bloody clashes against the police, was caught, tried and executed for murder.⁶⁸

c. The independent schools.

(1) Linked closely with the creation of the independent churches was the development of all-African schools. The strong hunger for learning had been recognized for some time as the most potent factor in attracting Africans to the Christian missions. The Government had largely neglected to provide state schools, preferring to allow the missions to determine and provide the proper education for the Africans.

(2) From time to time the missions made some effort to bring about changes in tribal custom, especially to discourage polygamy and female circumcision. The profound attachment to these practices among the Kikuyu and their inextricable relation to tribal organization and solidarity was never fully appreciated by the missions. The crisis came in October 1929 when the CSM decided on a firm policy against female circumcision; the mission demanded of its African teachers a solemn declaration against the practice and against membership in the KCA. Many teachers refused to make the declaration and their schools were closed.

(3) Although the Education Department eventually prevailed upon the CSM to adopt an impartial attitude toward these practices, the damage had been done and African demands for independent schools became adamant. Ultimately 180 independent schools were begun with students numbering about 30,000 (out of a total student population of roughly 90,000). Even those Kikuyu who continued to send their children to the mission schools

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for formal education became more inclined to disavow everything else the missions were trying to teach. Through the 1930's, missions still sometimes refused to educate children of parents who practiced polygamy or other "unacceptable" customs, which tended to further undermine the influence of the missions and increase the importance of the independent schools.⁶⁹

(4) Also as a result of the 1929 controversy, two African school associations came into existence, the Kikuyu Karing'a (Pure) Education Association (KKEA), and the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association (KISA). For the next 20 years there was considerable competition between the two for control of the independent schools. The KKEA soon aligned itself with the KCA and became the more radical of the two associations. It opposed any form of mission or Government control and aggressively pursued the development of a school system to propagate Kikuyu nationalist and separatist and anti-European fervor. In the early years KISA attempted to cooperate with the Education Department, to remain nonpolitical, and to develop a more moderate religious association. KISA subsequently established the African Independent Pentecostal Church which was based on an interweaving of traditional beliefs and practices with Old Testament puritanism.⁷⁰

(5) From the beginning the independent schools suffered very low educational standards, principally because of an almost total lack of trained teachers. As a result, Peter Mbiyu Koinange established the Kenya Teachers' Training College at Githunguri. Koinange had spent a year at Cambridge, and then went to the United States to study at Harvard and

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Columbia. Upon returning to Kenya, he was offered a teaching position with a salary less than one-half that being paid to Europeans. Deeply embittered, Koinange founded the Teachers' College and began to devote himself to the rising nationalist movement. Githunguri suffered the same low academic standards as the independent schools, and frequently severe money shortages as well. However, by the end of World War II its student body numbered 500 and, although not openly antiwhite, it had become the center of African nationalism. When Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya in 1946, he took up residence at Githunguri. Through the remainder of the 1940's, Koinange and Kenyatta devoted themselves to making the college a nationalist training ground for KAU, drawing KISA into the KKEA, making them instruments for the spread of Mau Mau. These efforts were largely successful by 1950, but the conflict emerged too soon to make full use of their organizational and indoctrination potential.

d. The Trade Union Movement.

(1) Between the World Wars several efforts to begin a trade union movement had been undertaken with only moderate success. After World War II, the presence of thousands of unemployed and low-wage earners in urban areas, especially Nairobi, and the spiraling cost of living laid a fertile groundwork for the development of political and social unrest; the trade union movement became the organizational focus of urban grievances.

(2) The first postwar violence took place at the Uplands Bacon Factory when Chege Kibachia led the African Workers' Federation on a

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strike. Violence erupted and Kibachia was subsequently imprisoned and the union disbanded. Shortly thereafter Fred Kubai (also Chairman of the KAU Nairobi Branch) and Makhan Singh organized the East African Trades Union Congress (EATUC); the Government, however, refused to register it as a lawful union. From the beginning of EATUC, Kubai and Singh demanded the immediate granting of independence to the East African territories.

(3) Despite its questionable legal existence, the EATUC continued to expand and, in 1947, led a successful dock strike in Mombasa and another strike among the transport workers. In May 1950, Kubai led an 18-day general strike in Nairobi against the granting of a royal charter to the city which brought Africans directly under the control of the white-dominated city government. The strike culminated in a May Day rally which broke into violence and caused the arrest of Kubai and Singh. The arrests caused further outbreaks in Nairobi which lasted until the end of May.

(4) In 1951, the Government again refused to recognize the EATUC because of its military leadership and association with KAU; it set about encouraging a rival, controlled, trade union, the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions, under the British-trained and promoted labor organizer, Tom Mboya.⁷¹ By this time the EATUC was intimately connected with KAU in most urban areas and becoming a principal recruiting ground for Mau Mau.

(5) At the same time, working closely within the trade union movement and often forming the liaison between the union and the KAU,

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KCA, and Land Committees was a group of militant African ex-servicemen. These men had seen action in India, Burma, Ceylon, the Middle East and Europe as members of the British Army. In a larger repetition of the events after World War I, these ex-servicemen returned to Kenya with high expectations supported by British wartime promises only to find no place in which to apply their new skills and little change in colonial administration. Having lost their awe of the power of the white man and his weapons, and disgruntled over conditions in Kenya, these men became the new militants in the trade union struggle, and subsequently some became the leadership of the Mau Mau military arm.⁷²

e. The Kenya African Union and Mau Mau.

(1) In 1944, the Legislative Council was opened for the first time to one African member, to be appointed by the Government. Eliud Mathu was selected and, apparently on the advice of the Governor, a colony-wide African body was developed in order to advise Mathu on the needs of Africans. The body was first called the Kenya African Study Union; the word "Study" was objected to by many nationalists and was soon dropped, making it the Kenya African Union (KAU). Mathu and James Gichuru became the principal organizers of KAU, and Gichuru was elected its first president. Both men were regarded as moderate nationalists, intent on organizing and bringing pressure to bear on the Governor and Legislative Council and on London, but willing to work within the constraints imposed by the colonial administration. The KAU was governed by an executive committee, and local, tribal, and regional committees soon developed throughout Kenya.⁷³

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(2) Also in 1944, the leaders of the proscribed KCA were released from prison. They decided to join the KAU in order to enjoy the freedom and organization of a legal body, from the outset they constituted the radical wing of the KAU and were prepared to capitalize on popular frustrations if the moderate majority failed to make headway with the colonial administration.

(3) The KAU constitution called for: the uniting of all Kenya Africans; the preparation for the introduction of democracy; defense and promotion of the interests of Africans by organizing, educating, and leading them in the struggle for better housing, working conditions, etc.; fighting inequality and racial barriers; acquiring the right to vote and to sit on all governing councils; the freedom of assembly, press and movement; and the raising of funds to accomplish these objectives.⁷⁴ Conspicuously absent among these aims were the demands for the return of alienated lands and the eventual gaining of independence, the two radical demands of the old KCA.

(4) The first years of the KAU were filled with considerable organizational activity, bringing together the independent schools, churches and associations, and trade union movement and traditional tribal hierarchies. Hopes ran high for democratic reforms, encouraged by British wartime pronouncements, the accession of the Labor Party in Great Britain, and similar stirrings elsewhere in British Africa. KAU also undertook an intensive propaganda program; through its official Swahili newspaper, "Sauti ya Mwafrica" (The African Voice), and numerous vernacular newspapers,

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It sought to engender enthusiasm among Africans and argue its case on land, wages, the color bar, and representation.

(5) In 1946 Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya and was popularly acclaimed as the leading figure in the nationalists movement. In June 1947, James Gichuru stepped down from the presidency of KAU and Kenyatta was elected without contest.⁷⁵

(6) From the beginning of KAU the militant and moderate factions of the organization had wrestled for control of the movement. The militants, composed mainly of KCA members, began in 1947 to assume the strategic positions within KAU. The KCA membership remained highly select during this period and was composed mainly of those tried and trusted individuals who had proven themselves in the 1930's. They were closely tied together by experience as well as by secrecy and their oaths of loyalty. By 1950 the militant faction had firmly established itself within KAU and had begun to widen its membership through an aggressive recruitment program and secret oathings; this organization gradually came to be known by outsiders as Mau Mau. Many moderate leaders were aware that something was happening and were showing signs of acute distress, but they were powerless to recapture or redirect the growing momentum of the movement.

(7) Kenyatta's precise role during this period has never been clearly established. Some authors argue his total innocence of the development of Mau Mau; others such as Corfield find in him the evil genius which conceived, molded, and directed the movement almost single-handedly. Rawcliffe appears to present the most balanced and believable view.

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According to him, Kenyatta was intent on reorganizing KAU into an effective and disciplined nationalist movement. Patterning his program after Nkrumah's in the Gold Coast which was enjoying such success, Kenyatta believed that the use of passive resistance and political sabotage of Government measures would force the colonial administration to deal with the African leadership. In addition, the activities of the extremist nationalists would help in this process by encouraging the administration to seek reasonable and moderate Africans, that is Kenyatta, through which to work to reachieve some form of political balance. Therefore, Kenyatta encouraged and directed the early growth of Mau Mau, but took great pains to keep himself publically divorced from it. His actions and public utterances stayed barely within the law; he did and said nothing which would either encourage or discourage the movement.

(8) By 1948 the movement began to get out of hand, and Kenyatta himself appears to have recognized that the passions he had encouraged and sought to manipulate were moving beyond his control. In 1950, Kenyatta and Koinange met with administration officials and Asian and European representatives to try to hammer out a program for the development of an interracial society, and out of these meetings came the Kenya Citizen's Association. But the failure of the association to make rapid progress for lack of support from the European settlers and the rapidly rising tide of Mau Mau seemed to have convinced Kenyatta that African aspirations were doomed so long as settler interests remained paramount with the administration; therefore, Mau Mau should be permitted to run

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its course, however bloody and erratic, until this fundamental balance of power was changed.

(9) In April 1952, the administration had to admit that it had no direct evidence of Kenyatta's "management" of Mau Mau, and no such evidence was presented at his trial a year later which was admissible under English law. However, in the eyes of most Kikuyu, both conservative and radical, nationalism, Mau Mau and Kenyatta were inextricable from one another. The mode and pattern for the coming conflict had been established and the name Kenyatta had been made its symbol independent of the directions or desires of the man.

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23. Mau Mau organization.

a. Much mystery and confusion surrounded the nature of the organization of Mau Mau well into the conflict period and even after. The existence of the KAU as a legal organization, the continuance of the prescribed KCA both within and outside KAU, and the fact that the term Mau Mau was apparently never used during this period by the insurgents themselves, tended to confuse Africans as well as Europeans. In addition, the oaths administered in the late 1940's were still voluntary and relatively mild, and the oath used for KCA appeared interchangeable with those of KAU, the independent churches or Mau Mau.

b. Because the KCA was unable to operate openly, most of the Mau Mau organization during the preconflict period had to operate covertly within the structure of the KAU, the tribal associations, schools and trade union movements which were tacitly accepted if not approved by the colonial administration. By the end of the preconflict period the Mau

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Mau organization had developed all the character of a shadow government, paralleling both the colonial administration and the tribal councils.⁷⁷

c. The supreme governing body was the Central Executive Council, which was organized first in Kiambu but was moved to Nairobi in March or April of 1952 in order to operate under the guise of the KAU Central Committee. Below the Central Council were district committees, later called "district governments" by Mau Mau. In the Kikuyu reserve, each of the districts of Kiambu, Fort Hall and Nyeri had a district committee. Below these district committees were divisional councils which corresponded to the old Rugongo or ridge system. Below the divisional councils were the local village committees. The committees and councils at each level were responsible for accepting the guidance of the next higher body and formulating policy and action at its level to implement the general Mau Mau aims. The bulk of this activity took place within and under the cover of the KAU branches and agencies at these levels.

d. In the urban areas, such as Nairobi, where the large Kikuyu population was drawn from all three Kikuyu districts, a town council was organized for each of the three subpopulations. In turn, each of these town councils was divided into subsidiary councils in each of the native locations within the city. To provide additional cover for this organization in the cities many groups were formed ostensibly for social purposes, such as the Kikuyu General Union, the Kikuyu Club, and the Kikuyu Musical Society. These groups held tea parties, dances and sing-songs at which the new nationalist "hymns" were sung, and the propaganda meetings and meetings could be held later in the evening.⁷⁸

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e. The functions of the councils were to pass on new orders and instructions, enlist new members and administer the oath to them, collect funds, spread propaganda and collect information on Kikuyu opposed to the movement. Each council at every level was composed of nine men, at least in theory: the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, assistant treasurer, and three members. In addition, each of the office holders selected a deputy so that the group would not be disrupted with the absence of one or more officers because of death or arrest.

f. Attached to each of the councils and at every lower level was a force of police or askaris. In the preconflict period they generally acted as sentries for clandestine meetings and performed ceremonial functions during the oathings; later they were responsible for undertaking the physical punishments or executions ordered by the Mau Mau courts, acting as messengers between groups, and gathering intelligence information for the military arm. Many of these askaris were recruited from the Nairobi underworld of gangsters which thrived after World War II.

g. Three levels of "courts of justice" were developed in the movement, corresponding roughly to the colonial system of police courts, magistrates courts and the supreme court. The lower courts were empowered to deal with minor offenses and to impose fines or corporal punishment. The higher courts could impose the death penalty, but this did not become common until the conflict period.

h. During the conflict period the organization described above was to become what was referred to as the "passive element" of Mau Mau.

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Its principal responsibilities were to become: the recruitment for the Mau Mau armed forces, collection of money and supplies and, when possible, arms and ammunition, and provide intelligence from the vast system of Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu informers who were in the Government offices, the police, home guards and telephone service.

i. Although various acts of terrorism had been perpetrated in the name of the movement prior to the declaration of the state of emergency in 1952, these were principally the acts of the membership in the reserves or from among the "squatters." The real recruitment and training of the "army" in the forests of the Aberdares and of Mount Kenya, the so-called "active" element of Mau Mau, did not begin until well into the conflict period of 1953. This suggests the lack of preparedness of the organization for the onset of the conflict period, or the development of active conflict at a much earlier time than the leaders had assumed would be the case.⁷⁹

j. Most writers agree that the organization and structure of Mau Mau was much more flexible than the simple reciting of its hierarchy suggests. In actual practice the town and reserve councils operated with great autonomy, as did the "army" when it was finally developed. This loose structure provided the advantage that the movement could not be eradicated by the imprisonment of its top leaders; it was necessary to deal with every locality separately in order to establish control. At the same time the decentralized aspect of Mau Mau did not permit the leaders to impose coordination on the subordinate elements, or bring the conflict into the open at the time and place chosen by them. Under these

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circumstances, Mau Mau was able to perpetrate an immense amount of suffering, terror and carnage, but it could never be a serious threat to the colonial authorities.

24. Leadership.

a. Most of the literature focuses heavily on Jomo Kenyatta in the discussions of Mau Mau leadership. Official British reports, such as Corfield, went to great lengths to place principal blame for Mau Mau on Kenyatta. The Africans themselves rapidly made the name Kenyatta the symbol of nationalist aspiration and obviously many acts were perpetrated under the aegis of this symbol which were clearly beyond the control of the man himself. As a result most of the other leaders, those from among the traditional tribal leadership, the independent churches and schools, the trade union movement, and the Nairobi underworld, remain relatively obscure.

b. In addition, the speed with which the onset of violence and the declaration of a state of emergency took place left Kenyatta and most of the other militant leaders exposed and vulnerable to the British authorities. With the arrest of most of these militants, the movement was leaderless for a short period, and those leaders who emerged during the conflict period were of a substantially different character from those of the preconflict period. This section deals exclusively with the preconflict leadership; a subsequent paper will be devoted to the leaders of the conflict period.

c. Besides Kenyatta, the foremost preconflict militants were as follows: Fred Kubai and Bildad Kaggia, Chairman and Secretary of the

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Nairobi branch of KAU respectively, and leaders of the secret Mau Mau organization; James Beuttah, Chairman of the Murang'a branch and vice president of the Central Province KAU council; Harrison Wamuthenya, Henry Wambogo, Kiragu Kagotho, chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary respectively of the Nyeri branch KAU; Pratt Njogu and Romano Jamumo Gikunju the chairman and secretary of the Embu branch; Mbiyu Koinange, chairman of the Kiambu branch; Kung'u Karumba, chairman of the Limuru branch; and Paul J. Ngei, a Kambu, KAU assistant secretary. Most of these were young men, products of mission schools, the modern African intellectuals. Many had traveled abroad, a few while with the British army. Only one, Fred Kubai, could be described as detribalized for he grew up in Mombasa and was not a member of a Kikuyu age group.⁸⁰

d. Others such as Kamau Gichahi Githau, Stanley Methenge, Waigwa Kamurwa, Dedan Kimathi and Waruhiu Itote (General China) had become members during the preconflict period, but did not take the military and other leadership positions until 1952-53. These men were not numbered among the intellectuals; several were already well-known figures in the Nairobi underworld.

e. Presented below are short sketches of Jomo Kenyatta, Mbiyu Koinange, Fred Kubai and Bildad Kaggia, the senior leaders. With the exception of Kenyatta, their backgrounds and the manner and reasons for gravitating to Mau Mau are largely representative of the leadership group as a whole.

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f. Jomo Kenyatta.

(1) Jomo Kenyatta was born around 1900, the exact year is not known. At about age 10 he was taken in as an orphan by the Church of Scotland mission near Fort Hall and given the Christian name Johnstone. After his early years in the mission school he was taught the carpentry trade. As a young man Johnstone began to demonstrate his talent and imagination; he was employed in 1919 as an interpreter for the supreme court, and later worked in the Nairobi municipal offices. Kikuyu leaders recognized his leadership talents and he soon became editor of the newspaper "Mwigithania." In 1928 he was elected as president of KCA. The following year Johnstone went to Britain for 6 months to argue the land question. With the encouragement of various British sources, he also made a short visit to the Soviet Union. Having failed to elicit British sympathy for reform in Kenya, he returned home in 1930 a bitter and disillusioned man.

(2) In 1931, he went again to England to continue his studies and was to remain away from Kenya for 16 years. Most of the time he had very little money, provided from limited Kikuyu tribal funds, and he lived a meager existence. In 1932, he took an extensive trip to Europe and, apparently with Communist financial assistance, returned to the Soviet Union to study at Moscow University for a year and one-half. Rawcliffe judges that this training in Moscow obviously changed Jomo's outlook on colonialism, and he picked up ideas and techniques for organization, propaganda and revolution. However, he judges unlikely that Jomo was seduced by the ideology. At the time these ideas had little immediate

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relevance, so Jomo returned to England and took up his studies in anthropology. He attended the London School of Economics and London University, where he studied under Malinowski and under whom he produced a postgraduate thesis which was published under the name "Facing Mount Kenya." The book was an absorbing mixture of anthropological observation and political testament, arguing that the influence of the white man had demoralized the Kikuyu and broken their tribal discipline and self-restraint. A revival of the spirit of manhood and racial pride must come about, but this was not possible so long as the white man ruled Kenya. ⁸¹

(3) At about this time Jomo gave up the name Johnstone and assumed the symbolic name Kenyatta. Now well known in African and British circles, Kenyatta was able to bask in his prestige. Throughout World War II Kenyatta lectured to labor groups and operated as ex officio dean of the African community in London.

(4) With the end of the war and the emergence of extreme nationalist sentiment throughout all the colonial territories, Kenyatta finally found his opportunity to reenter politics. In 1945, he was elected president of the Pan-African Federation (Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast became general secretary). He presided with good humor and intelligence over the Pan-African Congress which brought together black people from Africa, the West Indies, and the United States to discuss their mutual problems.

(5) In September 1946, Kenyatta returned to Kenya, the most celebrated of African intellectuals and with overwhelming prestige among the Kikuyu. His assumption of leadership of the nationalist movement

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came easily enough, but the administration was unwilling to absorb him into the colonial hierarchy. For the next 5 years Kenyatta played a leadership role which has proved to be an enigma for his biographers. On the one hand he was able to strike will and discipline into KAU and his followers, and displayed an acute sense of organization and insight into the proper blending of traditional mythic and modern appeals to the emotions. On the other hand, he had accustomed himself to the good life; he lived in a pleasant house which literally "faced Mount Kenya," surrounded by the best of food and service. His self-indulgence and satisfaction, his humor, ingratiating manner and consummate ability to appear noncommittal appeared inconsistent with revolutionary zeal. These seeming inconsistencies were to plague his European prosecutors throughout his trial in 1953.

g. Mbiyu Koinange.

(1) Mbiyu Koinange was the son of Senior Chief Koinange, himself a longtime ardent supporter of African representation and education, and spokesman for the return of African lands. Senior Chief Koinange headed the Kiambu Kikuyu and enjoyed a good reputation with the administration. Mbiyu was sent to Cambridge for a year's study in 1927. He then went to the United States where he studied at Harvard and Columbia Universities. Dr. Ralph Bunche, then a professor at Howard, had visited Kenya during this period and had spent considerable time with the elder Koinange. Mbiyu developed a strong interest in the problem of African education, stimulated by the contact with Dr. Bunche and other American educators.

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(2) In 1938 Mbiyu returned to Kenya. He was offered a teachers post paying less than half that received by European instructors. He refused the position and became intent on founding an African university for Kenyans from all tribes. In 1939 the Kenya African Teachers College was opened at Githerguri headed by Mbiyu and operated with funds raised by his father using his position in the traditional tribal hierarchy. Soon the college became a center of African nationalism and a vehicle for spreading political consciousness.

(3) After the war Mbiyu became highly active in KAU, becoming chairman of the Kiamba branch, and competing with Eliud Mathu for the single African appointment to the Legislative Council. In 1950, he was sent by Kenyatta with a delegation to Tanganyika to help the Meru develop their land case against the Government. In 1951 he was sent to London to argue the land case in Kenya; this was the last delegation to try to argue patiently for reforms in Kenya before the militants decided to turn to the use of force. Mbiyu Koinange was characterized as an intelligent man, well educated and energetic in his pursuit of rectifying African grievances. It was in this area of Kiambu that political leadership emerged most clearly after World War II, stimulated most strongly by the land issue in the area. By 1952, Koinange was Kenyatta's chief lieutenant in the nationalist movement.

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h. Fred Kubai.

(1) Fred Kubai was an ex-serviceman who rapidly rose to leadership of the Forties group, the age group which had been initiated in 1940. After the war, Kubai became heavily involved in the trade union movement.

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By 1947, he was general secretary of the Transport and Allied Workers Union, later the Kenya African Road Transport and Mechanics Union.

(2) In May 1949, Kubai joined with Makhani Singh and Bildad Kaggia to form the East African Trade Union Congress, and the union made rapid organizational strides despite the quiet displeasure of the colonial administration and refusal to register it as a legal trade union. At the same time Kubai became chairman of the Nairobi branch of KAU and, as a result, KAU in Nairobi enjoyed a rapid influx of workers and organizing talent which increased greatly the militancy of the branch.

(3) Finally in 1950, Kubai and Singh were arrested for forming an illegal trade union movement; this touched off a general strike which lasted a week. The tactics of the strike demonstrated the growing militancy of the movement. Ten days later he was rearrested on charges of attempting to assassinate Councillor Muchohi Gikongo of Nairobi. He was finally tried and acquitted in February 1951. Kubai returned to KAU, this time to work with Kaggia on the development of the secret movement within KAU. In 1952 he was arrested with Kenyatta and tried for managing Mau Mau. The literature contains little more on Kubai, his background or talents, but the advances he made in the 7 years before his arrest in 1952 attest to his organizational capability and militant nationalism.⁸³

i. Bildad Kaggia.

(4) Bildad Mwaganu Kaggia was a member of the KAU Central Executive Council and was tried and convicted with Kenyatta. Kaggia was something of a revolutionary's everyman: ex-serviceman, organizer and

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leader of his own church, trade union leader and revolutionary organizer. He has been characterized as the high priest of Mau Mau; his principal motivation appears to have been his supreme religious conviction in the movement.

(2) Kaggia was born in about 1922, baptized by the Church Missionary Society, and trained at the CMS school at Kahuhia in Fort Hall. He was considered a devout mission follower. After working 3 years in the District Commissioner's office, Kaggia joined the Army in 1942 and rose to staff sergeant. In 1943 he was sent to England to help establish a reception camp for repatriated African prisoners-of-war from Germany; while there he met Kenyatta and began to become interested in politics.

(3) In 1945 Kaggia returned to Kenya, embittered by racial inequality in the Army, convinced that the missions were tools of colonial subjugation, and determined to liberate Africans from foreign religious teachings as a first step toward gaining independence. At age 23, Kaggia formed his own independent church, appealing to all denominations and nonchurch Africans. It spread rapidly throughout Central Province and Ukambani and, although he disavowed the name, it popularly became known as "Din. ya Kaggia."

(4) Kaggia also soon became heavily involved in the trade union movement; by 1947 he was president of the Clerks and Commercial Workers Union, centered in Nairobi. When the militants finally took control of the Nairobi branch of KAU in June 1951, Kaggia was elected General Secretary. Kaggia and Kubai formed in central leadership of the secret inner organization of KAU.

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CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC FACTORS

by Harley M. Roberts

25. Introduction.

a. The history of Kenya's progress from a rigidly stratified colonial economy to a more modern, interdependent economy, propelled by internal demand and investment, has been primarily a history of struggle and change in the relationships between the European settler "whites" and the Kikuyu "Africans." The official Emergency of 1952-60, declared against the Kikuyu Mau Mau movement, was an important stage in this economic modernization process.

b. In 1888, the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC) obtained a royal charter covering Kenya and Uganda, with the business goals of establishing a cotton producing center in Uganda and developing commercial ties to the coastal cities, plus the responsibility of halting the slave trade, focused upon Zanzibar. After just 7 years of unprofitable business, this company was bought out by the British Government for motives of grand strategy, to ensure British control of the Nile's headwaters in the Sudan and to resist German colonial expansion. Toward this end, the Uganda Railway was constructed by 1901 from the Kenyan port of Mombasa to Kisumu on Lake Victoria, 550 miles inland.

c. By 1920 the major characteristics of Kenya which distinguished its history from that of neighboring territories were already well established. The English, looking for a way to pay for their railroad and

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make it profitable, saw that the Kenya "highlands" offered excellent opportunities for successful European settlement and exploitation. An inflow of white settlers resulted, and the beginning of a rapid process which alienated land in large amounts.

d. "European" settlers immigrated from South Africa and England to found large farm estates in the areas known as the "white highlands." By 1930, some 2,900 such estates were recorded, about double the 1915 number. These settlers exerted a disproportionate influence over the other Europeans in Kenya, who were primarily employed in agencies of the Colonial Government. Kenya's urban and commercial middle class was composed of the distinctive "Asian" community of Hindu and Muslim Indians, who dominated the colony's trade. Asian immigrants settled mainly in the larger towns, but individuals were found in almost every African village of any market importance, where a "duka" (store) for general goods could support itself. Land alienation took place rapidly during 1903-15, as a conscious policy of the Colonial Office in London; this policy early resulted in hemming the Kikuyu with lands earmarked for European settlement. Well-intentioned Government policies to preserve Kenya's limited resources further restricted Kikuyu lands, since the best forest reserves lay along the Kikuyu border. At the same time, European settlers required farm labor, and the rapidly growing center in Nairobi required day-wage workers which the Asian community would not supply. The Kikuyu, centrally located to supply both needs, rapidly became predominant, both as Kenya's farm "squatters" and contract laborers, and as Nairobi's labor force.

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e. A number of distinctive events and trends distinguish Kenyan economic history after 1930 from the previous periods. The worldwide collapse of agricultural prices, triggered by the US depression of 1930-33, was felt sharply by most Kenya white settlers, who had established their economic strength during the previous decade. This reduced the demand for native labor and marked the beginning of the "squatter" problem in the white highlands. African farmers also suffered from serious locust invasions in 1930-32, which cut into African farm output and incomes.

f. In 1930, the Native Lands Trust Ordinance officially defined a policy of "native reserves" which had been first accepted in 1926. And the so-called Carter Commission (Kenya Land Commission) was set up in 1930, although its formal report and extensive hearings were published only in 1933. Judge Carter, the chairman, was a man who gained renown in Uganda for his vigorous stand in favor of European plantation-style farming. Yet this report represented the first acknowledgement of African land rights, the need for their official protection, and the need for protection of African standards of living.

g. Among other significant events of 1930-31 were the discovery of gold in Kakamega, Nyanza Province, in October 1931 (output reaching its peak in 1936-38); the first Agricultural Census in 1930, and a population census of "nonnative" Kenyans in 1931. In the midthirties, African barter markets were officially defined and transferred from the chiefs' sole control to the Local Native Councils (later, ADC's or African District Councils). Taking these events into account, the 1930's represented

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a new period of domestic economic change, of official attention to African economic conditions, and a rather clear economic transition period.

h. The 1930's and the war years of 1939-45 saw the growth of Nairobi as a center of East African commerce, regional transport and trade, and manufacturing. During the war, internal food shortages and rationing, as well as the service outside Kenya of some 70,000 African soldiers, helped to widen individual horizons, and make the European-directed colonial system of political, economic and social segregation much less bearable. Official recognition of this was the 1946-55 African Development Plan, established by the Kenya Government within the 10-year overall economic development plan approved by the Colonial Office. However, postwar changes came slowly for the energetic Kikuyu, who were most exposed to modernizing and urbanizing changes in postwar Nairobi.

i. This paper examines the economic system and factors of Kenya, leading up to the Mau Mau "rebellion." The period between 1930 and 1952 is examined in detail, because economic trends following the 1930 depression are most relevant to the postwar economic revival and to postwar political developments.

26. The overall economy.

a. National income and product.

(1) Quantitative measures of the early growth of Kenya's economy are fragmentary and often inconsistent. Such basic measures as the total African population were not recorded by the early censuses of 1911, 1921, 1926 and 1931. While the colonial Government collected extensive

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statistics on Kenya's crop production, Government finances and foreign trade from its earliest days, these were designed for narrow administrative needs. Thus, they fail to give an adequate picture of the African subsistence economy and Kenya's overall economic structure.

(2) An excellent economic history of Kenya's growth to 1945 has been written by C. G. Wrigley, which integrates the available data from official sources into a careful picture of economic trends for the interwar period. Wrigley stresses the rapid growth of European farming and its advantageous position in world markets during the 1920's, while African farming of the same period expanded very little and continued to be for "subsistence."¹

(3) The earliest estimate of Kenya's overall product was made for the year of 1930. This unique effort, prepared in a thorough survey of Kenya's economy by the Aaronovitches, is not directly comparable to later estimates, but provides the only comparison of early economic structure to the national accounts prepared for 1946-52 by the East African Statistical Department. A tabular comparison is made below.² More recently, national product and payments balances have been estimated for 1923-38 by R. L. West but these were not available for the present study.³

(4) The Aaronovitch estimates, like the later EASD estimates, offer no analysis of the foreign payments by or to Kenyan residents; therefore the definitional difference between "national income" and "geographic income" is not a measurable distinction, nor important to any broad analysis of economic structure. It is important to note the

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large size of the export sector, however, and to note that Kenyan imports consistently exceeded export earnings, by margins which varied with world financial conditions and internal investment opportunities. The difficulty of separating Kenya's balance of payments from that of the East African Customs Union has sharply limited the usefulness of all national-product estimates.

TABLE III. NATIONAL OUTPUT OF KENYA, 1930-52.

	Output (in UKL millions)			
	1930	1948	1951	1952
Net product (NGP).	8.74 . .	60.9 . .	102.9 . .	107.0
African crop product	2.25 . .	19.3 . .	26.8 . .	27.4
Government budget revenues . .	3.23 . .	11.41 . .	17.47 . .	20.55
Exports.	3.42 . .	10.96 . .	24.07 . .	25.79
Population (in thousands)				
Total.	3,014 . .	5,399 . .	5,669 . .	5,760
African.	2,940 . .	5,240 . .	5,479 . .	5,561

Sources: Aaronovitch pp 151, 102, 166 for 1930 data; East African Statistical Department, 1953: 4-5, and Statistical Abstract, 1955, pp 4, 15. Net national income equals net geographical product, 1948-52.

(5) What were the broad lines of the 1930 economy, and the differentials between the three main social groups? The Aaronovitch estimates showed that £2.25 million, or 25.7 percent of the net product originated from African agricultural (primary) production, while total African net income amounted to £3.20 million or under £1.1 per head. In contrast, the 1930 income per head was £18.8 for the Indian group, and £208.2 for Europeans.⁴ Primary production, mainly agricultural, was 63 percent of

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the national income, and the non-African share of this sector was 59 percent. Mining and manufacturing made up only 3.5 percent of the net product, at £310,000, whereas Government expenditures to purchase net product came to 11.5 percent, or £1.0 million. The transport sector was second only to farming as a major area, contributing 14.3 percent.⁵

(6) The structure of output in 1948-51 was markedly different, although differing methods of estimating subsistence activities were used and better coverage of economic activities exists for the postwar period. Primary agricultural output was 44 percent of 1948's product of 1.61 million, and 46.6 percent of the total 1951 output of 1.103 million. Mining and manufacture ranked third (11 percent for both years), after the commerce-financial sector which provided 17 and 15 percent, respectively, of net product. The transport sector share was less than that of Government services, and both were growing slowly, compared to the expanding manufacturing and building sectors.⁶

(7) The African share in primary output during 1948-51 was recorded in two parts: African subsistence output rose in value, from £16.5 to £22.1 million, but made up a falling share (27-21.5 percent) of total net product. The smaller share of African "marketed produce" rose in value terms, reaching £4.7 million of 1951 output, but was a relatively stable 4.6-5.1 percent of total product. So the proportion of African farm output which was marketed rose slowly between 1947 and 1951, from 14 to 18 percent of African farm output, while its proportion relative to non-African farm output was falling.⁷

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(8) The national income data for 1947-52 do not permit direct comparisons with 1930, to determine Kenya's growth rates. Price indexes for the postwar period were limited to Nairobi and based upon 1939; by 1952 this index was 240, which was 31 percent above the 1948 level and 148 percent of the 1944-45 index. While no official data on real product changes for the postwar period were prepared, the 1956 Budget Speech claimed that 1948-54 real growth amounted to 60 percent, or 10 percent annually in the "cash" or money economy. This average, however, conceals sharp swings between the 17 percent "real" growth of 1950-51 and the fall of 3 percent in real terms between 1952 and 1953, attributed to the emergency.⁸

b. Income distribution.

(1) Overall output figures are rather meaningless unless they are put in per capita income terms, to show trends in actual living standards. Again, illustrative data are available but strict comparability is extremely difficult. A household budget for 4.36 persons in South Nyanza of about 1932-33 was estimated at ESh104.84^{*} or ESh 24 per person. Roughly one-fifth of the income for this budget was earned from wage labor outside the native reserves, while only 13 percent came from marketed African-farm produce. Food consumption took over 60 percent of

* For easy comprehension, large figures are cited in UK pounds (£) while smaller amounts use the East African shilling, divided into 100 cents (ESh). The East African shilling equals the British shilling, with 20 to the pound.

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family expenditures, taxes took EASH18.60 (17.8 percent) and only some EASH20 was left over for clothing, housing, and all other family costs, or EASH4.60 per head.⁹

(2) No comparable estimate of average income for an African family during 1948-52 is available. However, a survey of African laborers in Nairobi, in October-November 1951, showed a total monthly expenditure of EASH51.68 or EASH620 per year. Food costs were some 60 percent of this budget, and "remittances" plus gifts were 6.1 percent. The reported average earnings of full-time and casual Africans in public service agencies rose from EASH320 to EASH440 between 1948 and 1952. A very rough conclusion is that African incomes grew by 40 percent over these 4 years, with at least three-fourths of this money increase being absorbed by price increases.

(3) The relative income levels of the three major ethnic groups in 1930 was shown to approximate 1:17:189 for the per capita income of Africans, Asians, and Europeans, by Aaronovitch's calculations. Reported average earnings for 1946-55 as provided by the Statistical Abstract show similar sets of ratios which are not comparable but are highly indicative of the differential economic position of these three groups. For agriculture, the 1948 proportions were 1:18.7:37 and in 1952 were 1:20:40. For the public services similar ratios were 1:7.8:20 and 1:7.3:19.9.¹⁰

(4) In private industry and commerce, the 1952 ratio was 1:7:21.5. Thus while the gap between the highest and lowest income groups appears to have narrowed considerably, this effect was relatively unimportant for income disparities in the agricultural sector, which

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showed a spread twice as great as that in urban and modern activities. There is little to show that relative income gaps were narrowing during 1948-52.

c. Employment trends.

(1) One final overall index of long-term economic change in Kenya may be found in the statistics of "registered employment." From as early as 1903 it was the legal custom to register formal labor contracts between African workers and European employers, but the available statistics require careful interpretation. The Labor Census of 1945 estimated that 334,000 adult males were in employment, while only 76 percent of these (254,700) were then registered by the Government as employed. In 1929, the registered African males employed totaled 160,000, but Kenya's 1930-32 depression cut down on this number.¹¹ By 1938, some 183,000 were so registered; in 1949 this figure reached 395,000 and by 1952 amounted to 434,600 Africans, or only 15 percent more than those so registered in 1946, 6 years earlier. In contrast, the number of Asians and Europeans reported as employed grew steadily and rapidly over the 1946-52 period, at 43 percent and 70 percent respectively.¹²

(2) Such employment estimates and the preceding national product estimates depend upon population data for their interpretation. It must be recognized that Kenya's total population is largely a matter of guesswork, up to the 1948 complete census. Aaronovitch records the semi-official estimates for 1928-45, collected by the various district officers on the basis of poll tax assessments, which show 2.9 million for 1929, 3.28 million in 1938 and 3.83 million in 1945. Using an annual

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rate of increase of 1.5 percent, as reported to the 1934 Kenya Land Commission, yields a 1948 projection of population which is fully 1.2 million (23 percent) lower than the census count of 5.24 million African persons. Plainly, there is considerable reason to doubt the accuracy of all estimates for the interwar period. This makes suspect any effort to derive per capita income, living standards or production estimates for the African subsistence economy in the "native reserves."¹³

(3) The non-African population, however, is fully accounted for by censuses starting in 1911. Between the 1931 and 1948 census years, this group grew from 73,900 to 154,800 for a 110 percent increase. While the European community grew from 16,800 to 29,700 over these years, its proportion fell to 19.2 percent of Kenya's non-Africans in 1948, for the lowest share since before World War I. "Indians" and Goans made up 63 percent while the Arabs of the coast were under 16 percent.¹⁴

27. The traditional sectors--farming.

a. Background.

(1) Kenyan economic history presents a number of difficulties for any analysis which tries to identify a separate, slow-changing traditional economic sector, and assumes that economic modernization arises from urbanizing and industrializing trends. It is not difficult to identify the African tribal economies as slow-changing, constrained by traditional habits, customs, and values. But up to 1940, the main impetus

¹³ For postwar, 1946-55, official estimates of natural population increase were: 1.0 percent (European); 2.5 percent Indian; 1.5 percent African. From the 1963 census, the African rate was proved to be too low, with growth reestimated at 2.5 percent.¹⁵

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toward economic growth may be clearly traced to agriculture, as practiced by the immigrant European and a few Asian farmers. Urban growth, also sparked by these immigrants, clearly followed in time upon the expansion of farm output, and was heavily concentrated in the political capital of Nairobi.

(2) Kenyan development appears to be best explained by the "staple crop export" theory, typically found in Canada's expansion. European maize production and other cash crops such as coffee, tea and sugar cane provided the rise in marketed surplus which was needed to support a growing city population; most of this surplus was due to the settlers of the white highlands, rather than to any spread of the money economy among African tribal groups. The result was the creation of a typical colonial economy, with rigidly stratified social and occupational levels in the production and income pyramid. In other cases of colonial development, similar but distinctive structures have been given various names, such as a "plantation economy," a "dualistic economy," and a "subsistence economy."¹⁶

(3) To discuss Kenyan economic trends in agriculture adequately, special attention must be paid to African "subsistence farming," and the Kikuyu are discussed as representative of this Kenya-wide economic sector. In most respects the Kikuyu group exemplify the economic, social and political pressures toward modernization and change experienced by all Kenyan Africans. European settler farming, despite its importance as a saving, innovative, and market-extending sector will also be discussed as part of the "traditional sector" of farming, because of the limited influence

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which this "progressive" element had upon African farming, and because the white settlers rapidly became an entrenched economic elite in Kenya, actively resisting such modernizing trends as the extension of cash-crop farming, the widening of markets and financial institutions, the free mobility of labor and the active developmental role for Government. The Asian social group, which also comprised an economic unit through its concentration upon commerce, will be included as one part of the traditional colonial society and economy, structured to resist and to slow economic change.

b. The Kikuyu--tradition and economic life.

(1) Traditional Kikuyu economic life, with its intertwined political and social features, has been detailed in a number of careful anthropological and sociological studies. The central unifying social threads were early identified as family lineage, neighborhood residence, and the age-sets of initiation. These three loyalties and sets of responsibilities, each taking in a different set of fellow Kikuyus, created a highly cohesive, interdependent community with a strong sense of identity and pride (chapter 4). Land ownership was the basis of family status and family production. Labor was carefully specialized according to sex and age-group, and the major forms of currency and capital were sheep and goats.¹⁷ However, it is complicated and difficult to trace the precise interactions of these traditional elements, and there are various interpretations of Kikuyu words and practices.¹⁸

(2) The importance of land and the nature of Kikuyu land ownership has been analyzed exhaustively. The Kenya Land Commission report of

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1932-33 found that "the basis of all Kikuyu land ownership is the githaka system."¹⁹ The githaka was land owned by a specific family-unit founder, through right of clearing, or by his descendants through inheritance; in time each githaka contained several homesteads of the resulting subclan or extended family (mbari) who shared in ownership and formed shifting patches of ground within the githaka. But the exogamous subclan family quickly extended outside its original lands, and mbari descendants moved elsewhere to clear their own lands, purchase lands or even to become tenants (ahoi) upon other family githakas. Thus some large subclan "families" sprang up, scattered widely across Kikuyu territory and owning many dispersed githaka.²⁰

(3) The land rights of the mbari members, however, were not extinguished by their departure; the local family head (muramati) continued to be responsible to provide a cultivation plot to close family descendants, as well as divide it annually among his wives and local relatives for cultivation. The land could not be sold without community approval by the council elders of the neighborhood. Tenants might be permitted farming rights, but these rights were withdrawn if other customary obligations conflicted with them. Almost all authorities agree that within the traditional Kikuyu area of Kiambu, Fort Hall (Mwanga) and Nyeri, there was no land that was not "owned," while there was much uncultivated land, bush and forest at the earliest times of European settlement.²¹ Communal lands, held for sacred or social purposes by the neighborhood, did not play a major role, but existed for local grazing, religious and social purposes.

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(4) The close relationship with "his githaka" and "his family subclan" was vitally important to the Kikuyu male adult, and contributed to the early resentment against immigrant Europeans, expressed by the "chiefs," the Kikuyu Association and by Thuku's Young Kikuyu Association in 1920 and 1921.²² "Land alienation" continued to be part of official Kenya Colony policy up to 1930, when the Native Lands Trust Ordinance was finally passed, to reserve specific limited territories for African use and ownership. In 1933, the Kenya Land Commission published evidence and a report, showing that some 100 square miles of Kikuyu land had been alienated since 1902 and "compensations" in other areas totaled only 70 square miles; thus some 30.5 square miles of forest reserve was owed to the "Kikuyu Native Reserves."²³

(5) From an historical perspective, it seems that the creation of native reserves should have meant the end of outright conflict between Kikuyu and Europeans, based upon land problems. In fact this was not the case, and by 1950-52, the new Mau Mau movement among the Kikuyu emphasized land alienation by Europeans as the primary injustice to be redressed.²⁴ What kept this problem alive and current was the differential treatment of land rights under the Colony's laws, which worked to prevent individual Kikuyu from obtaining land titles. At the same time, there was an ever-extending effort by the Kenya Government to actively direct and introduce improved agricultural and conservation practices into the native reserves.

(6) Differential rights lay in the confused doctrine that all lands in Kenya belonged to the Crown. Thus, "alienation" occurred only

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through an official document leasing land to an approved holder; from 1915 onward, Europeans could obtain 999-year leases, while after 1930 a normal 33-year lease period applied to lands in African reserves.²⁵ Few of the boundary changes to reserves as recommended by the Carter Commission were put into effect.²⁶ But more important were the positive policies of the Government, to maintain inviolate the Forest Reserve, much of which bordered Kikuyu country, and to upgrade African farming habits, particularly by slaughtering excess cattle stocks.²⁷ In postwar years, this agricultural policy reached its peak in official pressure to encourage Kikuyu terracing of farmlands, and the consolidation of scattered inefficient holdings. Only during the 1950's, under the stress of emergency conditions was a sweeping and rapid program of village formation, land consolidation and resettlement actually carried out in Kiambu, and much of Fort Hall and Nyeri districts.²⁸

(7) As is stressed by Wrigley, the early settlers' view of Kenya's economy identified land as a free good, in plentiful supply, while human labor was scarce and unreliable.²⁹ This same view was inherent in Kikuyu tradition and custom, as they expanded into the forested Mount Kenya highlands, cleared their githakas and adopted their shifting patterns of fallow cultivation. Cultivation rights belonged to the man who expended labor in clearing--land ownership was a separate, subclan matter. Traditionally, agricultural work was primarily delegated to women and children, while men concentrated upon livestock herding, crafts such as ironsmithing, and heavy work such as land-clearing, house-building, and trading.³⁰ Also men were exclusively concerned with

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warrior and elder council duties, which preoccupied them during their most productive working years.

(8) With the introduction of British law and order, the functions of a warrior class or age-set generation were sharply reduced; thus early European observers found many able-bodied Africans apparently idle, yet without enthusiasm for wage-work away from their homes. The immigrant settlers pressed continuously for official assistance to drive such Africans into the labor market; in 1919 Governor Northey's efforts to require such African labor outside the reserves led to missionary and British outcries and to Northey's resignation.³¹

(9) The kipande, a native male registration card, was introduced in 1920. This instrument of labor and movement control was greatly resented and opposed by Harry Thuku's Young Kikuyu Association, (YKA), leading to Thuku's deportation. The kipande continued to focus Kikuyu feelings of discrimination, long after Thuku's exile ended in 1931. It provided the means for unofficial pressure within the reserves to recruit African labor--pressure which continued through the 1930's and the war-time period. It also provided a means of checking upon the numerous Kikuyu "squatters" within the districts reserved as white highlands.

(10) By 1933, official estimates placed the Kikuyu total outside the reserve areas at 110,000, with a majority counted as "squatters" on European-owned lands, under special contracts to provide half-time wage labor, in exchange for a tenant's plot and limited pasture rights. Despite continued efforts to control such "squatters," especially under a law of 1937, their numbers continued to grow and by 1945 had reached

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200,000 with Kikuyu providing the majority.³² Governmental efforts to remove Rift squatters were pressed during 1945 and again in 1951.³³

(11) Postwar work force trends are not easy to analyze from the fragmentary data available on Kikuyu employment. Driven by conditions and events of the emergency period, some 100,000-110,000 Kikuyu are reported to have fled the Rift Valley district to return to the Kikuyu reserve, and some 70,000 Kikuyu residing in Nairobi were screened during Operation Anvil in June 1954.³⁴ These estimates fail to provide much information to update the 1948 census estimate of the Kikuyu population, of 1.03 million persons equally divided between male and female. As late as 1955, the net growth rate of all Kenyan Africans was believed to be only 1.5 percent, although the proportion aged under 14 was a high 48.1 percent in 1948. The Kikuyu were widely recognized to be the most dispersed tribe outside of the native reserves; others however such as the Luhya, were also numerous in the white highlands.³⁵

(12) During the postwar period, additional labor controls were imposed upon Africans in Nairobi, in the form of a labor registration book which provided space for employer comments, and in the form of tighter police security measures to control the city's overexpanded potential labor force. African housing was restricted to specific areas, and was extremely short, at a time when urban growth was very marked. The Kikuyu in particular suffered from the simultaneous restrictions upon any permanent movement of their family to the city, and restrictions upon travel to their nearby reserves. The "detribalization," which many observers including Leakey noted as a major factor in modern

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Kikuyu life, was not a complete or comprehensive economic severing of Kikuyu ties to the life of the reserves. Instead the Kikuyu male became increasingly aware of the limited economic opportunities available to him, in the reserves, in the city, or as resident labor on European farms.

(13) During the 1947-52 period, this awareness was accelerated by the construction and business boom in Nairobi, and by the Government's increased efforts within the Kikuyu reserves to mobilize community action to control soil erosion. A number of specific incidents evidenced this growing resistance to European control; to the Kikuyu, all was summed up in the political slogan that "the land" was theirs by original right. It is interesting to speculate whether earlier official action to distribute land registration titles, as recommended by a Royal Commission in 1935, would have diverted Kikuyu political action into more evolutionary channels.

c. The white settlers. From 1903 to 1952, the economic and political life of Kenya was dominated by the European or "white" immigrants who colonized the region, financed construction of the railway, and leased large tracts of highlands farm land from an indulgent colonial Government. The British Colonial Office early recognized the possibility that Kenya's large uninhabited spaces could support a British colony of farmers and ranchers, in the manner of the settlement then underway in Australia and New Zealand.

(.) Colonial Office policy remained quite consistent, from its earliest expression. It sought to establish English farmers on the land

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as permanent settlers, and at the same time to avoid land speculation and the creation of large estates or plantations.³⁶ The earliest settlers had different views. Although they also hoped for a large British colony of resident farmers, the earliest leaders obtained leases for tracts each in excess of 100,000 acres. Land was advertised in London, and large areas were purchased by persons who had no intention of settling upon them. This was only one of a series of differences in a history of conflict among the Colonial Office in London, the Governor in Nairobi, and the settlers. The latter early formed political associations and became the major problem for any new Governor to deal with.

(2) A remarkably small group of European settlers had major economic interests in Kenya land policy formation, and they were a highly homogeneous group, although individualistic in personality. The continuity of settler influence may be seen in two competing leaders: Lord Delamere died in 1931, still at his political prime, while Captain Grogan, an early immigrant from South Africa, continued service on Kenya's Legislative Council to 1957. The small group which they spoke for grew rapidly in the 1920's but totaled only 1,715 farmer-settlers with families in 1924 and just over 2,000 in 1929.³⁷ By 1952, little more than 2,000 settler families were actually resident on the land, and white "employees" in agriculture amounted to only 1,900 persons.³⁸

(3) Settler political influence was paralleled by the growth of European farm associations, with the Kenya Farmer Association (KFA) most important for its monopoly of the maize and wheat market, under the protective system established in 1923.³⁹ Before 1920, Kenya's most important

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export crops were coffee and sisal, both raised upon smaller "plantations" of 500-1,000 acres. During the 1920's, maize and wheat grew rapidly, both for export and domestic consumption. But the worldwide depression of 1930-35 cut sharply into European farm earnings and exports, leading to increased efforts by the KFA to maintain prices by purchasing African maize crops. In 1934, the Government established restrictions upon local native markets within the reserves, which ostensibly were designed to control Asian middleman profits. In fact, this permitted KFA buying agencies to set prices more easily and control African supplies more closely.⁴⁰

(4) This 1934 action was part of the steady economic resistance by white settlers to any expansion of African market output. From 1925, European coffee growers resisted official proposals to introduce coffee on native farms, claiming that low quality African output would destroy the European product. European settlers vigorously supported the official findings of the 1930's that African lands were overgrazed and overfarmed; soil erosion due to poor African farming practices became the Government's predominant agricultural concern by 1940, and direct control of crop patterns in the reserves was widely favored.

(5) The KFA and its parallel European group, the Kenya Dairies and Creameries Cooperative, were active participants in the official wartime effort to control and direct food production, and use Kenya's export surplus for wartime needs. In fact, Kenya's wartime food exports were disappointingly low. This was attributed to the shortage of European managers, of African labor and to the 1943 drought. But the postwar

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years, especially after 1947, saw a rapid revival of Kenya's export trade and a high level of farm profits. European plantation farming of coffee and sisal recovered quickly to 20 and 23 percent of export values, while maize exports remained low in 1948-49.⁴¹ In subsequent years, tea exports also reached a high level of L1.3 million. Thus the postwar agricultural boom favored the more intensive mixed European farming which had developed as official policy around 1938-39, and this trend also provided a good potential for the small-scale African producer, to raise a variety of cash crops.

(6) The 1952 employment pattern for the European population suggests how small a group was directly concerned with farming. Of the 10,000 Europeans employed in a population of 42,000, not more than 2,000 were employed in agriculture, along with some 3,000 farm owners. In contrast, some 200,000 African laborers represented farm wage labor, with 45,500 on coffee plantations, 25,000 each in tea and sisal, and 92,500⁴² occupied in mixed farming. This dependence upon African labor in the European white highlands was a tension-provoking subject throughout Kenya's history. European settlers pressed for labor controls which would force Africans into wage employment as early as 1919. However, they simultaneously objected to any permanent status for such laborers, which gave them tenant status, with their own farm plots and herds. In 1937 an official act was passed to control "squatters" or "resident labor" in the white highlands, which specified that excess African livestock and nonemployed adults should be returned to the native reserves.

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(f) This European ambivalence toward their native labor continued during the postwar farm boom; the desire to keep a labor supply close to each farm conflicted with the complications involved in protecting unused farmland from "tenant" encroachment and in requiring a fixed quantity of labor at the white manager's convenience. The situation, arbitrary and frustrating to both parties, was found in constant local supervision of African resident labor in the white highlands, a system of written labor contracts, and an insistence that African tenant farming and grazing rights existed only at the pleasure of the white owner.

d. The Asian community. The Asian community was established very early in Kenya's history as the skilled labor and trading layer of the colonial economy. Indians from the Punjab entered Kenya as contract laborers to build the Uganda Railroad, while Gujarat and Coon Indians established themselves even earlier as traders and storekeepers along the coast. An early Kenyan entrepreneur was Jeeva-jee, whose fortune provided Nairobi's first public park and carried him to membership in the 1907-09 Legislative Council.

(i) The Indian population grew rapidly throughout the interwar period, and consistently exceeded the European population. After 1945, despite the limitations to Indian immigration imposed in 1930, this inflow swelled even further, and by the 1948 census, Indians and Goans made up 97,700 of the total 154,800 non-African population. By 1952, the Indian communities totaled three times the number of Europeans; their numbers were highly concentrated in the largest towns of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu.

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(2) The Asian community is best considered as a force for economic change and growth due to its predominance in trade and commerce. It is discussed in 28 below in this context. But its significance in forming white settler attitudes makes it a subject for brief discussion in an analysis of Kenyan agriculture. A few Asian farmers obtained lands under the early land alienation policy, all in the Kericho district of Nyanza Province. This was the origin of Kenya's tea economy, but Asian farm settlers were quickly discouraged from further expansion. In fact the European settlers viewed the fast-growing Asian groups as their main economic enemy up to 1940; the white highlands policy was defined to exclude Asians, rather than the poorly capitalized African.

(3) While Indian or "Asian" initiative and skills were recognized and welcome in Government agencies and town commerce, there was a strong conviction that their economic abilities threatened the stability of the rural economy and the native reserves. Thus much of the Government's policy towards Africans was viewed as a benevolent effort to prevent Asian traders from taking unfair profits at the expense of Africans. The result was to make this middle class community into a narrowly defined economic layer, with political aims and economic interests normally in opposition to that of the Government and the white settlers.

(4) However, until the postwar period, it is reasonable to generalize that the Asian economic interests lay in the towns of Kenya, in modernizing trade and commercial channels, and to only a very minor extent were conceived as separable from the interests of the ruling

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European elite. While discrimination in land law and in wages was directed at the Asians, their mid-position on the colonial ladder led them to share many economic goals with the European rulers.

28. Industry and modernizing sectors.

a. Background.

(1) The major impulse behind Kenya's early economic growth was the Kenya-Uganda railway. In fact this single "industry" created Kenya's importance in early British policy, founded the city of Nairobi and made possible the European settlement and export-crop farming of the white highlands. Soda ash exports also were developed, and after 1931 the gold mining industry grew rapidly to importance. But until 1945 there was little manufacturing in Kenya, and the postwar boom in this sector and in construction contributed heavily to overall growth.

(2) Postwar economic planning by the Government was responsible only for investments in agriculture, welfare and transport. Industrial investment was mainly private, and in 1952 Kenya still represented a stronghold of laissez-faire policies toward industry, modern European commerce and banking. The Royal East African Commission of 1953-55, reporting primarily upon Kenya, found Adam Smith's economic prescriptions entirely suitable for the area.⁴³ But this postwar period of expansion also thrust many Africans into modern urban life and wage labor, with the growth of African trade unions and African political awareness as a natural consequence.

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b. Transportation.

(1) The railroad, originally named the Uganda Line, was built between Mombasa and Kisumu during 1895-1901, at a cost of L5.6 million. This was financed by London loans, and the modest profit earned after 1903-04 were insufficient to cover an investment which had exceeded original estimates by some 85 percent. It seemed a clever policy and unsuspected benefit to sell to European settlers the rights to large, uninhabited tracts in Kenya's no man's land, through which the railway passed to Uganda's cotton. Thus large estates were leased and a settled white community was established in Kenya before World War I; the political center, in Nairobi, was also the railway's administrative and shop center.

(2) Almost all of Kenya's export crops moved by railroad in this early period; fully 25 percent of import tonnage was for the railway's or Government's own account. The flows also determined the railway's rate structure and profitability, both being higher when exports were heavy. In 1920-21 the line towards central Uganda was begun, running north from Nakuru to Eldoret and the Uasin Gishu plateau so it would traverse the white-settled highlands. This longer route, with its second climb up to the Rift escarpment, reached Kampala, Uganda in 1931. By then the railway had been renamed the "Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours," was financially independent and controlled Mombasa port, as well as the major cargo movements on Lake Victoria. The 1929 traffic carried, of 953,000 tons, was twice that of 1924, and fully 90 percent of the 1937-39 prewar peak tonnage.

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(3) The Second World War saw rapid growth in the railway's traffic, to double the prewar level. Military cargo and passengers accounted for fully one-third of wartime totals, and caused depreciation of equipment. But the expected postwar recession was neither serious nor long-lasting. By 1948 the railway was carrying as much as in wartime peak years, and in 1951 traffic had grown by 28 percent further. This large and continued expansion, associated with the postwar boom in Kenya's imports and exports, suggests the high rate of overall growth and how heavily the railway contributed to it.

(4) In 1947 the total transport sector contributed 14.2 million, or almost 3 percent to the net product. By 1953, this share had fallen to 6.8 percent, but had grown in value to some 17.4 million. Within Kenya, the railway was the largest single employer, with some 26,000 employees in 1951. Fully 22,000 of these were African; the largest tribal units among them were the Kamba, who predominated in Mombasa, and the Kikuyu, largest in Nairobi.⁴⁵

(5) In 1948 the railway was merged with the Tanganyika Central and Southern railways into a self-contained entity, the East African Railways and Harbours Administration (EARH), responsible for all ports on Lake Victoria and the seacoast. Up to this time road construction had not been a major concern of Kenya's Government, but under the Ten-Year Development Programme much more attention to this sector was given. During 1946-53 some 14.3 million was provided for road construction and development; yet in 1952 only 340 miles of the total 20,000 were of all-weather standard, and one-fifth of these were in cities and towns.⁴⁶

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(6) The railway's main branch lines to Nanyuki, Thomson's Falls, and Magadi were never profitable, but successfully discouraged the growth of road transport. Proof that the railway in Kenya had effective control of most bulk traffic may be found in the small number of licensed road vehicles in 1952. Kenya's motorcars numbered 19,300, while there were 10,700 utility vehicles, 9,140 heavy trucks and 908 buses in that year.⁴⁷ There are no data available to show ownership or the intensity of use of these vehicles, but it is a reasonable assumption that the largest share were concentrated in Nairobi or in use in the over 3,000 white farms. Communications for most Africans in 1952 were still difficult, and transport limited.

c. Industrial and construction sectors. Until the wartime shortages of 1940-45, Kenya had little industrial development of any type; the major exceptions were mining enterprises based upon Lake Magadi's soda ash deposits, and the gold produced in Nyanza province. The Magadi Soda Company, aided by the railroad line to its site, produced some 55,000 tons for export in 1929 and averaged 100,000 export tons yearly during 1947-52. This was not a growing industry, despite its early establishment.⁴⁸

(1) The gold mining industry, started at Kakamega, Nyanza in 1931, reached its peak in 1935-37 with a total employment of 10,000. However, in postwar years this enterprise showed little promise, compared to Tanganyikan fields. In 1952 a major gold mine closed down, and total output of 14,800 ozs. was only worth L134,000. Other minerals were

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equally unimportant. Although adequate materials for a cement industry existed, the only Kenyan cement plant of 1952 imported its raw materials.

() In view of this early history of stagnation, the boom in Kenyan manufacturing during the 1947-52 postwar years is striking. Until the Second World War, Kenya had little more than a brewery, small cigarette factories and a few repair shops. During the war years, official encouragement was given to private industry, and the East African Industrial Research Organization was founded in 1944.

(3) In 1951 manufacturing employed some 10.3 percent of all employees, including 39,500 Africans (9.6 percent). This sector contributed 9.7 percent of the 1951 net product, compared to only 8.5 percent in 1947; the total product of 1.10 million placed this sector third in value, after agriculture and commerce-finance. Therefore manufacturing grew only slightly faster than the overall economy, even though this represented a rapid rate. In 1955, it was calculated that net product in manufacturing had grown since 1948 at 12 percent yearly, while inflation had raised this rate to 18 percent.⁴⁹

(4) The reasons for manufacturing's slow growth may be seen in the structure of Kenyan industry revealed in the 1957 industrial census. The 1,038 establishments then recorded employed only 53,800 persons (42,600 Africans) and had gross output of some 156.6 million. Forty percent of these plants were in Nairobi, although many small primary processors were located outside of the towns. In general, therefore, Kenyan manufacturing units were small, processed a wide variety of

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local materials and served a narrow local market. There were very few
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export industries.

(5) The "industrial" sector usually is defined to include the building and construction category. In this subsector, Kenya's postwar expansion was rapid and startling. Building activities provided only 2.8 percent of net product (L1.5 million) in 1947, but some 5.5 percent (L5.7 million) in 1951. Yet the housing situation for Africans in both Nairobi and Mombasa remained very short, despite efforts by various Municipal Councils and the Kenya Public Works Department. Under the Ten-Year Plan, construction of roads, Government buildings and official housing projects received high priority, as well as official funds. Thus this subsector represented an active, growing element in Kenya's economy; African male employment in building amounted to 19,000 persons
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in 1954.

(6) The growth of public utilities, particularly electric power, is usually prerequisite to significant industrial growth. Kenya's electric power was provided by small, local thermal and hydroelectric plants up to 1954, when bulk power became available from Uganda's Owen Falls Dam. In 1951, only 115 million kilowatt-hours of power was consumed, generated by stations with 25,000 kilowatt total capacity; 18,000 kw of this supplied Nairobi alone. Throughout the postwar years, power growth was limited by the lack of large hydroelectric sites within Kenya, and the need to import fuel by rail from the coast. Even so, power consumption expanded yearly after 1948, at rates of 15-20 percent.
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(7) In summary, Kenya's modern industrial sectors grew rapidly after 1945; in construction activities this was due to conscious Government development efforts, but in manufacturing the growth was entirely private and concentrated upon local markets. Even the basic cement industry was slow to grow; Kenya did not become self-sufficient in cement until 1957.⁵³ Nevertheless a large portion of industry was concentrated in Nairobi, and African wage-labor was attracted into this center. The lack of unemployment statistics makes it impossible to judge the social unrest which this caused.

d. Trade unions. In 1952, Kenya had 13 African workers' trade unions with a membership of 40,000 of whom about 25,000 were active and dues-paying. Total employment of Africans in commerce and industry for that year was 130,300, while a further 101,600 worked for the Kenya Government, its public services and joint East Africa High Commission offices. Thus about 30 percent of all "registered" African employment, by official figures, was in the modernizing private sector.⁵⁴

(1) The earliest labor union organization of Kenya was Indian in origin; the Labor Trades Union of East Africa (LTU) was founded by Makhan Singh in 1936, and he continued active as its secretary until his deportation in 1940. (Singh was reputed to be a link with "international communism," according to Corfield.⁵⁵) While separate trade associations for Asians and Africans were established later, there is no record of hostility between these groups.

(2) British support to Kenyan union organization appears to have been nonexistent. The earliest significant strike was on the

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Mombasa docks in 1939. In 1940 both the Kamba and the Kikuyu Central Associations were made illegal, on the excuse of pending war with Italy. In 1942, after much pressure from London due to reports of wartime forced labor practices, a modern Kenya Trades Union Ordinance was enacted. Thus the stage was set for postwar labor organization and growth.

(3) The short life of the African Workers Federation (AWF) provides an illustration of this postwar ferment and official efforts to control it. In January 1947, Mombasa experienced a strike, and its leader, Chege Kabachia, founded the AWF shortly thereafter, with support from both the Kamba Association and the Kenya African Union (KAU). The Nairobi AWF office, the "Office of the Poor," was soon active in recruiting affiliates. But in September 1947, the "Uplands Riot" in Kiambu, sparked by strikers from the Uplands Bacon Factory, caused three deaths. Kabachia was convicted and deported as one of the riot leaders; his union soon lost much influence, and its other leaders were charged with a variety of crimes.⁵⁶

(4) The LTU, under Makhan Singh and Fred Kubai, worked to strengthen separate unions in a number of trades, during 1947-50. Most prominent was the Transport and Allied Workers Union (TAWU) under John Mungai, based upon Nairobi's taxi and truck drivers, and the Kamba workers on the railroad's payroll. Second in importance was the Domestic and Hotel Workers Union (DHWU), important in Nairobi where most of Kenya's estimated 28,000 domestic servants worked. Leaders of both these major unions, which were predominantly Kikuyu, were arrested as Mau Mau

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and KAU leaders in April 1953; a further 27 union leaders were detained⁵⁷ in April 1954.

(5) The LTU was converted into the East African Trades Union Congress in 1948, following the British pattern, but the Kenya Government refused to recognize it, and formed a Kenya Federation of Registered Trades Unions in its stead. In May 1950 the Government's challenge of the legality of the EATUC led to a general strike in Nairobi, and the arrest of Kibai and Singh. While these steps damaged the Congress somewhat, in fact its leaders continued to be active, both in the approved individual unions and in the KAU; both the EATUC and the LTU continued to exist in name, if not in law, until 1954 and contributed to the confusion of political loyalties which prevailed during 1951-52.⁵⁸

(6) In November 1951, an Internal Security Working Committee reported on causes of the Mau Mau movement to the Governor. The economic causes given were those already well known: Kikuyu land grievances, and the African demand for equal pay for equal work. Study of the African trade union movement suggests that the continued Government effort to control these organizations helped to make them an active part of the Kikuyu political movement, and a financial support to Mau Mau bands.⁵⁹ Kenya's continued inflation during 1950-52 was also a factor in this.

29. Government, credit and trade in Kenya.

a. Economic policies and plans. The roles and policies of the Kenya Government have varied widely at different periods in the history of British rule, and have always been of major importance to the functioning of the economy. A careful catalog of these policies, in proper

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perspective, would require much space, yet there are few authoritative sources which attempt to analyze the pre-1952 history. An indispensable estimate is found in the essays collected by Harlow and Chilver; annual Colonial Office reports, while essential, provide little analysis and breadth.

(1) Bennett has described the many battles between the European white settler community and the Kenya Colony Government during 1903-30 regarding the proper role of Government towards the leasing of farmlands, the creation of Lord Delamere's "White Belt" of Scheduled Lands for exclusive European settlement, the supply of African labor and the control of "resident labor" or African squatters. A major controversy of the period after 1925 concerned the prohibition of African coffee growing, and the marketing of low quality African crops. The European community, however, also resisted any economic changes for the Asian community and continued to agitate against unlimited immigration to Kenya during the 1930's and 1940's.⁶⁰

(2) The uncomfortable but symbiotic relationships between a Nairobi government responsible to the Colonial Office and a permanently settled English aristocracy continued to 1940. According to Bennett, the wartime years saw considerable introduction of "unofficials," or white-settler representatives, into the Government's agencies, and a reversal of the official policy trends of 1930-40. These had included the introduction of formal native reserves, an income tax which primarily hit at European farmers, and a curtailment of the influence of settler "advisory" boards and committees. By 1945, the influence of

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European settlers on Government policy had regained much of its early weight; it had previously been directed against Asian progress, but was now to shift to opposition to African political pressures and economic advance.

(.) The concepts of State-aided investment and planning had been established by rather early precedent in Kenya. Economic development committees reported in 1919 and in 1935 on the needs for modern (European) development, and the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 (CDW) established development planning as a worldwide colonial policy. Thus in 1944-45, the Kenya Colony established an Economic Planning Committee, and a Ten-year Development Plan for 1946-55 was adopted and detailed by 1948, by a Development Committee in Nairobi. This plan gave heavy emphasis to social services, especially in public and curative health and in education. The so-called Beecher Committee, whose 1948 report was debated and approved in 1950, proposed L5 million for the last 5 years of the programme. But the original emphasis had been upon agriculture and veterinary services, and upon roads and buildings; approved programs through 1950 assigned 32, 10 and 18 percent to these categories, respectively.

(.) The implementation of these plans was slow-moving and deliberate, partly for political and administrative reasons, and partly due to Kenya's persistent postwar inflation of 5-6 percent yearly. The original 10-year program of the 1946 Development Committee called for some L16.5 million, roughly equivalent to the L20.7 million in approved schemes by 1951. The Planning Committee's extended program, approved in

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late 1951, outlined a L35.5 million program, of which L12 million had been already spent. Developmental spending in 1951 and 1952 was at a L5.5 million annual rate.⁶¹

(5) The amendments and extensions to this 10-year program are highly confusing; continued inflation and the emergency conditions increased the total program to L62.3 million, for a period to mid-1957. There can be little doubt that this large programme of numerous separate project headings and broad subprograms convinced many officials that the welfare and interests of Kenya's African population were being met as rapidly as was practicable. Funds were devoted to contour terracing, dams and other soil erosion projects in the native reserves; various settlement schemes were underway, particularly of Kamba families at Makeum, Dorobo at Olengurone, and Kikuyu in the Mwea rice-growing irrigation area (after 1953). There can be little doubt that this development work was important for "modernization." But nearly 40 percent of all 1952 development spending was for building construction, including new Central Government offices in Nairobi and Kisumu Prison, along with the completion of just 590 African housing quarters.⁶²

(6) The 10-year program did represent a drastic new direction in Kenya Colony policy, and a conscious implementation of the old policy of "paramountcy," reinterpreted to define the Government's active responsibility for local economic intervention in African affairs within the reserves. The many specific needs which had been analyzed as early as the 1930's--cattle inoculations and culling, sheep dipping, African cash crops, water control and antierosion terracing, planned resettlement,

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forest management, even cheap urban housing for Africans--were all the targets for pilot projects or expanded official programs during the 1947-52 years. All these activities, conceived by a dedicated bureaucracy of official technocrats, had to be defended against unofficial indifference and settler hostility; all made logical sense to the rational, detached observer. They found their final expression in the Swynnerton Plan for native agriculture in 1954, whose broad outlines continued to be valid for the next decade.⁶³

(7) It seemed beyond belief that African small holder farmers and politicians continuously resisted all of these technically progressive programs. Much attention was devoted by Europeans to the cultural and traditional constraints of tribal life which led to passivity, resistance to new ideas and nonrecognition of economic advantage on the part of Kikuyu and other tribes.⁶⁴ Perhaps a simpler answer is equally important, namely, the natural human reluctance to accept coercion. "Since adequate personnel were lacking to persuade compliance with terracing programs, workers were employed under supervision of a policeman."⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the changed emphasis in official policy toward African development during the postwar period is clear. Under the Swynnerton Plan, each African small holder was to be self-sufficient in subsistence crops, with additional cash crops giving a L100 income yearly.

b. Government revenues and expenditures.

(1) In 1930, the Government budget revenues amounted to some L3.5 million; throughout the 1930's it continued at this level, despite the introduction of a direct income tax in 1937. During the war years,

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starting with 1940, budget revenues began to climb, along with expenditures; the first deficit budget for Kenya Colony was registered in 1943. By 1945, revenues were L8 million, and in 1950 and 1952 they accelerated to L13.2 and 20.5 million. By this final year, income and estate taxes contributed 22.2 percent, import duties and excise taxes 40.9 percent, while the African poll tax represented only 4.3 percent, or 1,898,000.⁶⁶

(2) The African poll and hut tax provided a significant share of revenue during the 1930's, until tax changes in 1937. In 1920 this tax had been doubled, to EASH10, and by 1932-33 amounted to EASH16 on a family average. The basic rate reached EASH17 by 1952 for residents of an average native reserve. This tax, plus a local "rate" or cess for the District Council of about EASH3, was collected by District Chiefs under supervision of European Revenue Officers. The actual tax varied from EASH6-19 according to the district's wealth, was remitted entirely to Nairobi, and waived only in particularly bad years of the 1930's for some districts. In Kenya's six municipalities, the 1952 poll tax was EASH21-23, of which the Central Government received EASH16.⁶⁷

(3) Government expenditures during the 1930's were primarily for recurrent administrative costs, but a significant portion went to cover service of Kenya's public debt. Fully L3.4 million was issued debt in 1930, with a further 20 percent increase during the decade. In the early 1930's part of these capital sources was used for aid to European farmers, hit by the world depression; an Agricultural Bank was founded in 1931. But the major intervention, in agricultural subsidy

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programs, came with wartime and the rapid extension of Government controls and spending.⁶⁸

c. Money and credit.

(1) It is not easy to separate the East African currency statistics to provide information on Kenya's monetized economy. The earliest GNP estimates for 1947 suggested that the market or exchange economy represented only 71 percent of the total product, with the remainder being "subsistence" production, including a minor element of barter trade. By 1952, the marketed share in Kenya had risen to about 78 percent; in Uganda and Tanganyika this proportion was estimated by the Royal Commission of 1953-55 to be 83.5 and 61 percent. The total market size by product value of these three Eastern African economies was then set at L83.6: L81.2: and 62 million.⁶⁹

(2) If the total East African currency issue for 1952 (L39.8 million) were divided in these same proportions, rather than according to population, then Kenya's share of 37 percent amounted to L14.7 million. Commercial bank demand deposits and savings accounts in Kenya then totaled about L47.5 million, which undoubtedly included some funds used to finance business in Uganda and Tanganyika-Zanzibar.⁷⁰

(3) From 1921, when the shilling in Kenya was freed from its Indian-rupee links, the East African Currency Board in London administered a 100-percent backed currency for all three territories. With the rapid growth of Nairobi, as the financial, trade, and administrative center for British East Africa, any efforts to separate out Kenyan financial data are very difficult. No adequate efforts have been made in this

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field, and partial, limited statistics are all that can be used. Capital funds movements into and out of Kenya are also a matter for conjecture, and therefore no meaningful balance of payments data could be compiled as recently as 1951.⁷¹

(4) Since the Nairobi banks and major trading companies were branches of international British firms, it was natural that their early interest in exports and imports of the Kenya European community continued to determine their postwar credit practices. Surplus funds were readily transferred to a head office, and credits were secured by land or property, as typical British commercial banking required. Thus loans could not be provided to nontitled African farmers or squatter tenants. While two branches of Indian banks were active in Kenya, credit facilities within the reserves depended upon the personal credit extended by Asian traders and "duka" storekeepers.

(5) In 1952 there were four major banks in Kenya, with some 24 branches or agencies outside Mombasa and Nairobi. The Government's Land and Agricultural Bank, founded in 1931, had only 785 loans (L1.2 million) outstanding, with interest charged at 4.5 percent. This made borrowing profitable since inflation averaged over 5 percent in the postwar period. Perhaps the most important banking services, however, were those of the Postal Savings Banks of East Africa; in the three territories, 323,000 depositors held balances of L12 million.⁷²

(6) Wrigley has defined the 1930's as a period of hardship for European farming and the slow extension of cashcrop marketing into the African subsistence economy. The wartime interlude saw many new

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inflationary pressures, both inflation and increased consumption demands thus spilled over into the postwar period. From 1945 to 1954, world demand brought prosperity to the white highlands, while construction of industry in Nairobi absorbed large amounts of capital and credit. In this process of financial expansion, however, there were only a few African individuals or urban associations who could get credit. The individual savings of the extended family group or cooperative could be mobilized with difficulty, for only a few limited investment opportunities existed, such as higher education, or low-potential urban property.

d. Foreign trade.

(1) The depression of 1930 led to European diversification into mixed farming and an increase in African marketings, primarily of maize but also in the specialty crops of the native reserves--wattle, sim-sim, cotton, beans, and hides and skins.⁷³ After the wartime years, a rapid and steady expansion of both export crops and of imports occurred, as domestic exports rose from L6.3 to 25.8 million and imports from L15.0 to L59.3 million between 1946 and 1952.⁷⁴ Net imports added roughly 20 percent to Kenya's total availabilities of goods and services in 1947, and about 28 percent in 1953, although precise balance-of-trade figures cannot be isolated.

(2) The major postwar exchange earners were coffee, tea and sisal, with 28, 10.2 and 10.1 percent of total exports respectively. Pyrethrum extract for insecticides maintained its importance with one-third of world output, worth about L1 million, and soda ash exports from Lake Magadi were of similar values. But the major African-raised crops

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continued to provide lesser shares: wattle extract was about 8 percent and hides and skins 7 percent of exports value. Maize, the primary African market crop, underwent severe export swings in the postwar period, and these sales were controlled for "quality" by the Government, acting through the European KFA.

(3) The rapid expansion of Kenyan imports showed the combined effects of several distinct factors, including a steady improvement in the export-import terms of trade, during the Korean War period. Between 1948 and 1952, this favorable price differential index went from 100 to 145, with a 1951 peak of 166.⁷⁵ In addition to official capital inflows, private investments and the rise of tourist spending, a major feature of the period was the creation of Kenya's industrial sector and an energetic construction program in Nairobi which had reached a peak in 1952. While inflation was an unpleasant feature associated with this rapid expansion, it seems to have affected the traditional African import commodities, particularly cotton cloth, to a much lesser degree. Tariff schedules continued to favor European imports and capital equipment, and to discriminate unreasonably against such items as bicycles, but rising African demands and more modern expectations were clearly behind the growing import levels.

30. Conclusions.

a. A summary description of the Kenyan economy and its major trends and elements between 1930 and 1952 would necessarily include the following points:

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(1) Kenyan economic structure was colonial, sharply dualistic, and regionally segregated in 1930 and in 1952.

(2) Wartime economic dislocations and the postwar boom combined to heighten African expectations and increase the resentment against Governmental economic controls on land and labor.

(3) The land ownership issue reached crisis proportions to African, and especially Kikuyu, minds because of population pressures and opportunity constraints within the native reserves, continued legal discrimination against African property and labor in reserves and cities, and a series of postwar incidents concerning Kikuyu squatters, while settler "encroachments," and governmental "interference" with Kikuyu farm practices.

(4) The colonial system of labor controls became increasingly burdensome to the Government, its legal and security agencies, and to Africans, while its discriminatory structure supported wage differentials and occupational segregation.

b. A selection of the major economic features of the national economy, considered as a growing system during 1930-52, would include the following trends:

(i) Investment in prewar Kenya was primarily private, and largely in European agriculture, while governmental investment became important after the war. Postwar private investment went primarily into urban building and construction, and was especially concentrated in Nairobi.

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(2) Investment in Kenya was heavily financed by outside-Kenyan sources after the war. Private sources and their purposes went largely unrecorded, although the large aggregate size is suggested by Kenya's import surpluses.

(3) Consumption trends during the period showed the continued growth of importance of the domestic market, and the corresponding shift of European farmers from maize into mixed farming. African consumption expanded rapidly in the postwar period, but African incomes from wages probably continued to represent only one-twentieth of Indian per capita incomes and one-fortieth of European per capita incomes.

(4) Estimates of African subsistence production in agriculture showed a very slow decline in this nonmonetary share of total output for 1946-52, from about 26 to 22 percent. Agricultural production remained sharply localized and segregated, inside the native reserves or within the white highlands. Agricultural labor was similarly divided, with its mobility restricted by official policy.

(5) In modernizing the Kenyan economy, the Kenya-Uganda Railway provided the major impetus, as well as the basis for white settler farming. Railway traffic, both in exports and imports, provides the best index for Kenya's growth during the interwar period. There was little emphasis upon road construction until after 1945.

(6) Official policies toward industry and commerce until World War II favored free trade and private initiative; therefore there was little investment in industry up to 1940, and most European capital went into farming or trade.

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(7) The postwar period saw considerable official financing of roads and urban construction projects, under the Ten-Year Development Programme; only a minor amount went to assist industrial development, which was a reserved area for private enterprise.

(8) The Indian community, which had major responsibility for small-scale commerce and trade early in Kenya's history, was not provided encouragement in the postwar development period, but was discriminated against on the theory that African enterprise needed a chance to grow.

(9) At the same time, African enterprise outside of farming or the reserves was not encouraged or supported financially during postwar development.

c. Despite the judgments above, general Government policy did show a shifting emphasis and a series of major phases, in Kenya's economic history.

(1) The early policies stressing the establishment of white settler-farmers through long-term land leases lasted until 1923. This period included official efforts to drive African labor into the wage-labor market outside the "native reserves."

(2) From 1923 until 1930, official policy stressed laissez-faire policies and support to Kenya's farming boom.

(3) After 1930, policy shifted to emphasize protection and subsidy efforts to white farmers, with the encouragement of diversified farming. Official policy of the later 1930's also concentrated upon problems of soil erosion and overgrazing, which meant a series of restrictive

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programs aimed at the African reserved lands, particularly the Kamba pastoral economy.

(4) After 1946, the Kenya Government adopted a conscious "development plan" approach, aimed at growth, at directed development of Kenya's major cities, and also at improved production within the African reserves. This last objective, the first explicit effort to assist African development, was adopted in stages, however, and put into practice rather slowly. It reached its final expression only in 1954, after declaration of the emergency, when the Swynnerton Plan for African agricultural development was adopted; this called for consolidation of individual African holdings, the grouping of African farmers into "villages," and the encouragement of African cashcrop output to give each farmer his family's subsistence plus L100 in cash income.

d. Most Government programs for Africans after 1946 were concentrated upon the Kikuyu reserves; these were close to Nairobi, the Kikuyu drift of labor into the city was pronounced, and Kikuyu leaders were prominent in African political and trade union organizing after 1945. Despite these postwar official efforts, avowed to be in the long-term economic interests of the Africans and the Kikuyu, the popular African response was largely hostile or at best resigned. Thus the 1947 efforts to conduct extensive terracing and ditching programs within the Kikuyu reserves, using corvée labor drafts, was not supported by the councils and became a program of forced labor, which focused widespread resentment and political agitation. Government agricultural officers attempted to change the traditional Kikuyu farming patterns, but these efforts failed regularly.

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e. African tribal traditionism and cultural conservatism received the blame for the negative response. But economic realities were at least equally important: new inputs such as fertilizer, seeds or root-stock, and modern tools were priced expensively, while farm output in the reserves could only be traded at the few officially approved native markets, where bulk prices were kept low by the licensed Asian middlemen and by Kenya Farmers Association agents.

f. The importance of Kenya's "subsistence economy" continued to be large, up to 1952. This fact led European and official analysts to attribute great strength to African tribal culture and its traditional barter patterns. However the Kikuyu tribe itself is often singled out as one of the most progressive, most easily modernized groups of the East African area; this judgment is supported by the Kikuyu male willingness to migrate considerable distances to find labor. Kikuyu "resident labor" was found throughout the white highlands, and Kikuyu wage labor was important to Nairobi's growth. It seems clear that the Kikuyu culture did not oppose the widening of a modern money economy. What was equally important in preserving the large "barter subsector" was a conscious Governmental policy to restrict the number of local African markets, limit the number of Asian middlemen, and favor the price support policies and output controls of various "unofficial" white settler interest groups.

g. In conclusion, the valid grievances of all Africans in Kenya by 1952 included the following:

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(1) Africans had no legal land rights by European legal standards within their reserves, and were prohibited from migration to the underpopulated, underused white highlands.

(2) Official labor controls were designed to drive Africans into the money-wage market, and discriminated against African labor mobility, residence outside the reserves, and job opportunities in the growing cities.

(3) At the same time, the European elites who controlled postwar Kenyan society had developed rigid economic interests in preserving Kenya's colonial structure: Kenya's agricultural prosperity and export-oriented trade depended upon the profitability of a small number of white-settler farmers.

(4) The Kenyan history of farm boom and depression in response to world demand cycles made postwar prosperity seem likely to be a temporary opportunity, not to be shared equally with all Kenyan social levels.

(5) The postwar official efforts for African agricultural development inside the native reserves were perceived as practical and realistic modernization steps to develop African tribal life in evolutionary ways, and in a protected economic environment.

h. The statement of these contrasting economic conditions fails to describe the intensity and personal conviction which Europeans and Africans felt for these antagonistic economic rights and goals. White settler emotions against change in the economic structure were intense, and the Kikuyu conviction that "their land" had been stolen was equally

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strong. It is for these noneconomic reasons, historical and social largely, that the Mau Mau Emergency lasted from 1952 to 1960, and has received much attention as a "revolutionary movement" despite the small numbers of actual casualties on both sides. Less personalized economic factors probably were important in deciding why a Kikuyu movement was seen by many other tribes in Kenya as representing a wider African national spirit.

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CHAPTER 4

SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Section I. Demography, Education, Urban and Rural Society, and Culture

by Donald S. Bloch

31. Introduction.

a. Since the British (or "Europeans") dominated the Government and society of Kenya and members of the Kikuyu tribe were dominated by the Mau Mau, this section of the study emphasizes social conditions among the Europeans and the Kikuyu, and social conditions relative to dissension between them. The Asian community is treated somewhat more briefly than the major protagonists, and the Arab community even more briefly, reflecting the relative importance of these ethnic groups in the onset of conflict.

b. As with other case studies, the statistics are not entirely reliable and should be used to indicate tendencies and trends rather than precise amounts. Wherever possible, a single source has been used in the statistical presentation of time series so that any bias might be consistent. If sources conflicted in their estimates or calculations usually one source, hopefully the best, was selected. It was not considered pertinent or relevant for this study, nor was it always possible to present and reconcile the differences.

32. Population and demography.

a. Introduction. There have been seven population censuses taken in Kenya, 1901, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, 1948 and 1962. The first five were of the nonnative population (i.e., the European and Asian

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minorities); thus only the censuses of 1948 and 1962 included the Africans. However, there are some estimates of the African population for 1926. The following discussion will focus on the period 1926-48 not only because of the time period of major interest for this study, but also because of availability of data.

b. Population growth.

(1) The total population of Kenya more than doubled between 1926 and 1952, an increase of about 3.2 million amounting to 124 percent in 26 years. The growth in the non-African population, except for the Arabs, was due in great part to immigration, whereas the African population grew primarily as a result of decreasing death rates.* Among the Kikuyu, however, increased birth rates may have also contributed to African growth. Leakey points out that the Kikuyu traditionally practiced a method of birth control which inhibited conception while a mother was still nursing a child, and since Kikuyu children were not weaned until they were about 2 years old, children were usually spaced about 3 years apart.¹ However, this practice broke down during the Colonial period.

(2) The proportion of Africans to the total population changed little from 1926 to 1952. The statistics presented in table IV show a slight decrease from 97.9 percent in 1926 to 96.5 percent in 1952, and the Area Handbook for Kenya shows an increase to 96.9 percent in 1962.²

* See section on public health factors.

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The slight changes may, in fact, be due to small inaccuracies in enumeration and estimation.

TABLE IV. POPULATION AND PERCENT OF INCREASE
BY RACIAL GROUPS FOR 1926, 1948 AND 1952

Race	Population		Increase 1926-48 (in %)	Population		Increase 1948-52 (in %)
	1926 ¹	1948 ²		1952 ³		
European . . .	12,529 . .	29,660 . .	137	40,700 . . .		37
Indian (Asian). . . .	26,759 . .	97,787 . .	265	126,200 . . .		29
Arab	10,557 . .	24,174 . .	129	28,000 . . .		16
Other.	3,824 . .	3,325 . .	-13	4,300 . . .		29
African . . .	2,515,330 .	5,251,120 ³ .	104	5,561,000 . . .		6
Total. . . .	2,568,999 .	5,403,066 .	110	5,760,200 . . .		6

Sources:

¹ Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report on the Non-Native Census, 1926. Nairobi: The Government Press, 1927.

² _____, Report on the Census of the Non-Native Population of Kenya Colony and Protectorate taken on the Night of 25th February, 1948. Nairobi: The Government Printer, 1953.

³ _____, Statistical Abstract 1955, Nairobi: The Government Printer, 1957.

(3) Among the non-African population, the Indians, who are usually referred to as Asians and include "all persons whose ancestors were resident in the continent of India,"³ were the only group to increase relative to the other non-African groups. Indians made up about 50 percent

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of the non-African population in 1926 and 63 percent in 1952. Although the other groups had sizable numerical increases, their proportion of the total non-African population was reduced. The proportion of the European population--all persons of European origin whose color was white--fell from about 23 percent in 1926 to 20 percent in 1952 while the proportion of Arabs was reduced from about 20 to 14 percent. The category "other" included Chinese, Ceylonese, Mauritians, among others as well as persons with mixed ancestry but having some African blood. This group declined from 7 percent of the non-African population in 1926 to 3 percent in 1952.

(4) It is apparent that there was considerable growth among all segments of the population during the period under consideration. As will be shown below, this increased pressure on the land for the Kikuyu provided part of the rationale for protest movements, and was also partly responsible for the migration of Kikuyu to other tribal areas and to the urban areas.

c. Population distribution.

(1) Kenya's population was predominantly rural. The population tended to be concentrated in a rather narrow arc stretching from south of Nairobi northwest to the shores of Lake Victoria and in enclaves in the coastal area. The extreme southwest and the large expanse north and east of this band were sparsely populated. The Area Handbook for Kenya states, "Almost three-quarters of the country's population lives in about one-eighth of the total land area."⁴ Even though the Handbook referred to the 1962 census, that concentration of population, with little modification, would probably apply to the period 1926-52.

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(2) The urban concentration increased between 1926 and 1948. The census of 1926 did not include enumeration of the African population. Comparing the non-African population of both the 1926 and 1948 censuses, however, provides a good indication of urban growth (table V). In 1926 only six towns were considered to have populations large enough to be considered urban (Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu, Nakuru, Kisumu and Eldoret) and were inhabited by 64 percent of the non-Africans.⁵ In 1948, there were 17 towns of more than 2,000 inhabitants (including Africans) wherein resided 80 percent of the non-African population.⁶ In 1948, only 3 percent of the African population was resident in the 17 urban areas. Numerically, however, the African urban population was larger than the non-African, 161,569 to 123,976.

TABLE V. PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS
IN 1926 AND 1948 BY RACE

Category	¹ 1926 (6 towns)	² 1948 (17 towns)	Nairobi and Mombasa only
European	40	69	63
Indian (Asian)	74	87	79
Arab	62	79	74
Other	81	77	82
Total non-African	64	80	78
African	N.A.	3	66
Total	N.A.	5	71

¹ Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report on the Non-Native Census 1926. Government Press, 1927.

² Derived from the Statistical Abstract 1955. Nairobi: The Government Press, 1957.

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(3) African migration to urban areas was considerable during this period if the statistics on Nairobi are at least indicative. Middleton claims that there were about 27,000 Africans in Nairobi in 1931⁷ whereas there were 64,397 enumerated in the 1948 census.⁸

(4) By 1948, Nairobi and Mombasa were the only two major population concentrations that could be called cities. Nairobi had a population of 113,976 and Mombasa had 84,746, with Africans comprising more than 50 percent of the population of each. The other fifteen urban areas ranged in population from 2,028 to 17,625.⁹

d. Density of Kikuyu population. The Kikuyu population has been singled out for this brief analysis because of Kikuyu primacy in the major African political organizations, their primacy in the Mau Mau and because their rallying cry has been land poverty.

(1) The Kikuyu inhabited an area that became the Kiambu, Fort Hall and Nyeri districts of Central Province. Population increases since the start of the colonial period and alienation of land now adjacent to their reserve, part of which they had claimed and into which their increasing population could not expand, produced a high density per square mile of arable land.

(2) Table VI indicates that the higher the density of population to the arable land, the larger had been the proportion who migrated to districts outside the Kikuyu reserve. It appears that there was a strong relationship between density and migration. Middleton presents similar statistics for the Embu and the Meru, tribes related to the Kikuyu who inhabited areas to the north of the Kikuyu reserve, which showed that the

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Embu with a density of 168 per square mile of arable land had 2 percent migrants while the Meru with a density of 188 had 3 percent migration. Many of the Kikuyu undoubtedly migrated to one or another city. Most of the 51,475 who had migrated to the Nairobi district probably went to the city, but in 1948 Kikuyu were found as far south as Mombasa district, where they numbered 3,304, and as far northwest as Nakuru district, where 130,303 were inumerated.¹⁰

TABLE VI. DENSITY OF KIKUYU PER SQUARE MILE OF ARABLE LAND BY DISTRICT AND PROPORTION THAT HAD MIGRATED AS OF 1948

<u>District</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Density/sq mile arable land</u>	<u>Total originally from district</u>	<u>Percent migrants</u>
Kiambu. . . .	251,884777.	388,162	35
Nyeri	179,956	536.	253,328	29
Fort Hall . .	300,355	515.	384,851	22

Source: John Middleton, The Kikuyu and Kamba of Kenya, p 12.

(3) However, population density was not the only influence on internal migration. The European settlers were inducing Africans to work on their farms, and a money economy and taxation influenced many to seek work on these farms and in urban areas.

33. Ethnic groups.

a. Introduction. The major ethnic groups in Kenya were the Africans, Asians (Indians), Arabs, and Europeans. The Europeans were numerically the smallest of the four groups until 1926, and outnumbered only the Arab population during the period under consideration in this study.

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However, British domination and control of the country relegated the Africans, Asians and Arabs to the status of minority groups in that the Europeans were given preferential treatment by the Government. Other sections of this study point out some of the specific cultural, social and attitudinal differences among these groups. What follows will be a rather summary treatment of each.

b. The Africans. About 97 percent of the total population of Kenya was African. The vast majority were agricultural or pastoral during the period 1926-52. The African population consisted of "about 70 differentiated African groups, usually called tribes."¹¹ Some of the tribes are closely related to one another so that they were classified as tribal groups. The Area Handbook for Kenya presents one classification of 40 tribal groups and indicates that the 1962 census classified them into 35 tribal groups. A more general, but still meaningful, classification differentiates the tribes into three large language groups: Bantu, Nilotic and Cushite.

(1) The Bantu were primarily an agricultural people who settled in the higher elevations and along the coast where the amount of rainfall was conducive to agriculture. They were numerically the largest group but occupied the smallest land area. The Luhya (Baluhya), who settled in the uplands north of Lake Victoria; the Gusii (Kisii), who lived to the south of Lake Victoria; the Kikuyu, in what became Central Province; the Kamba, in what became Eastern Province; and the Mijikenda (Nyika), who settled along the coast were the major Bantu tribal groups.

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(2) The Nilotic speakers, numerically the second largest group, settled in the western part of Kenya generally following the Rift Valley from northern to the southwestern borders. This was an area of grassland which supported their pastoral economy. Three of the largest tribes among the Nilotic language group (the Luo, Nandi and Kipsigis) were primarily cultivators--although they did keep some cattle--and settled along the shores of Lake Victoria. The major pastoral tribes were the Turkana in the far north, the Pokot south of the Turkana, and the Masai, who had controlled most of the Rift Valley in the first part of the 19th century. The power and predominance of the Masai were reduced in the latter part of the century by a combination of misfortunes--a disastrous civil war, a cattle plague and an epidemic of smallpox--so that the British were able to move the remaining Masai into a large reserve to the south to make room for European settlers.¹²

(3) The Cushites, who engaged in herding camels, settled in the large, mostly arid eastern half of Kenya. The largest Cushite tribe was the Somali, closely related to the Somali in the Somali Republic. They ranged, with their herds, in the most eastern portion of Kenya closest to the border with the Somalia Republic.¹³ The Rendille occupied an area east and south of Lake Rudolph, and a number of smaller tribes ranged to the north, east and south of the Rendille.

(4) The 10 major tribal groups listed in table VII totaled 83.9 percent of the African population as of 1948. The Kikuyu alone represented 19.5 percent, and the four largest tribal groups comprised 58.1 percent.

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All 10 were primarily cultivators, although the Kamba and the Nilotic speakers also raised cattle.

TABLE VII. POPULATION OF THE MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPS
BY LANGUAGE GROUP, 1948¹

<u>Language and tribal group</u>	<u>Population</u>
Bantu	
Kikuyu	1,026,341
Luhya.	653,774
Kamba.	611,725
Meru ^a	324,894
Mijikenda (Nyika)	296,254
Gusii (Kisii) ^a	255,108
Embu	203,690
Nilotic	
Luo.	757,043
Kipsigis	159,692
Nandi.	116,681

Sources: ¹Statistical Abstract 1955 p 11.
^aAlternative names.

(5) Common threads of social organization* were found among the rather diverse tribal groups. Except for one small tribe, all were patrilineal, basing their larger family groups (lineages and clans) on descent from a common male ancestor. Almost all of the tribes--the Luo

*
See section on family and social class for a more detailed discussion of these factors.

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and the Somali were the main exceptions--were organized into age-sets or age groups, composed of men who had been initiated, in their youth, during the same time period. There were complementary groups for women. The age groups moved through a series of grades as a function of time, from junior warrior to senior elder, and took on new roles and responsibilities in each grade. Membership in age groups cut across lineages and clans, thus providing for broad, society-wide organization. Finally, with one minor exception, the tribes had no hereditary or appointing chiefs. Political power was exercised by councils of elders.¹⁴

(6) Prior to the Colonial period there was some intertribal conflict in Kenya, but there was also much peaceful contact. Kenyatta insists that so-called wars between the Kikuyu and other tribes were nothing more than armed raids, usually for cattle or other economic goods. Middleton also writes about cattle raiding between the Kikuyu and the Masai.¹⁵ Both emphasize, however, that there were most usually peaceful relations between the tribes manifested by a considerable amount of trade and intermarriage.¹⁶

(7) Conflict between the Europeans, mostly British, and the tribes of Kenya started with the movement of the Imperial British East African Company caravans from Mombasa to Lake Victoria in the last decade of the 19th century, continued with the building of the railroad, and ended when the British Government obtained administrative control over the tribes. At first the armed caravans exploited the divisions between the tribes to obtain African allies, and African was again fighting African. Later the Government troops, including Indians and Africans, made

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punitive expeditions against recalcitrant tribes in order to bring administrative control to the tribal areas. For the most part control, and peace, was imposed in areas along the railroad route by 1905, but control of some areas was not gained until after World War I.¹⁷

(8) With the establishment of the "Pax Britannica" came immigrants, both European and Indian; a money economy; head and hut taxes; development of towns and cities; encouragement of wage work on the estates of Europeans and in the towns; encouragement of internal migration; and education. The result was rapid social change which first affected those areas closest to towns, cities and missionary stations where there was close and constant contact with Europeans and Asians.

(9) Internal migration, education, experience in the towns and cities, and outside contacts through World War I and World War II promoted a breakdown of tribal traditions, caused unrest, permitted articulation of African grievances against the colonial Government with respect to its land policies, educational policies and color bar, and provided examples of political organizations which the Africans adopted when they organized to press for redress of their grievances.

(10) By 1945, Middleton contends Kenya had changed from a country of very small tribes, each living in its own world, to a country where many Africans, mostly the more educated, were aware that all the tribes had a common community of interests as Kenyans. Kenya had become a single economic and political system, in effect a single society even though deeply divided.¹⁸

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c. The Europeans. The European population was differentiated into four main occupational groups: the settlers who were engaged in agriculture, primarily in the highlands; those employed by the Government, including the military; those in commerce and finance; and professionals. Almost 50 percent of the employed Europeans were in farming or Government service in 1948: 23 percent in agriculture and 25 percent in Government. The professional group made up almost 70 percent of all non-African professionals, and about 14 percent of the employed Europeans. Less than 10 percent of the Europeans were employed in commerce and finance, and were outnumbered by both Asians and Arabs in similar occupations. The rest were represented in various industries or were high level clerks employed by private companies.¹⁹

(1) A majority of the settlers were from the United Kingdom, the rest primarily from South Africa (the latter mostly of British extraction). The settlers from the United Kingdom were largely aristocrats who established estates similar to the landed gentry in England and clung to aristocratic traditions. Both the British and the South Africans, who saw themselves as pioneering another "white man's country," were interested in founding a colony which would eventually be self-governing and dominated by whites.²⁰ The settlers for the most part lived in isolated houses on their farms.

(2) Nairobi was the seat of Government and also the commercial and financial center of Kenya. Most of the Government officials, Government clerks, and the commercial, financial and industrial employees were found there. In fact, 56 percent of the total European population and

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more than 50 percent of the urban Europeans lived in Nairobi or its suburbs in 1948. A much smaller number of Europeans lived in Mombasa and Nakuru, the second and third largest cities in Kenya.²¹ Most of the missionaries and many of the teachers lived in small towns and small centers formed by the missionary stations. Some professional Government officers also lived in the small towns.

(3) The European community as a whole (all whites including South Africans and American missionaries were identified as Europeans) was the elite group in Kenya. In order to carry out the stated policies of protecting the African and bringing to him the fruits of Western civilization, so as to lift him from the depths of disease and poverty,²² institutions were developed to segregate him, persuade and coerce him to work for and in the manner of Europeans, and to give him first a practical education and later a European-like education.

(4) In order to keep the European elite status and to create a white man's country in the highlands, all nonwhites were excluded from the highlands in practice if not in theory. Early in the colonial period the Indian community reacted against these restrictive policies and fought them unsuccessfully.²³ It appears that the main concern of the settlers and the Government of Kenya was the Indian community until sometime after World War I. Later, when the Africans formed and maintained organizations to voice their grievances against the Government, they became the center of concern.

d. The Asians. The Asian community consisted of immigrants, or their descendants, from three localities in India: Cutch-Kathiawad,

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eastern Punjab and Goa.²⁴ Although there were some Indians who settled in Mombasa centuries ago when Indian ships, along with Arab and Persian vessels, carried on a lively trade with the coastal cities of what is now Kenya, large numbers of Indians did not settle in Kenya until after the Kenya-Uganda railroad was completed. Some 32,000 laborers were brought in from Punjab to help construct the line and about 6,700 remained when it was completed in 1901.²⁵ Others followed, and by 1948 they were by far the largest nonnative group in Kenya, numbering 97,687.²⁶

(1) The Asians maintained a cohesive community in the face of religious and caste diversity. A strong contributing factor was the migration pattern in that later immigrants were related to the earlier by kinship or ethnicity. The two major religious groups were Hindu, comprising 47 percent of the Asian population in 1948 and Muslim, comprising 28 percent.²⁷

(2) Among the Kenya Hindus, the caste system was followed, including caste endogamy. The Muslims professed to four sects which also practiced endogamy. The endogamous feature of the castes and sects promoted cultural differentiation between the groups and cultural continuity among them. However, the Hindu principle of accepting pluralism as a corollary to the caste hierarchy extended also to the Muslims and fostered a measure of cohesiveness among the entire Asian community.²⁸

(3) The Asians practiced urban skills and lived primarily in the cities and towns. As of 1948, 91 percent of the Asian population was found in the 50 townships listed in the census.²⁹ However, they were concentrated in the two largest cities. More than 40 percent of the total

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urban Asian population lived in Nairobi, and over 20 percent in Mombasa.³⁰

(4) As has been indicated, the Asians had a high degree of interest in education, and they did not find the acquisition of modern skills incompatible with the retention of their culture. Thus it is not surprising that the Asian community predominated in commerce, skilled trades, lower clerical positions and transportation. The Area Handbook points out, "no sizable town or settlement is without Asian representatives."³¹

(5) Conflict with the Europeans, especially the settlers, began in 1902 around the question of land purchase by the Asians. The settlers tried, successfully as it turned out, to restrict Asians and other non-whites from the highlands. The Europeans also wanted restrictions placed on urban land, especially in Nairobi, in order to keep their residential area white. As has been indicated above, the European community was successful not in legislating an actual color bar, but in enacting legislation which effectively imposed segregation through restrictive covenants, and Government review and powers to veto land sales and leases. The Asian community continued its resistance to these policies to a greater or lesser degree throughout the period of this study. The major argument raised by the Indians for less restrictive policies were that they should have been accorded equal treatment with Europeans since they were British subjects, since they had helped develop Kenya by helping to build the railroad and serving with the armed forces, and since promises of land to encourage Asian settlement had been broken.³²

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(6) A foundation for potential conflict between Asians and Africans was laid through Asian near monopoly of trade, especially in the outlying areas, as skilled workers and in lower clerical positions. One of the first expressions of conflict between them was the organization of the Kisumu Native Chamber of Commerce in 1927, which tried to break the Asian monopoly in trade in Nyanza Province.³³

e. The Arabs. The Arab community was the oldest non-Hamitic group in Kenya, having first settled along the coast some centuries previously when Islamic city-states were developed as trading centers. The influence of the Arabs was considerable, as evidenced by the development of the Swahili language, a mixture of Arabic and the language of a local Bantu tribe.³⁴

(1) The Arabs continued to concentrate along the coast of Kenya, primarily in urban areas. As of 1948, 79 percent of the Arab population was urban, with 55 percent of the total population in Mombasa and an additional 14 percent in the coastal towns of Lamu and Malindi.³⁵ They were primarily involved in commerce and trade.

(2) Both Rosberg and the Area Handbook for Kenya insist that centuries of admixture, primarily of Arab and African, had developed a Swahili culture of which the Arabs were an integral part rather than culturally distinct. They do not, however, describe the culture. On the other hand, the Statistical Abstract 1955 shows that almost all of the Arabs considered themselves Muslim, so some differentiation, even if only along religious lines, must have obtained between the Arabs and the Africans in the area.

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(3) The rather brief consideration given to the Arab community reflects a judgment, articulated by Rosberg, that Arab influence on the interior portions of Kenya, and hence on the genesis of conflict, was negligible.³⁶

34. Education.

a. Traditional Kikuyu education. Prior to the arrival of Europeans and the start of the colonial period, African children received their education within their family group, through formal initiation ceremonies, and by ceremonies and instruction required for each move up the status hierarchy. The following description summarizes studies of the Kikuyu, but would apply, with slight modification, to most of the tribes in Kenya.

(1) The very young child was educated in the family and clan tradition primarily by the mother's stories and lullabies.³⁷ When the child was old enough he or she learned many of the male and female roles by accompanying his father and older male relatives or her mother and older female relatives. By watching and helping parents and older relatives, the child learned many of the practical skills which were required in daily living.

(2) On a somewhat more formal level the child was taught the tribal traditions, religion and generally accepted codes of behavior through stories and songs told and sung by the elders of the extended family around the fire after the evening meal. As the child approached puberty, the evening sessions became more formal and serious, and the

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child was taught specific songs and dances required for his or her initiation into adult tribal status.³⁸

(3) Formal education was given to initiates by the elders during the ceremonies preceeding initiation, during the actual initiation, and after the initiation rites. Such educational activity, as well as education given an aspirant to succeeding levels of the social hierarchy (senior warrior, elder, senior elder), provided the Kikuyu with the knowledge and basic skills to fulfill his duties and responsibilities as an adult member of the tribe.³⁹

b. Modern African education.

(1) European education was brought to Kenya by missionaries who tried to spread Christianity by teaching Africans to read the Bible. Schools were established first at mission stations along the coast and in the Lake Victoria area. Missionary stations and associated schools moved into the central areas around the turn of this century. The schools expanded into other areas of teaching and eventually became regular primary schools.

(2) By 1912 there were 40 main mission schools distributed in the coastal and central areas which boarded most of their students,⁴⁰ and many smaller, so-called bush or village schools, out from the mission stations but under missionary direction. The schools at the mission stations usually had a European staff, but many of the bush schools were taught by Africans who had completed only a modicum of education. As enrollment increased, even the schools at the mission station had to use unqualified teachers.

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(3) In 1911 a Department of Education was established and the Government took upon itself the responsibility for developing and implementing policy. A system of Government primary and secondary schools was planned as well as a program of Government grants-in-aid to those mission schools which qualified. The missionaries were given general managerial responsibility for the whole system. The Director of Education, however, was empowered to make the final decisions regarding the curriculum, whether or not a school should open or close, and on funding.⁴¹

(4) At first Government policy emphasized practical education and grants were "limited to a capitation grant for each indentured apprentice, . . ."⁴² Later, this policy was revised and grants were extended to schools which were providing teacher training and to schools providing a more literary education and included the system of village schools which were linked to an aided institution.⁴³ Subsequent Education Ordinances revised the rules for grants-in aid and refined the administration system. (This revised system continued until 1952 when the Government reviewed its policies and practices in view of the so-called Beecher Report--a report of a committee appointed by the Governor of Kenya in 1949 to examine African education and submit recommendations.)

(5) Basically, the revised administrative system consisted of Local Native Councils whose members included Africans, District Education Boards chaired by the District Commissioner and which included representatives of the school manager, the Local Native Councils, and an education officer, a representative of the medical department and the Agriculture department as members. At the top was the Department of Education with

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the Director of Education as the highest official, and a Central Committee to advise the Director.⁴⁴ European settlers were appointed to membership on the advisory committee but African representation waited until 1936.⁴⁵

(6) At first the Local Native Councils allocated both Government and local funds, but when the District Education Boards became active, allocation of all funds became their responsibility. The general requirements for a Government grant-in-aid included provision for teacher training or for approved technical subjects, and provision that the staff included an instructor for agriculture and one for manual training.⁴⁶ Many schools could not meet these criteria. In 1948, the Local Native Councils were given financial responsibility for primary education and the Government assumed financial responsibility for secondary education.⁴⁷

(7) The first Government primary school for Africans was opened in 1913 to provide for teacher training and technical instruction, and by 1925, five Government schools had been established. The first secondary school was the Alliance High School opened by Protestant missionaries in 1926 and which "developed with the help of Government Grants-in-aid."⁴⁸ By 1945, there were four secondary schools, and from 1945 to 1949 seven more were opened.⁴⁹ There is some inconsistency in the statistics on the growth of the schools because of a change in structure after 1934 and because of differences in definition which the sources do not fully explain. The Statistical Abstract 1955 shows that the number of African primary schools increased from 1,805 in 1938 to 2,955 in 1952 and secondary schools increased from 3 to 15 in the same period, but the statistics

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did not include teacher training schools.⁵⁰ There was no distinction in the statistics between Government schools, Government aided schools or unaided schools.

(8) Enrollment increased by a much greater rate than the number of schools during the same 1938-52 period. Enrollment in primary schools increased by more than 250 percent from 128,823 to 330,547, and secondary school enrollment rose by almost 900 percent from 184 to 1,624.⁵¹

Although this is a dramatic increase both in number of schools and enrollment, it does not tell the whole story. Aaronovitch calculates that as late as 1943 less than 19 percent of the school age children were receiving an education.⁵² Probably no more than 30 percent of the school age children were in school in 1952; the increasing population of school age would partially balance out the large increase in enrollment.

(9) Evidence that the educational facilities were felt to be inadequate was obtained by the Beecher Committee when African representatives were asked to give oral testimony. The report of the Committee points out that "the African aims at universal literacy through a much expanded primary school system, and can see no reason why a plan to bring this about should not be prepared and fully implemented at once."⁵³ The Beecher Report also showed that more than 50 percent of those enrolled in the first grade (Standard I) of primary school did not start the second grade.⁵⁴ The quality of the African school system was also the subject of much criticism. Two important measures of quality were funding and the quality of teachers.

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(10) As of 1952, according to Leakey, there were almost no free African schools in Kenya;⁵⁵ thus grants-in-aid and local taxation were supplemented by student fees--one factor influencing comparatively low enrollments and early dropouts. Schools maintained by or aided by the Government generally had more money to spend for qualified teachers and for facilities than did unaided schools. Although criteria for grants-in-aid were relaxed over the years, by 1949 there were still many schools which did not enjoy a Government subsidy. The Beecher Report showed that as late as 1948 some 61 percent of the primary schools and about 15 percent of the secondary schools were not receiving Government aid.⁵⁶ The unaided schools included many missionary schools, primarily the smaller bush or village schools linked to a larger institution, as well as the independent schools that had been created by the Kikuyu in 1931.

(11) The independent schools grew out of a conflict between the Kikuyu and the missionaries which centered upon the circumcision of women. From the beginning of missionary activity the missionary churches had taught that circumcision of women, polygyny, nonburial of the dead, and many of the traditional dances were "indecent and barbaric practices."⁵⁷ All of these practices were integral parts of the Kikuyu culture supported by strong social and religious sanctions. Female circumcision was especially important to the society in that only a circumcised girl was considered to be an adult woman, and it was widely believed that an uncircumcised woman could not bear children. As Rosberg puts it, "Not to be circumcised was to be debarred from developing the personality and

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attributes of womanhood and to be condemned to remain psychologically a little girl forever."⁵⁸

(12) In the earliest colonial period there appeared to be little objection to the missionary teachings, but as more and more Kikuyu were educated they began to question the necessity for abandoning their traditional practices in order to remain true Christians. Kenyatta points out that faced with missionary opposition to traditional Kikuyu practices, evidence to support such opposition was sought in the Bible, and no such evidence was found.⁵⁹ The missionaries, led by the rigid, puritanical Church of Scotland, continued their attempt to stamp out female circumcision, and attempted to gain the support of the Government. However, in 1926 the East African Governors decided that the practice should not be interfered with by legislation, but that the Government should try to influence the tribes toward a milder form.⁶⁰

(13) The circumcision issue took on political overtones in 1928, during the elections for representatives to the Local Native Councils. The Kikuyu Central Association supported female circumcision, and the Church of Scotland Mission sponsored a political party dedicated to the abolition of the custom. In 1929, after hearing that a young convert of the Gospel Missionary Society had been circumcised without her consent,⁶¹ the head of the Church of Scotland mission asked for a pledge of adherence to all missionary doctrine, especially the ban on female circumcision, by all members of the church, pupils, teachers and other agents of the mission.⁶² The result was a boycott of many missionary schools and a withdrawal of teachers who refused to take the pledge, the closing of many

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schools, and an educational crisis by early 1931.⁶³ (The political consequences of the controversy are discussed in chapter 2, section III.)

(14) The Kikuyu were highly motivated to gain a modern education in order to enhance their economic and political status; they therefore met this crisis by developing their own schools. Two groups were formed, the Kikuyu Karing'a Schools and the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association. Both groups considered themselves antission but not anti-Christian and were dedicated to providing "a Christian education based on African traditions"⁶⁴ in schools funded and staffed entirely by Africans. They became associated with the African Orthodox Church and the African Independent Pentecostal church, respectively.

(15) By 1935, more than 40 independent schools were in operation, and by 1947, more than 100.⁶⁵ The schools spread throughout Kikuyuland and were, with very few exceptions, the only schools to provide education for the African employees of European settlers. The Kenya African Teachers College was opened as an independent school in 1939,⁶⁶ and provided most of the teachers. The schools had no official recognition, since they did not follow the Government curriculum.

(16) In the African school system as a whole, the quality of the teaching staff left much to be desired. As of 1948, there were 165 European teachers in the system, and 51 percent of the African teachers were "untrained."⁶⁷ There were four levels of trained teachers from T.1, the highest, to T.4, the lowest. To qualify as a T.4 a person must have completed six grades of school and have completed a 1-year training course; a T.3 had to pass the Kenya African Preliminary Examination, given after

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completion of Junior Secondary School (8 years of schooling), and complete a 2-year training course; to hold a T.2 a teacher had to pass the Kenya African Secondary Examination, given after completion of the second year of Senior Secondary School (10 years of schooling), and have completed the 2-year training course; the grade of T.1 was reserved for those awarded the Makerere Diploma of Education (from Makerer College, Uganda).⁶⁸ Table VIII indicates that only 18 percent of the African teachers had more than a primary education and had completed a 2-year teacher training course.

TABLE VIII. AFRICAN TEACHER QUALIFICATIONS, 1948

	<u>T.1</u>	<u>T.2</u>	<u>T.3</u>	<u>T.4</u>	<u>Untrained</u>
Number of teachers	56	129	853	1,710	2,852
Percent.	1	2	15	31	51

Source: Kenya, p 15.

(17) Evidence taken by the Beecher Committee indicated that neither the Africans, the European Administrators of the school system nor the potential employers of the Africans were pleased with the educational system. As noted in (9) above, the articulate Africans wanted expanded and upgraded primary schools to provide universal literacy. They also expected that completion of a primary education would automatically provide the graduate with a well-paying, nonmanual job. Since this was not

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the experience their children had had, they requested postprimary education in practical skills. It should be noted that the low percentage of primary school enrollment and early dropout was not only influenced by lack of schools and funds, overcrowded classes, and unqualified teachers but also by the need to assist on the farm or with the herd, by diminishing parental influence, by the fact that some wanted only bare literacy, and by the lure of earning rather than learning.⁶⁹

(18) European administrators felt that the school system did not prepare the African for the problems or practical necessities to be faced outside of school, including farming in the reserve. And the employers argued that the schools did not fit the applicants for the positions for which they were applying, i.e., higher-status clerical positions, nor did the schools imbue the student with the "proper" attitudes toward work.⁷⁰

(19) There were no statistics kept on literacy during this period, however, by 1966 it was estimated that not more than 30 percent of the total population of Kenya was literate.⁷¹ Aaronovitch has calculated that about 19 percent of the African population of school age were attending school in the midforties, and there were large numbers who either did not complete the first grade or did not continue after the first grade. Therefore, a very rough estimate would be that not more than 15 percent of the Kikuyu were literate by 1952.

(20) Thus it appears that the school system as it existed up to 1952 was not able to prepare the student for adult responsibility either in the European community or in the African community. Many who had primary school training nevertheless flocked to the cities and towns hoping for

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nonmanual employment, and not finding it became a group of unemployed that were of concern to both the European and the African community as a potential subversive force.⁷² Additionally, the uncontrolled operation of the independent schools encouraged the inculcation of dissident ideas.

c. Nonnative education.

(1) The Kenya European schools accommodated Europeans from all of British East Africa and maintained high academic standards. The system followed the British pattern of a 7-year primary school, a 4-year secondary school, and 2 years of preparation for university entrance. In 1942 schooling became compulsory for European children between the ages of 7 and 15.⁷³

(2) The Indian (Asian) community had a high regard for education. The various segments of the community established schools which followed the European pattern except that a 2-year terminal practical course was available at the secondary level. These schools were operated by the Asian community; however, they received financial assistance from the Government of Kenya. In 1945 school attendance was made compulsory for Asian boys in the three largest cities. Most of the boys as well as the girls in other areas attended. In general the Asian schools were of poor quality because of insufficient funds for high quality staff and equipment.⁷⁴

(3) The Arabs did not require attendance in the regular school system and only a small proportion attended. Most of the Arabs sent their children to traditional Koranic Schools which had been established and operated by the Arab community in Mombasa. Although there was only one

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secondary school for Arabs, they were admitted to the Asian secondary schools.

TABLE IX. NUMBER OF SCHOOLS FOR NONNATIVES, 1938-1952¹

	European		Indian (Asian)		Arab and other	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
1938 . .	27	6	69	9	9	1
1952 . .	37	9	90	20	13	1

Sources: Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1955, p 104.

(4) Table IX shows the growth of schools among the non-African population. As has been indicated above, all of the European schools were Government maintained. The Asian schools included both Government schools and Government aided institutions, whereas among the Arabs there were Government schools as well as Government aided and unaided institutions.

(5) A gross indication of relative interest in education may be obtained by comparing the ratio of primary schools to total population. As of 1952 in the European community the ratio was 1:1100, among the Asians it was 1:1400, and among the Arabs it was 1:2500.

d. Higher education. There were no colleges or universities in Kenya as of 1952. The Kenya African Teachers College was not considered to be an institution of higher learning. Most of the Africans who qualified went to Makerere College in Uganda and some few studied abroad. Although there were few statistics on the subject, the Beecher Report

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indicates that only 23 African students entered Makerere College during the 3 years, 1946-49.⁷⁵ Europeans, Asians and Arabs sent their children abroad, but statistics and particulars were not available.

35. Religion.

a. Introduction. The breakdown of traditional religious values has been considered a contributing factor in the development of Mau Mau. This section, therefore, will focus on the major aspects of the traditional Kikuyu religion, and the changes brought about by Christian missionary activity.

b. Traditional Kikuyu religion. The Kikuyu religion was a combination of three elements; belief in an all powerful God, "Ngai," belief in the power of spirits, both ancestral and animistic, and a belief in magic with its concomitant belief in the power of sorcerers and medicine men. Magic is treated here as an element of religion, not only because it was one of the ways the Kikuyu related to the supernatural but also because the functions of the medicine man involved both the spirits and magic. As Leakey stated, "It is not easy to draw a dividing line between religion and magic in Kikuyu society, nor between white magic which is beneficial and black magic or witchcraft which is anti-social."⁷⁶

(1) Ngai was God for the Kikuyu. He was omnipotent, the creator and the source of all things. Ngai had no parents or companion. He lived in the sky but came down to earth to visit and make inspections, as Kenyatta puts it, and to bless or punish the people in accordance with their behavior. On these visits he rested in the mountains; Mount Kenya was considered to be his official resting place, and it was toward Mount

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Kenya that the Kikuyu faced when offering prayers and sacrifices to Ngai. Ngai was not seen by mortals but his powers were manifest in the sun, moon, stars, rain, thunder, and lightning, and other phenomena. Finally, there were two related characteristics of Ngai that had important social implications. The God of the Kikuyu did not bother with the activities of any one person; rather he was concerned, at the least with, an extended family (mbari), clan or larger tribal grouping. Further, he was not to be pestered with minor problems, and the implication is clear that individual problems were minor compared to problems effecting the mbari and larger groups in the tribe.

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(2) Prayers and sacrifices were made to Ngai at planting time, during early growth of crops, at harvest time, during periods of drought and epidemics, and during the ceremonies of initiation; activities and events which were significant for the larger societal groups. Ngai was also called upon at times of family crises. Birth, death and marriage were events that effected the entire mbari, not just the individual. The ceremonies were conducted at special shrines--fig trees or groves set aside for this purpose. The timing of the ceremonies was the responsibility of a seer, an elder who had communication with Ngai in dreams. There was no official priesthood. The ceremonial officials were senior or ceremonial elders, for religious ceremonies involving a grouping larger than the mbari, or the head of the mbari, the "murimati." Usually all members of the community were present or represented; however, women of childbearing age and children (youth who had not been initiated) stayed well back from the shrine.

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On all occasions when prayers and

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sacrifices were made to Ngai the spirits of the ancestors were always
linked to the living in the prayers.

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(3) The relationship between the living and the ancestral spirits was an extension of the prestige and respect accorded senior members or elders within the tribe. Kenyatta pointed out that the elder's presence or advice was sought for all occasions, but further, a son always invited his father to a feast to act as ceremonial leader; if the son had his own homestead, he gave his parents a portion of his produce such as part of an animal he had killed or some of the beer he had prepared. The father or elder, in turn, offered some beer or food to the ancestral spirits.

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(4) According to Kenyatta the spirits were organized into three groups. There were the spirits of the parents which communicated with and advised and admonished their children as they did in life; there were clan spirits which acted collectively in the interests of the clan; and there were age-group spirits which were concerned with their age-groups. The three groups combined maintained an interest in the broader tribal affairs.

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(5) The ancestral spirits were always with the living. They were believed to inhabit the ground, the huts where they had lived, and the courtyard of the homestead. The spirits could become displeased and bring illness or misfortune to an individual, family or larger group. They could, however, be placated with the proper ritual and gifts. As long as the spirits received their due it was believed that the day-to-day life of the tribe and its members would go well. When food and drink

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were consumed, some food and beverage would be dropped close to the hearth for the spirits, and a short prayer would be given. It was also normal to invite the spirits to partake in all of the ceremonies.⁸²

(6) When a minor disaster, misfortune or illness visited an individual or a homestead, it was explained "not by natural causes, nor yet as acts of vengeance by God, but by the disapproval of the ancestral spirits for some act of commission or omission that had displeased them."⁸³ Under these circumstances the medicine man of the district, the "mondo-mogo," was asked to discover what spirit or spirits were offended, what the specific offense was, and what was required to appease the spirit or spirits. The required ritual would be undertaken by the homestead or family under the leadership of the elder of the group.

(7) Belief in animism, that there are spirits of trees, rocks, streams and other inanimate objects, played a much less important role in the Kikuyu religious system than Ngai and ancestral spirits. However, care was taken not to offend these spirits lest supernatural forces would cause harm. For example, the tree spirits were believed to require a home in the trees. Therefore, when felling trees to clear part of the forest for cultivation, some large trees were always left as a home for the spirits of the trees that had been cut down.⁸⁴

(8) A belief in magic, the ability to control impersonal supernatural forces for one's own ends through the proper herbs, amulets, or set rituals, was another aspect of the Kikuyu religious system. The Kikuyu believed that magic could, among other things, heal, protect one from a multitude of dangers, cause another to love one, and purify after

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contracting spiritual uncleanness. The medicine man was the expert in magic and the practitioner. He served an individual on the client basis for a fee. The medicine man prepared the proper mixture of ingredients, said the proper magical phrases, and instructed the client in the use of the magical potion or amulet. He usually exacted an oath from the client stipulating that the client would not reveal to anyone else the magical knowledge he might have witnessed.

(9) To purify a client the medicine man had to divine the source of the ritual uncleanness, since most of the time the client was unaware of it. Ritual uncleanness was brought on by breaking a religious or social taboo, by not carrying out one's parents' wishes, by being subject to magic, or by certain oaths. Once the cause was ascertained, the proper ritual and ceremony was prescribed for purification.⁸⁵

(10) Administration of oaths and their effectiveness was intimately related to the Kikuyus' strong belief in the power of magic,⁸⁶ and thus, in a broad sense, was part of their religious system. Simply stated, an oath was a statement of fact or resolve which invited penalties, usually stipulated in the oath, if the facts were not correct or the resolve not carried through. The penalties were to be administered by supernatural powers. Traditionally, the Kikuyu used oaths as a last resort in judicial matters, in land transactions, as part of the rite of purification, as an expression of resoluteness before an enemy, to stop conflict between groups, and to insure secrecy, for example to keep the initiation ceremonies secret from uninitiates or not to betray the magician's art or instructions.

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(11) Taking an oath was always a serious matter, not only because of the strong belief that the supernatural powers would inevitably invoke the prescribed penalties if the oath was broken, but also because the penalties in most instances could be meted out on any member or members of the extended family. An oath was almost always a social act, taken among witnesses, but only after the families of the men involved were satisfied that their representative was in the right. The strength of belief in the power of oaths was indicated by the fact that in many judicial cases--especially when the court would not come to a satisfactory decision--if the injured party demanded that both parties to the dispute take an oath, a confession could be expected by the guilty party.⁸⁷

(12) It is apparent that the traditional Kikuyu religious system supported collective action and collective responsibility rather than individuality. Religious rituals from supplication of Ngai to "oathing"* required at least family participation, and many required the participation of larger social groups such as the age-groups or the members of a ridge (the largest communal grouping for most ceremonies). Some aspects of magic appeared to be exceptions in that just the magician and his client were involved. Further, the system permitted only the senior representatives, the elder of the family or elders of the tribe, to conduct the religious ceremonies--even the medicine man had to reach the status of an

*This is the word used in the literature to describe the Kikuyu (or Mau Mau) taking of oaths.

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elder before he could practice his art--giving additional support to collective action and responsibility.

c. Christianity and change.

(1) Christian missions were established in Kikuyuland and in other areas around the highlands after the railroad had reached Nairobi. The Church of Scotland mission arrived first, and set up a station near Nairobi in 1898.⁸⁸ Others quickly followed and by 1902 there were five missionary societies spread among the Kikuyu. Besides the Church of Scotland mission, there was a Roman Catholic mission, the Church Missionary Society of the Church of England, the African Inland Mission which was interdenominational primarily composed of Baptists and Seventh Day Adventists under American leadership, and the Gospel Missionary Society composed of a fundamentalist group that had broken away from the African Inland Mission.

(2) The societies divided Kikuyuland into areas of operation in order to avoid overlapping and duplication.⁸⁹ However, by 1910 there were 18 different societies spread from Nairobi to Lake Victoria,⁹⁰ and although not all of them had established mission stations among the Kikuyu, there is no doubt that the five original societies no longer enjoyed their monopoly.

(3) Each society had somewhat different traditions and beliefs, varying levels of commitment, and different techniques and attitudes toward proselytizing and education. Nonetheless, each set up stations which were economic and educational as well as evangelizing units. By their early practice of keeping converts within the mission stations, and

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by continued stress on the evils of polygyny, clitoridectomy, drinking of alcoholic beverages, and barbarous dances, they caused doubt among the Kikuyu about many of the customs, values and beliefs embodied in their traditional religious and social systems.⁹¹

(4) It took a fairly long time for the first Kikuyu to be converted to Christianity, because the missionaries first had to learn the Kikuyu language and then embark on the difficult task of persuading them to "abandon their own highly organized beliefs for those of Christianity."⁹² However, the mission stations attracted the Kikuyu through medical services and education, and the mission soon became an important medium of social change. Statistics on African adherents do not appear to have been reliable enough to be discussed in the sources used. There was some discrepancy even in the early 1960's when two estimates were presented by the Area Handbook for Kenya; an estimate of 60 percent, and a more conservative estimate that only 40 percent considered themselves Christians at that time. The proportion was undoubtedly smaller from 1930 to 1952, but there is no way of making an estimation.

(5) There were several major reasons why missionary activity influenced the break from Kikuyu institutions and brought about a negative reaction to missionaries as exemplified in the so-called separatist or independent churches. A true convert would not participate in what he now considered to be heathen practices, including family rituals, initiation and polygynous marriage. Others, because they were boarded at missionary schools, did not take part in the ceremonies. Still others who had come to the mission station only for its educational advantages

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began to doubt the value of tribal practices. Absence from ceremonies by Kikuyu was also prompted by the exigencies of a job on a settler's farm or in the city. Such absence was influenced only indirectly by missionaries in that they were persuaded to take such positions while in school and influenced by the general value orientation of the Western missionaries.

(6) Since many of the Kikuyu rituals were not valid unless all members of the family were present, the traditionalists in the society became hostile to the missionaries. Further, many fathers disowned their absent children. This permitted valid ceremonies, but the children then lost their inheritance and the social support of their family and tribe.⁹³

(7) The position of the missionaries against polygyny and clitoridectomy was important in the breakdown of tradition, and the latter became the catalyst for the organization of separatist Churches. Although the controversy surrounding clitoridectomy, as it heated up in the late 1920's, became the focus of the Kikuyu break with the missionaries, other factors certainly contributed to the separation. The missionary societies differed in their policies toward potential converts. Some did accept a man who had more than one wife and excommunicated him if he took another wife after conversion, whereas others accepted the polygamous family. And, if all were against clitoridectomy in principle, some were content to make small inroads on the practice and wait for it to end gradually whereas others wanted the practice stopped at once.⁹⁴ With increased internal migration, Kikuyu from different geographical areas met each other as well as members of other tribes, and when these differences

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among the powerful white missionaries were discovered, doubts were raised. In addition, the experience of many Kikuyu in World War I where they saw white fighting white reduced the power and authority of the white man in their eyes. Thus there was a sufficiency of ingredients for a movement to retain elements of traditional culture.

(8) Two major independent churches were organized in the early 1930's in association with the independent schools: the Kikuyu African Orthodox Church and the Kikuyu Independent Pentecostal Church. A number of smaller religious movements also appeared. In general all of the independent religious organizations were based on Christianity but also supported the major Kikuyu social institutions. Leakey points out that these churches used translations of the Bible provided by the missionary societies as well as the Book of Common Prayer and the mission hymnals.⁹⁵ In essence the movement was an attempt to preserve traditional culture and was antimissionary and antiwhite to a greater or lesser degree (for the political implications of the independent churches, see chapter 2, section III). It should be noted that the substantial numbers of African Christians did not join the new movements, nor did those who adhered to traditional Kikuyu culture. The movement appeared to have attracted many who were not really committed to either but who needed some spiritual support.

d. Nonnative religious affiliation. As of 1948, as might be expected, the overwhelming majority (95 percent) of Europeans were Christian, and more than 99 percent of the Arabs were Muslim. However, the Asians were distributed among several religious groups. A most 44 percent

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were Hindu, almost 30 percent were Muslim, about 10 percent were Sikh, about 8 percent were Christian and about 6 percent were Jain.⁹⁶

36. Communication. The traditional method of communication within and between tribes was by word of mouth. Prior to the Colonial period, there was limited contact between members of different tribes because there was little internal migration and because of language differences even within the three major language groups. However, as was pointed out above, there was some, if limited, intermarriage and trade between adjacent tribes. With the arrival of the British and the Colonial period, newspapers and radio supplemented word of mouth communication.

a. The first newspapers catered to the British and the literate Asians. As the number of Africans with some education and political awareness increased, newspapers were published in Swahili and in other African languages. A Government newspaper, "Habari," printed in Swahili started publication in the 1920's. The first Kikuyu language newspaper, a monthly, was started in 1928 by the Kikuyu Central Association.⁹⁷ By 1930 there were 17 newspapers and other periodicals in circulation,⁹⁸ and although the number had increased to 22 by 1931, there were only 18 by 1938.⁹⁹ There was, unfortunately, no itemization of the number printed in an African language as against those printed in English. In 1940, a dispatch from Johannesburg stated that a Swahili "propaganda edition" of a Nairobi newspaper called Baraza, was reported to have "an excellent circulation throughout Kenya and Uganda."¹⁰⁰

(.) The African press grew rapidly after World War II. Four papers were started in 1945, and by 1952 the number had grown to seven.

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These were supplemented by a number of newsheets in 1951.¹⁰¹ Circulation, however, was rather limited. Mumenyerie, a weekly, had a circulation of about 10,000, which was considered rather high.¹⁰² The influence of the African press was also restricted by the low literacy rate among Africans. It is likely that no more than 15 percent of the African population was literate.

(2) Both Rosberg and Corfield believed that the increase in newspapers and newsheets was responsible for "fostering political action in Kenya's cities,"¹⁰³ and for an increase in hostility between Africans and the Government and settlers.¹⁰⁴ The Kikuyu were influenced by the press to a greater degree than the other tribes since there were a large number of Kikuyu in Nairobi where most of the papers were published, most were printed in the Kikuyu language, and the Kikuyu tribe lived closest to Nairobi, which made circulation easier than in distant localities.¹⁰⁵

(3) Although the Government felt that the papers, in general, were hostile and subversive, Corfield claims that there was almost complete freedom of the press until the emergency in 1952. From 1906 until 1950 there was only a Book and Newspaper Registration Ordinance which required no more than registration. Control was exerted under the sedition law of the Penal Code. In 1950 the Penal Code was amended to give the courts power to confiscate presses used for printing seditious material, and in 1952 the Government was given the power to revoke licenses.¹⁰⁶

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b. Radio broadcasting came to Kenya in 1928 through the Government¹⁰⁷ operated and controlled Kenya Broadcasting Service. Although radio had the potential to influence illiterates, there were only 3,000¹⁰⁸ receivers in Kenya in 1938 and but 17,000 in 1953.¹⁰⁹ Even though each set undoubtedly had a rather large audience, most of the impact probably was urban since most of the upland areas did not have electricity and battery operated receivers were expensive.

c. The spread of information by word of mouth continued to be the most important system of communication in rural areas up to 1952 if not beyond. During this period the colonial administrators relied primarily on the representatives of the African tribes to bring information about Government policies and practices to the rank and file. Sometimes this provided problems through garbled communication and lack of understanding because Swahili, which was not the language of either group, was used. For example, Leakey points out that a District Commissioner might have said the government would try to do something, but it would reach the people as will, and when the Government did not come through the people felt that the Government went back on its word. Also throughout this period when an important Government order or decision required communication, or when important grievances needed to be heard, a "baraza" or large public meeting was held to inform or receive information from the rank and file. Further, it is apparent that the limited spread of Mau Mau to other tribes was accomplished through face-to-face, word-of-mouth communication, usually through the intermediary of Kikuyu tribesmen who¹¹⁰ had migrated to other tribal areas.

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d. In sum, the press supplemented word of mouth communication to increase political awareness and unrest among the urban population primarily in Nairobi, and among some of the rural population near Nairobi. However, problems of literacy and lack of radio communication probably constrained the spread of increasing unrest, and with it the spread of Mau Mau.

37. Major aspects of Kikuyu rural life.

a. Before the Colonial period the Kikuyu engaged in subsistence agriculture. The family (see section II below) was the economic unit, producing and consuming the fruits of its labor within the framework of the larger family unit, the mbari.

b. An mbari consisted of several homesteads whose families formed a common descent group. Each homestead consisted of a hut for each wife and for the husband, the whole surrounded by a fence. The homesteads were spread out over the land jointly held by the mbari, the "githaka." The githaka might not be one large plot, but could be several dispersed areas. There was usually a bachelor hut outside the homesteads, in which initiated bachelors of several homesteads slept. There were no population concentrations similar to village or towns. Although a man with many wives would have a large homestead, and several homesteads might be situated in fairly close proximity, specialized activities associated with village or urban life, such as commerce, trade and industry were not found.¹¹¹

c. The huts were circular and usually made of poles, thatch roof, and mud walls. They required rebuilding after about 10 years.¹¹² A

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three-stone hearth commanded the center of the hut. Sticks partitioned the wall space into sleeping quarters, storage and an area for goats. ¹¹³

d. The pace of rural life was tied to the agricultural calendar, religious ceremonies and market days. There were essentially four seasons, two rainy seasons and two harvests. All members of the domestic family, except for very young children, took part in agricultural duties and caring for the animals within a sex-based division of labor. Markets were held every fourth day in a cleared area convenient to the scattered population. They were not more than 7 miles apart in the more heavily populated areas. The Kikuyu would trade surplus farm products, home manufactured goods, and perhaps items taken in trade with neighboring tribes. Market days were evidently important enough so that feuds and fighting were stopped during market days, and members of the warrior age-grade were responsible for law and order. ¹¹⁴

e. Trading was by barter, but sheep and goats were regarded as the standard of value. Cattle were a status symbol of the wealthy. In respect to brideprice a cow was worth about 10 sheep or goats. The milk of a cow was used for children and the hide, after the cow had died, was used for bedding and sandals. A cow was never killed for a sacrifice or for food unless there was a famine. Bulls or oxen, however, were killed for a luxurious feast or for sacrifice. ¹¹⁵

f. Colonialism introduced a money economy. Many of the changes that occurred in the rural areas were, in some respect, related to the Kikuyu's consequent need for money. The need became acute when the Government instituted head and hut taxes on all Africans. Money, however,

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was obtainable at first only by wage labor either in the cities and towns or on the farms of the settlers. In large part, the taxes were part of a campaign to get the African to work for the settlers and others.

g. These policies promoted movement to the towns and to European farms. In general, families moved to European farms as "squatters" where they were given a plot of land on the estate that they could farm and on which they could graze their animals. They were paid for what they produced on their plot by the owner of the estate. In other cases men migrated to the towns without their families as a temporary expedient to earn money for taxes. Later, continued contact with Europeans and Asians produced needs for European clothing and other manufactured products. Male movement to the cities, although transitory for the most part, left the women in charge of the homestead. Reduction in male guidance and movement away from the homestead after initiation age reduced the authority of the family on young men and, for many, there was incomplete socialization, therefore, incomplete knowledge of and adherence to tribal customs, traditions and values.

h. European clothing, shorts, cotton shirts and cotton dresses, gradually came into use in the rural areas. Some of these items were secured in the traditional markets which evidently continued in areas not close to one of the towns that grew up under colonialism.¹¹⁶ Others bought goods at the general stores, run primarily by Asians, in the small towns in the countryside.

i. With increasing need for money for European goods, which were considered status symbols as well as part of the magic of these powerful

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people, some cash crops were farmed. Until after World War II some cash crops were prohibited to Africans, and by 1952 few of the rural community were engaged primarily in cash crop farming.

j. The influence of Europeans was also seen in new types of houses that were built on the homesteads. Instead of the huts a larger house, divided into several rooms, was built. When each wife in a polygynous household had her own hut, the privacy helped reduce jealousy. With all the wives in the same house, albeit in separate rooms, jealousy and ill will were created.

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k. Although the activities in the rural areas outwardly appeared to be little changed, there seems to have been a gradual shift to an excess of women in the rural areas, loss of authority and control over the youth by the family and the elders which produced a deterioration of traditional customs and beliefs, and some change toward cash cropping rather than a subsistence economy.

38. Major aspects of Kikuyu urban life: sources of tension. Except for Mombasa and perhaps Malindi and Lamu on the coast, there were no population concentrations that could be considered urban in Kenya before the colonial period, and there is no evidence that Kikuyu were found in the coastal areas at that time. Nairobi, to become the largest city in Kenya, was founded as a railroad settlement in 1899, and soon became the seat of Government and the center of commerce, industry and finance. Other towns developed, first along the railroad route and then beyond, as administrative and trading centers. Since the Kikuyu tribal lands were almost

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adjacent to Nairobi and the main route of the railroad, contact with urban areas came earlier than with other tribes.

a. Early migration to Nairobi and the towns was fostered by the necessity to engage in wage labor. The early migrants were those who for one reason or another did not work on the settlers' farms. Later, with the growth of the African population and increased pressure on the land, urban migration became a search for better economic opportunities than agriculture afforded. Then as more Kikuyu were educated they came to Nairobi and the towns in search of nonmenial, higher status positions for which they felt qualified.

b. For the most part, this was a transitory migration of males who spent part of the year working for wages. Very few Africans had their families with them. Most of the early migrants only wished supplementary income, and when they had earned enough they would return to their homestead. However, this practice persisted to some degree throughout and beyond the period under consideration in this study. Many of the later migrants may have wished to work and live permanently in Nairobi and the towns, but found that the housing provided for them by their employers would not suffice for their families and that the wages received were barely sufficient for their individual needs. Therefore, almost all of the Kikuyu maintained some ties with the land either as tenants or land-owners,¹¹⁸ inhibiting the growth of the stable urban population of Kikuyu.

c. Many conditions of urban life produced personal stress and anxiety among the Kikuyu. Residential areas in Nairobi and most of the larger towns were segregated, and it was obvious that the African

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residential area had the worst housing and sanitation. Most of the Africans lived in barracks-type housing provided by the employer. Such housing was designed for single men rather than for families. Each man occupied a small room, and shared common cooking and sanitary facilities. As African migration to urban areas increased, housing could not keep up with demand, resulting in a proliferation of shacks, overcrowding and slums.

d. Other obvious contrasts were the type of work allotted to Africans, and their low level of wages. Aaronovitch points out that as of 1945 about 70 percent of the African wage earners were considered unskilled by their employers, and 10 percent were domestic servants.¹²⁰ This was especially disheartening to those who had completed some education since they expected to qualify for nonmenial positions, and evidently were not willing to start at the bottom and work their way up in a job. They were seeking status positions that were denied many of them. It is of no relevance, here, what the objective facts were, whether the African was not qualified or the potential employer was discriminating against him. What is relevant is that he had come to town with expectations, given to him or inferred by him during his educational experience, and these expectations were not fulfilled, creating frustration, stress and anxiety. As has been mentioned,^{*} there were sufficient numbers of Kikuyu young men in this predicament that both the Government and tribal leaders were worried that they might become a subversive force.

^{*}See the paragraph on Education.

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e. Separation from the homestead, the cohesive domestic and extended family, and other tribal groups, even for periods of less than a year, removed the Kikuyu from the traditional source of social control and removed him from the support that had always been part of his life. He observed new activities, was introduced to new values and became confused and anxious. Further, if he had been initiated, was married, or had a child ready for initiation, the traditional society accorded him a status position which he was aware of. In the urban environment he either had no status or was impressed that he was at the lowest rung of the status hierarchy, adding to his insecurity.

f. Many of the educated Kikuyu--that is, those who had acquired some education and were literate even if they had not completed primary or secondary school--had been separated from their family environment while attending school so that they lacked some strength of attachment to traditional values. They had learned enough to doubt many of their traditional values but did not have sufficient preparation to have strong attachments to the European system. They were in between two worlds. They had been motivated in their educational pursuits to obtain the "magic" of the superior white "tribe," and having been exposed expected access to higher status jobs, to have higher status and to have access to the material goods associated with European status. The failure of many to attain their goal led to insecurity, stress, frustration and anxiety.

g. After World War II many Africans who had served with the British Armed Forces migrated to Nairobi and other urban areas in Kenya. The former soldiers had been fed, clothed and paid the same as other soldiers,

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many had served overseas where they had the opportunity to compare their situation with commonwealth countries, returned with some political sophistication and had saved some money.¹²¹ The ex-soldiers returned with higher standards and expectations which were not realized. Some used their savings to open a business and, because of lack of experience, most failed. Here again failure to realize expectations led to frustration and insecurity.

h. Although the experience of men in urban areas has been emphasized, women also migrated to the city and towns but in much fewer numbers. Those who did so were those who had not married because many of the eligible men were in towns or who might have become second wives in areas where polygyny was breaking down; those whose marriages had broken and who were far from their homestead;¹²² and unwed mothers who had been cared for at missionary stations. These women tried to find husbands in town or get work as nursemaids in European homes. However, Leakey contends that many failed in both endeavors and wound up as prostitutes.

i. The conditions of the urban Kikuyu were conducive to the formation of many organizations in the cities and towns. Many tribal associations grew up to promote the social welfare of their members in Nairobi and Mombasa; labor unions were organized; vocational and trade associations were formed, as well as political organizations.¹²³ Many Kikuyu probably joined one or another organization, especially the tribal associations, in the hope that such an organization would substitute for their extended family.¹²⁴ Others joined, and were active, in order to achieve a status position which they believed they deserved or had lost through separation

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from their homesteads but had not been able to achieve occupationally. In most cases the leadership of these organizations was made up of younger, educated men who would not have achieved higher status in their tribe for some years but who believed it was their due by virtue of educational achievement. The proliferation of associations may have been influenced by that aspect of Kikuyu tradition that sanctioned the organization of age-groups which cut across family and clan groups, and by the attempt of the Kikuyu to imitate or adapt institutions, used successfully by their higher status urban neighbors, the Asians and the Europeans.

j. Certainly not all of the urban Africans felt insecure in the midst of strange values or because they were somewhere between two systems of values, accepting neither and not being accepted by the system to which they aspired. Middleton tells us that "an African middle class was clearly emerging."¹²⁵ This group regarded themselves as enlightened, having freed themselves of tribal superstitions and loyalties. They were members of different tribes who had a relatively high educational level, adhered to Christianity, and were monogamous. Their status symbols were European; the use of English as a language, living in European-type housing, wearing European clothing, in effect the European style of life. They envisioned the past in terms of the grandeur of tribal exploits and peaceful tribal life "in which ties of fraternal kinship between tribesmen and of wise guidance and authority between young and old were idyllic and without strain or stress."¹²⁶ Their aim was a united African Kenya with national rather than tribal loyalties, and where the African would enjoy

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the educational advantages, wealth and power that was then the province of the Europeans.

39. Major cultural characteristics and values.

a. Kikuyu.

(1) Collective loyalty. Perhaps the major aspect of traditional Kikuyu culture was its emphasis on a variety of collective loyalties with concomitant support, security and status of the individual within the various collectivities.

(a) The Kikuyu gave his primary loyalty to the extended family or mbari. This was the social unit in which he was socialized, which shared responsibility for his misdeeds, sponsored his initiation, helped him accumulate his brideprice and build his own homestead, gave him land to farm on the githaka and through which he might gain the status of muramati, head of the mbari. His loyalty extended from his family to the clan.

(b) He also had a strong loyalty to his age-group, and considered its members his brothers. Here again, the Kikuyu was secure in the support and assistance he could expect from his age-group, and as the age-group progressed through the status hierarchy, the individual was ascribed higher status. This loyalty cut across family and clan to at least the ridge if not the tribe, and the feeling toward the age-group extended to the ridge and tribe, but with less intensity.

(c) Land tenure was an integral part of the strength of the extended family, the mbari, and permeated all aspects of the society. Kenyatta felt that the beliefs and values associated with land tenure

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among the Kikuyu made it ". . . the most important factor in the social, political, religious, and economic life of the tribe."¹²⁷ (See also the discussion of land tenure in chapter 3.)

(d) Religion, except for some aspects of magic, reinforced the collective solidarity of the mbari, clan, age-group, ridge and tribe since the validity of the prayer, sacrifice, oath, or other religious ritual rested upon family or larger collective participation.

(e) Kenyatta sums it up thus,

In the Gikuyu /Kikuyu/ community there is no really individual affair, for everything has a moral and social reference. The habit of corporate effort is but the other side of corporate ownership; and corporate responsibility is illustrated in corporate work no less than in corporate sacrifice and prayer.¹²⁸

(2) Equalitarianism. Along with the corporate emphasis there was a strong sense of equalitarianism among groups of similar status: new or recent initiates, married men without children, married men with children who had not been initiated, married men with children who had been initiated; and similarly for women. This also applied to members of the same age-group. Under these circumstances status was ascribed by age, marital condition, or the general status of the age-group. In effect all tribal members, providing for sex differences, had a basic life history that was the same for each Kikuyu, and none would remain in a subordinate status all through their lives.¹²⁹

(3) Achievement orientation. On the other hand, there was also room for individual achievement. Although there were not wide variations in levels of living there were differences in wealth and status

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differentiation based on wealth. Wealth, however, was not inherited, so that it had to be achieved by younger members of the community and in principle it was accessible to all. When an age-group moved up in rank, especially from warrior to elder, it meant the members were eligible for the status. To obtain official elder status required being instructed in the role, and payment of fees was necessary for the instruction. A man of wealth could, therefore, gain the status more rapidly than a poorer man. Within all age-groups there were leaders chosen on the basis of special skills or expertise. Such skills and expertise were achieved through practice and study. Thus there were conditions within the culture which provided motivation for achievement.

b. European.

(1) The cultural characteristics and values of the European community in Kenya during the period under study stemmed from the English upper class. For the society as a whole they placed major emphasis on cohesiveness, stability of the social order and an absence of internal conflict, and growth of the economy. Europeans adhered to the Christian religion and valued family stability, a strong sense of honor, fair play and personal courage as personal attributes. Their status symbols were aggressive behavior (of the "proper" type), proper accent, the correct material possessions and club membership.

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(2) In Kenya the Europeans considered themselves to be the competent group who had to rule for the benefit of the incompetent many, and would accept an opposition viewpoint only from those in their own status group. In general, they considered Africans to be undisciplined,

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unreliable, irresponsible and lazy. It was, therefore, legitimate to persuade and coerce Africans to work for Europeans, to change their bad habits and attitudes, to suppress opposition by this ignorant group, and to separate or segregate them for their own protection.¹³¹ By domination, by example, by leadership and by election the European elite would deliver the unfortunate African from his ignorance, poverty and disease and provide him with the fruits of western civilization. But this would take a long, long time.

c. Asian.

(1) The Asian community in Kenya tended to hold to the hierarchical caste system, religion, and family system that was their heritage from India. The Asians accepted membership in their caste or sect through birth, and almost without exception they married within their caste or sect. They tended to be more concerned with religious than secular matters. An Asian participated in secular organizations such as the school board, in effect as a representative of his caste or sect. Within the joint family system the highest values were placed on deference to parents, proper education of one's children, and on giving financial assistance to less fortunate relatives.¹³²

(2) The Asian community as a whole, held to some important principles despite caste and sect differences. All groups stressed abstinence from alcohol and held to the puritanical values of industry and lack of ostentation. The latter values perhaps provided them with a competitive advantage in the modern business and professional world.¹³³

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(3) Decades of European influence on India as a colony of Great Britain was also part of the heritage of the Asian community in Kenya. Their emphasis on industry and education was applied to European business enterprise and professions, and they soon came into competition with the European settlers and businessmen in and around Nairobi. Later, they provided competition to the more educated Africans because of Asian ubiquity in clerical positions and in small commercial enterprises.

40. Cultural change. Rather close and constant contact with the British and other Europeans over some 50 years, first through missionary activity and later through colonial officers, settlers, businessmen and military service produced some changes in the Kikuyu culture. Changes in specific areas of the culture and deterioration of customs and traditions have been treated in the separate sections. The general impact of such change in terms of the traditional characteristics presented above will be presented here.

a. Rosberg contends that the major change was an emphasis on the value of achievement in terms of self-achievement and, therefore, individualism.¹⁵⁴ Certainly the cultural balance tipped and self-achievement, an element already present in the traditional Kikuyu culture, became a major value. But it was also true that many if not most of the European values became the standard for many Kikuyu.

b. Although some changes, such as a money economy and wage labor, were forced upon the Kikuyu by colonial policies, it would appear that Kikuyu readily imitated or adapted European institutions in order to

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meet their changing needs. At least part of the motivating force behind this adaptability was their general ideas of power and their belief in the power of magic. Carothers, although generalizing to all Africans, pointed out that an African saw the world as an area of conflicting forces, both natural and supernatural. The power of these forces might be manipulated for the benefit of the tribal group or might have to be opposed by a more powerful force. Those who were successful in conquest and in maintaining control were perceived to possess greater powers than the conquered, and "this new power must be tapped."¹³⁵

c. Sociological and anthropological theory also tells us that when contact between two

unequally advanced peoples is largely a one-way movement; the subordinate . . . group in general has more to learn than the dominant group and the incentives to learning are greater and more obvious.¹³⁶

Thus the contact between the Kikuyu and the Europeans, combined with the Kikuyu's strong belief in magic, were strong motivations for them to attempt to utilize the institutions and adopt the values of the dominant culture.

d. The Kikuyu interest in education, land and wealth continued in a modified form. Education was required in order to achieve the status symbols of the colonial society; high status jobs, nonmenial work, and higher paying jobs. Wealth became the means of obtaining the clothes, type of housing and general style of living of the westerner. Ownership of land was still a symbol of status; it would be farmed by hired hands, and perhaps add to one's wealth. Rosberg contends that the Kikuyu with

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the highest prestige were those who had made some progress within the colonial system, such as teachers, Government clerks and officials, business men and progressive farmers.¹³⁷ Further, as has been pointed out in the section on urban life, the emerging middle class among Africans also accepted Christianity and monogamy.

e. There was unequal acceptance of cultural change in different parts of the society. Those closest to missionary stations and the cities, the more educated, and the more mobile among the Kikuyu accepted more of the values more rapidly. The more rural were slower to accept, and more selective. The change, moreover, was not particularly orderly.

f. A major manifestation of both resistance to change and acceptance of new values as well as a reflection of the malaise and insecurity resulting from the process of change itself, was the development of schools, churches and sects which were not dominated by the missionaries. The movement, although antimissionary, retained both the missionary school system and basic Christian doctrine while holding to some important Kikuyu institutions. The formation of a variety of organizations from political to tribal welfare indicate adoption of new institutions to redress grievances, gain power within the new system and provide security since the traditional institutions and relationships were breaking down.

g. It is fair to state that during the period under study there was a gradual, uneven, and disorderly change from traditional Kikuyu culture to the institutions and values of the colonial society. The change was by no means complete by 1952. In fact, the Area Handbook for Kenya points out that in the midsixties, after some years of attempting to develop a

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spirit of nationalism among the various tribes before and after independence, tribalism was still a concern of the Government.¹³⁸

41. Conclusions and general observations. Several studies or parts of studies have addressed the problem of the underlying conditions that produced the Mau Mau and the violence that was attributed to this organization. Of the sources used for this section of the study, Rosberg, Corfield, Leakey and Brown treat the problem and Kenyatta alludes to it.

a. Rosberg contends that the rise of militant political organizations was a manifestation of cultural nationalism, a reaction to policies instituted by the colonial Government or supported by them which were interpreted as attempts to destroy the indigenous culture.¹³⁹ Corfield's analysis of the sociological factors involved emphasizes the problems Africans encounter in urban areas, problems precipitated by education, and their social frustrations based on discrimination.¹⁴⁰ Leakey looked to the general breakdown of traditional authority, deterioration of marriage customs, unbalanced and rapid social change, the development of separatist churches, and rapid growth of the population as major processes in the development and support for the Mau Mau.¹⁴¹ And finally, Brown traces the problem to general social disintegration and the undermining of white authority brought on by alienation of land, disparity between the European moral code and their actual behavior, unwise or unthinking interference in indigenous customs, and an unrealistic (for the African population) educational system.¹⁴² In essence all of these analyses stress the deterioration of the Kikuyu culture although they may emphasize different institutions.

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b. Two aspects of Kikuyu society and culture seem most important to the understanding of conflict. They are related to each other, and both were factors influencing the growing insecurity and anxiety of the Kikuyu, since they contributed to the breakdown of many traditional institutions.

(1) The first was the alienation of Kikuyu land. Arguments concerning the objective facts, whether or not Kikuyu land was actually alienated and whether or not they were adequately compensated, are not relevant. The Kikuyu land, the githaka, was such an integral part of his culture that any alienation of land believed to be necessary for the cultural integrity and survival of the tribe appeared as a major threat. The cultural significance of the land, its sacredness, was the basis of the strength of the rallying cry, "Return the stolen lands."

(2) A related aspect is the dislocation of Kikuyu from their mbari and githaka. With pressure on the land, abetted by colonial tax policies and missionary boarding school policies, Kikuyu left their traditional residence for the settlers' farms, the cities, and the schools. Removed from their traditional base of authority, support and status symbols, they were extremely vulnerable to insecurity, frustration and anxiety. Attempts to imitate and adapt the institutions and values of the dominant culture, for the most part unsuccessful during this period, reinforced their insecurity and frustrations. Deterioration of specific institutions stemmed from or were strongly influenced by continued dislocation which saw more and more confused and frustrated Kikuyu. These feelings were undoubtedly abetted by their relations with the white community both in the highlands and in the urban areas.

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c. African experience in and out of Kenya during World War II appears to have been the impetus to the development of new organizations and strengthening old ones for redress of grievances. Africans in Nairobi met whites from abroad and American Negroes reinforcing their grievances. Kenya Africans who served abroad developed new standards and acquired some political sophistication. When conditions did not seem to improve after World War II, they were evidently ready to take action.

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Section II. Family and Social Class

by Jessie A. Miller, PhD

42. Introduction.

a. All ethnic communities in Kenya--European, Asian, and African--were similar in being patrilineal (tracing descent through males) and patriarchal (authority is vested in males). Men were expected to be the heads of the households as well as of families; children took their father's name and/or clan affiliation; women usually joined their husband's household. It was generally believed that the family provided the continuity between "the dead, the living and the as yet unborn." The idea of the extended family was central to the Asian and African families, not to the European.

b. For the purposes of this study only the African family need be examined. A careful survey has shown that at this time the herding peoples, as for example the Masai, tended to remain aloof whereas the agricultural peoples were more responsive both to the missionaries and to the money economy. Of all the tribes the most responsive to social change and the most involved in the Mau Mau episode were the Kikuyu. They have, therefore, been chosen for more detailed study.

c. So far as can be learned no scholarly study of the class structure within the European, Asian, or African segments of the Kenyan population has been made. One is forced to rely on bits and pieces gained from a variety of impressionistic reports. Even these do not deal with class as such but are concerned primarily with occupational groups. To

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some extent these may be correlated with class but the relationship is far from clear.

43. The lineage system.

a. The basis of the Kikuyu social organization was an extremely complex lineage system. When, in about the 16th century, the tribe began to move into its present territory individuals took possession of land and each became the founders of a subclan or mbari. By the time the British arrived a subclan tracing its origin to a single individual land owner might consist of a thousand adults or more. This unit was considered to be closely bound together by ties of consanguinity. The original head of the subclan was of course, the founder. Thereafter, upon the death of a headman the adult male members of the subclan debated the choice of a successor until unanimity was reached. The man so elected, known as the muramati, was chosen for his wisdom, tact, and suitability as a religious leader.¹⁴³

b. Within the subclan were sub-subclans, with organization similar to that of the subclan as a whole. The sub-subclans were composed of a number of family units, each consisting of the head of a family or father, his children, possibly grandchildren, and even great-grandchildren--using all these terms in the African and not the European sense (see 44a below). Family organization was the same as that of the subclan except that the head of the family owed his position to seniority, whereas the head of the larger group was chosen because of his suitability.

c. Within the subclan hierarchy the rights and duties of the various levels were defined. In matters of land the subclan--and the

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subclan only--was empowered to act. It alone was the custodian of the land. To the Kikuyu this was a matter of the utmost importance for two reasons: the land was believed to be the residing place of the ancestral spirits; and, all male subclan members living and as yet unborn were considered landowners having a share in the one single great estate or githaka. Hence it was highly desirable to keep the estate undivided. If an individual wished to settle a tenant on the portion of land he held, he first had to get the sanction of the muramati. Similarly, if he wished to sell his share he first had to inform the muramati so that a buyer within the subclan could be found. Only if no member of the subclan was willing to buy could land be sold to an outsider.¹⁴⁴

d. In matters of law and religion the lineage was also important. Disputes or matters of discipline involving members of a single family were settled by the family, with ultimate authority vested in the father. When two or more families were involved the subclan took jurisdiction. Communal religious observances and sacrifices were primarily the responsibility of the subclan leaders. The father was similarly charged with performing the rituals and sacrifices for the members of the family.

e. In brief, the lineage was the custodian of the land, of religion and of law. Separate specialized institutions were not developed to carry out these functions.

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44. The extended family.

a. To understand the family it is necessary to examine the African system of classifying relatives, which is derived from the concept of the family as one person.

(1) The term "brother" applied to all of a man's brothers, half-brothers and to his male cousins on the father's side. All of these ranked as father to the next generation. "If the actual father of a family died, his next senior brother, half-brother or patrilineal cousin became automatically 'father' to those whose real father had died." It was not until there were no male members of that generation living that the responsibilities passed on to the eldest son of each man in the earlier group. The original extended family thus broke up into as many new families as there had originally been male members of the earlier generation.¹⁴⁵

(2) The concept of the family as one person is epitomized by three phrases: "I and my grandfather are one, I and my brother and sister are one, I and my wife are one." Hence, a man referred to all women who were the wives of his classificatory self, that is his brothers, half-brothers and patrilineal cousins, as "my wife." Since "I and my grandfather are one" the same term applied to the wives of his grandfather and classificatory grandfathers, and to the wives of his grandsons. As Leakey points out a Kikuyu villager might well identify many women, some quite young, some quite old, as "my wives."*

*It would never have occurred to him to explain the classificatory system, which he took for granted, nor would he think to explain the taboos controlling his relationship with his various "wives".

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led Europeans to believe that the number of wives a man might take was much greater than it actually was. They were unaware that custom forbade him to touch, let alone be intimate with, many of the women he referred to as "my wife."¹⁴⁶

b. The significance of the identity between the individual and the group is clearly seen in the family responsibility for crime and torts committed by its members. For example, after the institution of the British administrative system relatives were expected to help an offender pay fines imposed by native tribunals or European courts. The size of the kinship group expected to assist depended on the amount of the fine and the wealth of the offender. If the fine was small the culprit would pay it himself. If his resources were inadequate his relatives helped approximately in proportion to the nearness of the kinship. A full brother paid more than a half-brother. If the fine was considerable the paternal uncles helped and if it was very large, his paternal grandfather's brothers collected contributions for him from their sons. It also was considered right that the husbands of the offender's sisters should help. A family which had acquired a girl from another family was under a continuous obligation to it.¹⁴⁷

c. Psychologically the concept of the extended family as one person encouraged the development of an individual who took for granted his security within the group, his right to support from its members, and his responsibilities to the individuals in that group.

45. The nuclear family. Within the extended family was the individual or nuclear family. On the customs surrounding this unit much of the

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African-European hostility was centered. Particularly controversial were the initiation ceremonies that marked adulthood, the "bride purchase," and polygyny.

a. Before a young man or a young woman could be considered adult and thus eligible for marriage, he or she had to undergo an initiation ceremony which included circumcision for the boy and clitoridectomy for the girl. From the Kikuyu viewpoint, not to be circumcized was to be barred from developing the personality and attributes of an adult, to be condemned to remain psychologically a child forever.¹⁴⁸ The operation symbolized the most important moment in a young person's life.

b. Since female circumcision in particular became an issue between the Africans and the Europeans it should be emphasized that the operation was regarded by the Kikuyu as the very essence of an institution that had enormous educational, social, moral and religious implications. According to Jomo Kenyatta, to abolish clitoridectomy amounted to abolishing the entire initiation ceremony, the "sine qua non of the whole teaching of tribal law, religion and morality."¹⁴⁹

c. Some years after initiation when the young man had reached the proper age for marriage, he chose a young woman with whom he thought he could be happy. If she accepted his proposal he asked his father's permission for the marriage to take place; and if after investigation the father found no valid reason against it, such as certain ties of consanguinity or evidence that the girl was unstable, the girl's family was approached. Once their permission was given, negotiations began as

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to the number of sheep and goats to be given the bride's family by the groom's family.

d. To outsiders, it appeared that the bride was purchased. To the Kikuyu, the marriage settlement was a form of "marriage insurance." The handing over of the livestock was a guarantee of good faith and of the belief that the young man and young woman would establish a stable family in accordance with law and custom. If the marriage should later break down because the young man failed to behave properly, his family would forfeit the "marriage insurance" stock and the wife would return to her family. If the marriage failed through some fault of the girl, her family had to return not only the stock received "but all the computed (as distinct from the actual) offspring."¹⁵⁰ The "insurance" was, therefore, a strong factor in stabilizing marriages. Each family had a stake in its success "and would go to infinite trouble to heal a breach before it becomes too serious."¹⁵¹

e. At the same time a young man built a hut for himself and his bride, and before the birth of the first child he built another. The first hut, or nyumbo, belonged to the wife. It was hers, not his, and it would become the home for her children. The second hut was called the man's hut. If in time he took additional wives a new hut was built for each. If eventually the grown sons married and resided near their father the family compound expanded to form an extended polygynous family. The father's authority and family cohesion were well established. At the same time a wife and her children formed a semiautonomous unit within a larger family composed of the husband and all his wives and children.

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The separate huts provided a measure of privacy and helped mitigate tensions between the wives.

f. Two other culture traits indicate the intricate adjustments within the polygynous system. First, while a woman was nursing an infant she was generally prohibited from having intercourse with her husband. This rule protected the newborn child against a succeeding pregnancy of its mother. At the same time, by providing a regular interval between the births of siblings of the same mother and father, it was an effective means of birth control. Second, unlike most polygynous societies, the Kikuyu permitted the women a measure of freedom; she could invite a lover of her own choice to her hut (provided he was of her husband's age group), but she must later tell her husband she had done so.¹⁵² The rules were clear. Children always belonged to the husband's family. There was apparently no problem of illegitimacy or question of support.

g. Within the family, men's and women's roles were clearly delineated. In agricultural areas each wife cared for her children in her own house, took her turn in preparing food for her husband, cultivated her own plot of ground, harvested and stored her own food. The husband was responsible for the care of the animals and, after the introduction of the cash economy, for providing some money income. The larger the family the greater its resources in people, services and materials. For this reason the large family unit was the ideal toward which most people worked. It was a stable, intricate social pattern well adjusted to the African needs in the precolonial era.

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46. The impact of change.

a. The impact of the British occupation on the Kikuyu family was harsh and in many ways disastrous. To the British several of the Kikuyu practices were immoral, indeed revolting. They did not understand the intricate way in which the initiation ceremony was tied into morality education and the assumption of adult roles, or the true nature and function of "bride price." Nor did they perceive the very practical advantages of an extended polygynous family in meeting the economic and social security needs of individuals in a subsistence economy. Finally, they did not understand either the psychological tensions imposed on individuals by a sudden wrenching away of the fundamental belief systems on which they depended, or the breakdown of social control that was likely to follow. To improve the morals of the natives by changing their customs was to many colonials a significant part of the "White Man's Burden."

b. The missionaries led the demand for change by forbidding Christian converts or those attending mission schools to practice polygyny or female circumcision. Because of their high emotional content these practices, particularly the latter, became major points of tension between the Europeans and the Africans. A contemporary observer pointed out that when some of the missionary societies demanded that their adherents sign a pledge not to have their daughters initiated, "a wave of fury swept through the Kikuyu country." Later the Kikuyu Central Association was not slow in taking advantage of this issue to point out how the white man and particularly the missionary, was an enemy of the people. It said in

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effect, "first the land has been taken from us . . . and now they attack our most sacred customs . . ." ¹⁵³

c. Several policies initiated by the British to achieve other ends were as destructive of the traditional family as were the direct attacks.

(1) The colonial administrative and court systems, by taking over many of the elders' functions or placing them in a new context, struck hard at the authority of the family and the lineage. The old effective system of social control was weakened.

(2) Restriction of native lands (combined with population growth) resulted in a shortage of goats and sheep necessary for the many religious ceremonies in an individual's life. For many, it was no longer possible to provide the "bride insurance." This according to Leakey was an important contributory factor to family instability and to "the mental unrest and discontent" which contributed to the growth of Mau Mau. ¹⁵⁴

(3) Tax and land policies designed to increase the labor supply of European employers forced thousands of men to leave the reservations to such work. Sometimes employers on estates provided quarters for families but those in the cities seldom did. This meant that the father, the chief authority figure, was removed from the family. The African woman disliked innovations, especially those that "took her man away from her and caused him to live a life of dissipation and disgrace." ¹⁵⁵

(4) Increased dependence on a money economy, new taxes, and low wages made it difficult for the extended family to survive and to provide economic security for the young and the aged. For the urbanized Africans, particularly those who had to some degree improved their economic status

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or secured a Government position, the kinship obligations became onerous.^{*} The partial break-up of the traditional social security system without the provision of an adequate substitute not only caused economic deprivation but increased psychological tensions for individuals and strain within an already disrupted social system.

(5) Missionary schools contributed to weakening family ties. Most of them tended to be boarding schools. This was a means of insuring regular attendance, providing systematic religious instruction and accommodating students from distant areas; but the result was that from the primary school on, perhaps for 8 or 10 years, students were continuously away from home except for brief holidays. Fewer emotional ties and vast cultural differences between the educated and uneducated family members were the result.

(6) Even the change in housing styles played a part. In both rural and urban areas the new single house divided into rooms in contrast to the traditional separate huts for each wife and for the husband, took away much of the privacy previously enjoyed. In consequence jealousy and ill-feeling between wives and their children were said to increase.

(7) The male children, too, were drawn away from the family. No longer were there sufficient herds to occupy them in their traditional

^{*}Typical of the frequent complaints of the burden of family obligations is the following: ". . . This merciless influx (of kinfolk) is not solely a result of greed or In some cases it is due to dire poverty. But often it is due to the curious notion that government employees are always rich The poor Government official cannot plead poverty. He will be forced to borrow to make ends meet. On occasion he will extort bribes."¹⁵⁶

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task. Some parents complained that the boys were enticed away by estate managers. Others, in need of money, sent the children away to work. In either case, once they were away they tended not to return as an integral part of the family.¹⁵⁷

(8) The growth of the cities contributed to and highlighted the problems of family disorganization. At least some of the problems unsuccessfully faced by individuals, as reflected in prostitution, crime, delinquency, divorce and illegitimacy were "concomitant effects of the fact that in the urban setting the individual adult whether male or female" was forced "to live apart from a normal household and without normal family ties."¹⁵⁸

47. Social class. Kenya's social structure was sharply divided into three caste-like strata, each largely ethnic in composition: the European elite, the Asian "middle," and the African lowest "caste." The term "Asian" was generally used to include the Goan and Arab communities although both presented some classification difficulties. The Goans were originally from India but most retained Portuguese citizenship and were Christian. It was "difficult to establish a behavioral correlate" for this mixed European-Indian identity. Similarly the Arabs were considered by all to be distinctive in culture, language and attitudes. Their large admixture of negro blood would have marked them as "African" but their distinctive tradition of political and commercial dominance in the coastal areas give them something of an Asian "caste" identity. On a purely social basis there was almost no contact among the three castes.

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48. The European elite.^{*} The first European settlers arrived in Kenya in 1901. By 1948 they numbered about 29,000 or less than 1 percent of the population. For the most part they were of British background and, as in England, social standing was determined primarily by birth, education and occupation. Before World War I the social hierarchy was fairly distinct. At the top stood the colonial administration followed, in order, by the settlers (farmers), and the missionaries. There were at first few other Europeans.

a. Components.

(1) The administrative staff of the Colonial Service (as distinguished from the technicians) was marked by its aristocratic flavor. Its members were selected almost exclusively from the upper and upper middle classes. Typically they had attended one of England's leading public schools and probably also had a degree from either Oxford or Cambridge. This background, it was felt, "produced an English gentleman with an almost passionate conception of fair play, of protection of the weak, and of playing the game,"¹⁵⁹ a man of honor, tolerance, and a strong sense of justice. These were the qualities it was thought that were needed in the colonial service.

(2) Most of the farmer-settlers were likewise drawn from the British upper-middle class. Many were the younger sons of prominent county families and brought with them the codes, values and pattern of

^{*} All whites, regardless of place of origin, are referred to in Kenya as Europeans.

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life of the landed gentry. However, the settlers were by no means as homogeneous a group as the generally accepted stereotype implies.* Significant numbers came from South Africa and others, pictured as "typical frontiersmen," arrived from Australia, New Zealand and Canada.¹⁶⁰ Reminiscences of early residents portray a heterogeneous group of acquaintances and neighbors and suggest that a bold spirit and willingness to work hard often substituted for family background and capital.¹⁶¹ However, the settler group was small, everyone knew everyone, and conformity to the British gentleman's code was the sine qua non of belonging.

(3) No information is available on the class background of the missionaries, but since Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, Seventh Day Adventists and various Pentecostal sects in England, Scotland, Canada, the United States and Europe sent evangelists into the field it can be assumed that they represented a broad spectrum of religious beliefs, educational background, and class affiliations.

b. Attitudes. The colonial administrators, the settlers and the missionaries as subgroups within the Kenyan class system, shared certain basic assumptions about African society.

(1) All accepted the elitist philosophy of a stratified society in which a small number of individuals, believed to be best qualified by ability and training, governed in the interests of the many.

* It is true that the successful establishment of a white family in the highlands required considerable financial resources and that the colonial administration encouraged the well-to-do, but land grants made to them were frequently resold in smaller blocks.

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(2) The European community by virtue of its superior culture, including the Christian religion, higher standards of technology, and greater organizing and administrative abilities, was naturally accorded the role of economic, political and social dominance.

(3) The African was seen at best, as "the child race of the world," happy, thriftless, excitable, irresponsible, incompetent and incapable of governing himself. ¹⁶² To the more critical he was barbaric, cruel, dishonest, dirty, hopelessly lazy and immoral.

(4) The Asian, though less uncivilized than the African, was said to be contaminated by an inferior culture, immoral marriage customs, unsanitary habits and dishonest trading practices. Unless carefully restricted he would endanger the social well-being and economic position of the African.

c. Relations with the Africans and Asians.

(1) The above attitudes made it easy to rationalize the need for a rigid color bar. Although it was not an officially stated policy of the colonial Government the regulations established were essentially that of apartheid: separate schools, hospitals and other public facilities for each of these ethnic groups; separate residential areas; and differential wage scales in both public and private employment. Neither the African nor the Asian was permitted to move outside of his assigned social sphere.

(2) The rigidity of the race barrier was adhered to under all conditions. Even in the more isolated posts where there were literally no other companions, a proper social distance was carefully maintained

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between the British administrator and the Asian and African members of his staff. One officer reported that he did indulge in tennis with his Goan clerk but his evenings were spent in status-maintaining solitude.¹⁶³ In the more populated areas the administrator's social life was sharply restricted to the European community.

(3) Similarly, settlers drew the line at meeting Africans in other than in a master-servant relationship. The etiquette of this relationship emphasized the social distance between them:

While there were many settlers who treated their African workers kindly there were many others who never bothered to summon their servants by name but screamed "Boy" contemptuously all day long--and allowed their children, who seem to adopt the bwana-no-mensahib complex very early in life, to do the same thing and to order full grown servants about like dogs.¹⁶⁴

(4) The missionaries, genuinely concerned as most of them were, for the welfare of their protégés, reflected the same caste mentality:

They were among those who constantly told the African he was not ready for various advances They were among those who spread fear and feelings of inferiority among Africans¹⁶⁵

Most were interested in promoting education but some--the Seventh-day Adventists, for example--thought it immoral to give Africans any academic education and held it "un-Christian for an African to want to go to high school and college."¹⁶⁶ And there were other ways of emphasizing social distance:

Sometimes they made us ruffle our hair and take off our shoes before we went to church, because they said smart appearance was evil and showing off¹⁶⁷

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(5) Eventually as some Africans became well educated more refined techniques were developed to "keep them in their place." For example, many Europeans spoke to the educated Black man, who might have a Cambridge degree, only in Swahili.

(6) The caste-like structure of Kenyan society, once established was extremely resistant to change. The elaborate rules of conduct as well as economic and educational obstacles (see section I above, and 50b below) blocked any upward mobility for Asians and Africans. The stereotypes of all Caucasians as gentry and all Asians and Africans as inferior provided the psychological underpinnings which rationalized the system. Having achieved dominance the Europeans not unnaturally opposed any changes that threatened their position. Changes were, however, taking place within the European community itself. These, combined with external pressures, tended to weaken the class structure.

d. Changes during the period.

(1) With the acceleration of immigration after World War I and particularly after World War II, the social composition of the elite caste was greatly altered. Numbers of "temporary gentlemen" of the British wartime officers corps who had been stationed in Africa returned as residents. The veterans' settlement scheme brought others and the withdrawal of Great Britain from India resulted in an influx of retired soldiers and civil servants. British professional and business men came in considerable numbers and additional immigrants arrived from central Europe.

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(2) Many if not most of the newcomers did not fit the role of "gentry": they lacked the gentleman's principles but were quick to grasp his prerogatives; "this was clearly not a descent of gods, but of people who expected to be treated as gods;" "there are too many marks of the fake gentry; too much of the White Sahib who is white enough but not so Sahib."¹⁶⁸ Clearly it was increasingly difficult to maintain the elite image of the Europeans.

(3) Increased immigration also brought about a marked occupational diversification. In addition to the administrators, settler-farmers and missionaries increasing numbers of Europeans were to be found in the public services, and in trade and industry. According to the 1948 census, of those who were employed about 170 were members of the colonial administration, that is they occupied the higher administrative positions. About 3,411 were engaged in agriculture; of these about 2,000 were heads of families settled in the agricultural white highlands; with their families, they accounted for 9,000 persons. Some 4,764 were employed in "public service," that is, in the police, postal service, railways, education, health and sanitation, etc.; these were numerically the preponderant group. The remainder were mainly in trade and manufacturing. Thus the original farmer-settler predominance was diluted.

(4) It is difficult to evaluate the impact of these changes. On the one hand there was a frequently expressed, though not well documented, opinion that racial arrogance was particularly characteristic of the newcomers especially those whose own social standing in Britain was dubious.¹⁶⁹ It was also hypothesized that the business group, because of

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its interest in cheap labor, and the public service sector because it was competing with educated Asians and Africans for middle level civil service jobs, would align themselves solidly with the settler viewpoint. Moreover, their interests, it was said, would create additional points of tension.¹⁷⁰

(5) It is not clear that such was the case. In fact, there is some evidence to the contrary. The business men, for example, were generally reported to be more moderate in their expression of race attitudes than were the settlers and though by no means egalitarian they did participate in interracial social gatherings such as the United Kenya Club and the Rotary Club.¹⁷¹ Even more striking was one seldom noted episode involving the civil servants. In 1949-50 the European Civil Servant's Association took the initiative in entering into close consultations with the Asian and African Associations to devise a plan for a unified civil service which would insure the Asians and Africans the possibility of advancement to the top. The Governor rejected the plan as premature.¹⁷²

(6) It is evident that by 1952 some cracks had appeared in the upper tier of the class system. It is possible that the absence of a firm European united front encouraged the Africans to increase their activity against it.*

* The political controversy between the settlers and the administrators and between the settlers and the home Government is an extremely important part of the breakdown of a united front. Because it is covered in the political section, it is not discussed here.

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49. The Asian "middle".

a. Within the Kenyan three-tier social structure, only the Asian middle strata showed a class distribution similar to that in most modern societies: a small wealthy educated elite; a middle class of professionals, independent business men, and skilled artisans; and a lower class of unskilled laborers. The European elite, in contrast, were comprised primarily of upper and middle class families; few were identified as lower class. At the other extreme, only a small number of Africans had achieved the occupational and educational levels generally designated as middle class, and few, if any, could meet the upper class criteria of "good education" and "wealth."

b. However, class lines among the Asians were obscured by a multiplicity of other divisions. Not only were there the basic religious cleavages between Muslims, Hindus, Parsees and Christians, but sectarian and caste lines were very important in defining social relationships.* In fact, the primary identification of the Indian was not with the Asian community, but rather with a specific religious group.¹⁷³ Thus, despite the occupational distribution, class consciousness, as such, was hardly developed.

c. In the absence of any specific studies of class structure in the Asian sector, analysis for purposes of this study may best be approached

* For example, the Bahras refused to share mosques or cemeteries with other Muslims.

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by an examination of occupation, social mobility and achievement orientation.

d. From early times, Indian traders had been active on the east Coast of Africa¹⁷⁴ but not until the British occupation was there any considerable movement of Asians into the interior. In the last decade of the 19th century the colonial Government actively encouraged immigration from India. Indentured laborers were brought in to build the Uganda railway; at least half the British troops in East Africa were Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs;¹⁷⁵ Indian trading entrepreneurs were encouraged to help open up the interior; white collar workers, primarily from Bombay and Goa, found ready employment in business and Government; and hundreds of artisans were recruited to fill the void created by the lack of skilled African labor. Because of the diverse background and training of the immigrants, it appears that the settlers' stereotyping of Kenya's Indian population as primary "ex-coolie" was nothing more than a well perpetuated myth.*

e. By 1921 several levels in Kenya's Asian community were discernible. At the top were a few wealthy businessmen, the entrepreneurs of Kenya who controlled most of the import and export trade of the colony and who were the founders of much of the industry. Indians at the next

*Of the 32,000 coolies imported to work on the railroad about 6,700 failed to take advantage of their contractual right to free repatriation. Of these many continued to work for the railroad, others became market gardeners, itinerant traders or skilled craftsmen. Mangat refers to the "erroneous view, commonly held by Europeans, that most of the Indians were 'ex-coolies'."¹⁷⁶

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level included some doctors, lawyers and teachers, independent small merchants, skilled artisans, and a large number of clerks, hospital assistants, surveyors, draughtsmen, cashiers, custom collectors, post and telegraph assistants, police, etc. Nearly all skilled craftsmen in Kenya were Indians, and Indians and Goans virtually monopolized the middle and lower positions in Government and business.¹⁷⁷ Semiskilled and unskilled laborers formed the lowest element in the middle strata.

f. During the next three decades the economic and occupational position of the Indians continued to improve. Despite steady anti-Asian pressures by the Europeans, particularly the settlers, and despite the severe hardships of the depression years, prominent business families were able to expand their enterprises into new fields of endeavor such as motor transport. Asians were generally recognized as the backbone of Kenyan commerce and industry.

g. During the retrenchments of the 1930's the Asians lost much of their hold on the middle and lower echelon Government positions. From the top, pressure was exerted by newly arriving European immigrants; from the bottom, by aspiring Africans. Even this loss the Indians turned to their advantage. Increased efforts were made by the Indian community to improve the quality of their education. The obvious gain lay in the opportunity for the educated Indian to enter a profession.¹⁷⁸ On the other hand, racial discrimination continued to restrict many to their traditional occupations as shopkeepers, artisans, and subordinate employees.

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h. It is clear that the Asian community as a whole was aggressive, was achievement-oriented to a high degree, and that it showed great resiliency in its responses to the discriminatory pressures on it. Its economic progress strengthened its position as a middle group in the three tier system.

i. Nonetheless, the Indians were given neither social nor political equality. Only at the upper level was there by 1952 some dilution of the rigid racial barrier of the early colonial period.¹⁷⁹ There, status within the Asian community was often judged in terms of access to interracial activities--"with the ultimate goal, eligibility for functions at government house."¹⁸⁰ Considerable prestige derived from entertaining European officials or being entertained by them or, if a woman, from participating in various interracial women's associations. At the middle and lower economic levels there was little interracial interaction other than business contacts.¹⁸¹

j. Politically during this period the position of the Asian grew more precarious (chapter 2) and was the source of great strain and bitterness.¹⁸² Why were their tensions not expressed in a more aggressive form? At least four reasons may be hypothesized:

- (1) They perceived their economic position in Kenya to be better than it would have been in India;
- (2) The upward economic and occupational mobility in part compensated for the political and racial discrimination;
- (3) The Asian community was fragmented by religious and racial lines, hence unable to organize for effective action;

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(4) Most significant, perhaps, was the class structure of Kenyan society. The Asians were caught between the temporarily dominant white minority and the permanent black majority. Regardless of the outcome of the struggle between Europeans and Africans, the political status of the Asians was increasingly vulnerable. An opportunity to improve their position was clearly lacking.

50. The Africans.

a. The traditional situation.

(1) In precolonial East Africa, social structure centered around the age-grade system. There was nothing that could be called "social class" in the western sense of the term. Some men acquired greater wealth than others and some were recognized as having greater wisdom. Wealth and wisdom, like age, gave a man greater status in the community, but there were no hereditary chiefs, no nobility and comparatively little differentiation in social and economic position. In other words, "The Kenyan African's view of social stratification was . . . essentially egalitarian in the sense that social rank and political power were not the permanent attributes of exclusive self-perpetuating classes or lineages."¹⁸³

(2) The sense of individual social equality grew naturally out of the age-grade system. The close bond of brotherhood within each age-group was, in itself, antielitist. It was taken for granted that all normal men would pass through all the appropriate age-grades; no one was expected to remain in a subordinate position throughout his adult life. The question was not so much whether a man could acquire status as when.

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(3) At the same time, at least among the Kikuyu, childhood training inculcated the values of achievement; and within each age-grade, while the initial criterion for entry was the date of initiation, a number of prestige-bearing roles based primarily on achievement were provided. Unlike the British-dominated social structure, the Kikuyu society was a relatively open one in which the individual on the basis of ability and effort could often make significant choices between roles. Both egalitarian sentiments and achievement orientations were, then, basic to the East African value system. Neither prepared the African to be quiescent in the subordinate role projected upon him during the colonial period.¹⁸⁴

b. Change during the period: development of intergroup tension.

(1) From the point of view of social class, two sets of factors are of importance in understanding the developing tensions: the relations of the Africans to the Europeans; and the appearance of a new pattern of social stratification within the African community itself.

(2) At first the African appeared to accept European superiority. He was impressed by British military strength and technology. He was assured by both the missionaries and the colonial administration that he was not yet prepared to govern himself but that the period of tutelage was not permanent. The Kikuyu in particular were eager to learn. The education offered was accepted as the road to political, economic, and social advancement.

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(3) As time passed, it became increasingly apparent that whatever the Western concepts of individual rights and opportunities were in theory, in actual practice the African was firmly blocked from all the essential routes of advancement. Restrictions on land ownership and on the production of crops for export, segregated and inferior schools, differentials in the rates of pay, rules against the promotion of Africans into the higher echelons of the civil service, and the absence of African representation in the legislature or of any voice at all in the Government seemed clearly designed to confine him to an inferior status. For the foreseeable future at least his role was destined to be that of a laborer, a servant or at best a low grade clerk.¹⁸⁵ The situation was most apparent in the case of the educated African. The few young men who studied at Oxford or Cambridge returned to find themselves still subject to the African wage scale and promotion limitations.¹⁸⁶

(4) Equally galling was the social stigma placed upon the African. Status was important, particularly to the Kikuyu with his achievement orientation. To be excluded from all social contact with Europeans, to have one's hair ruffled and made to go barefoot into church, to be addressed in Swahili when one was fluent in English were humiliating experiences.¹⁸⁷ Thus, the class structure presented the African with immense psychological difficulties.¹⁸⁸

(5) The Africans' growing dissatisfaction with their position at the bottom of the social structure was exacerbated by events of

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World War II. Resentment was felt at the treatment accorded them by many wartime British stationed in Nairobi. Great envy was also expressed of the standards enjoyed by American Negro troops.¹⁸⁹ Even more important, thousands of Africans conscripted for overseas service returned thoroughly disgruntled with conditions in Kenya. This was foreseen and a Government committee on postwar African employment warned:

He has shown his worth and it will not be surprising if he expects to see it acknowledged. A second factor is the standard of life to which he has become accustomed. He has been well clothed and shod; he has been fed on a balanced and ample diet; and his medical and material needs have been carefully tended. His pay has been comparatively high and on discharge the habits of the standard of life he has acquired will not easily fall from him. His desires will be such that he will not generally be content with the low standard with which most Africans were content before the war.¹⁹⁰

The warning was unheeded.

(c) Many of the returning Africans refused to work under the differential wage system. Instead, they engaged in a mixture of burglary, pansterism, and political agitation.* Their constant war against the police in Nairobi found ready support both among the criminal elements in the city and among the thousands of Kikuyu in the reserves who had been discharged from the Army after the War.¹⁹¹ Resentment and anger at their low social status and lack of opportunity for advancement were emotions Kenyatta did not scruple to use to strengthen his nationalist campaign.

*These young men were known as the "Forty group" because they originally comprised those Kikuyu who were initiated by the circumcision ritual in the year 1940.¹⁹²

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(7) The second important set of factors in the relationship between social class and conflict were the changes in the African social structure. The pastoral tribes for the most part remained outside the cash economy and were highly resistant to western acculturation. Members of the agricultural communities, however, entered the urban milieu and by 1950 the essential elements of class stratification had appeared: considerable disparities in wealth and education, occupational specialization, and a rural/urban dichotomy in outlook and mode of life. These differences were complicated by Christian vs non-Christian and by tribal vs detribalized affiliations.

(8) By 1952, the vast majority of Kenya's African population of about 5.6 million were peasants living in the "overcrowded and steadily deteriorating Native Land Units 'reserved' for them." For the most part, they were engaged in subsistence agriculture. Another large segment of the African "lower class" was made up of unskilled laborers. Some were employed on the European farms in the highlands or in the urban centers of Mombasa and Nairobi. Hundreds of others drifted into the city, landless and unemployed, in search of work. Wages in both absolute and relative terms were extremely low and living conditions, particularly in the cities, marked by squalor and degradation. The low position of the African worker in the social hierarchy is suggested, though not adequately pictured, by a comparison of his earnings with those of the other two ethnic groups (see chapter 3). In 1955 an African Royal Committee found that only 5 percent of the

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African workers in urban areas had incomes which could support a normal family.¹⁹³

(9) Slightly above the unskilled laborers in the class structure were a small but growing number of semi-skilled workers, petty traders and hawkers. Competition in both these areas between the Africans and their entrenched Asian counterparts was sharp and animosity between them strong. Because of the direct economic competition the Asians were often seen as the direct block to African aspirations and the attitudes toward them were bitter and resentful.¹⁹⁴

(10) By 1952, there had also emerged a small but significant group of African "elite," a white collar class of low-salaried Government clerks, insurance salesmen, teachers, medical assistants, sanitary inspectors, etc., who were accorded status in the urban environment both because of their education and their occupation. This group was of particular importance in the growing nationalism. On the one hand they were severely frustrated by the limitations imposed on their upward mobility in the political and social spheres. On the other hand they frequently found that they had lost the status implicit in the traditional family age-group pattern.¹⁹⁵ In this very difficult psychological situation they turned to the organization of cross-tribal associations as a method of general African advancement. Through these organizations they focused their hostilities on the privileged positions of the Europeans and Asians.

(11) The relationship between the upper and lower class Africans was ambivalent. For many of the elite the Europeans "functioned as a

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reference group, possessing various attributes of Western civilization which the educated African both aspired to and, at least in part, judged himself in terms of."¹⁹⁶ Many aspects of traditional African beliefs and practices were seen by the new elite as inferior and backward. The illiterate peasants and workers, while they were eager to secure education for their children, were nonetheless suspicious of the efforts of the better educated to become "black Europeans." To this extent the developing class stratification signaled a cleavage in African society.

(12) The rigidity of the color bar and the discriminatory policies of the European made it impossible for the educated "to shed their identity as Africans" or to break their connections with the illiterate masses.¹⁹⁷ Nonetheless, although the importance of class stratification among the Africans was for the time being submerged by the greater issues between the Europeans and blacks, the growing cleavages in African society itself added one more facet to the personal frustrations and tensions of the period.

51. Conclusions.

a. Family. There is little doubt that the family disorganization played an important part in setting the stage for violence in Kenya: premarriage and marriage customs created specific points of intense friction between Europeans and Africans; the well-knit unit in which each member had a well-defined position and clear responsibilities was shattered and in many cases replaced by a rank individualism; the old system of family authority was destroyed, the new system not really

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accepted by the Kikuyu; moral restraints were broken down; illegitimate children and crime, formerly rare in Kikuyu society, became commonplace. In brief, tensions, uncertainties, resentments combined with a lack of social control to create a dangerous situation.

b. Social class.

(1) The main feature of the Kenyan social structure was a rigid three-tier class (or caste) system. The Europeans, the top stratum, were determined to maintain their position. Most of them, particularly the settlers, perceived the situation as right and just since they saw themselves as the true developers of Kenya: their work had brought it to its present level and made it a white man's country. They were also convinced of the inferiority of the African and the untrustworthiness of the Asian.

(2) The established system barred the social advance of both the Asian and the African. But whereas the Asian had considerable economic and occupational opportunity which compensated to some extent for his political frustrations, the African was blocked at almost every turn. Particularly for the Kikuyu whose achievement orientation and egalitarian value system had not prepared him for an inferior position, this posed a major problem of psychological adjustment.

(3) In the words of one Kikuyu leader, "We had so many wishes and ambitions awakened in us and then always the door slammed in our face. This is worse than never having the ambitions awakened in the first place, far, far worse."¹⁹⁸

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(4) To the initially frustrating class situation must be added the tensions within the African community itself of a developing class stratification. The resulting general sense of unease provided an ideal situation for manipulation by political leaders. In brief, the class structure, status change, and status deprivation must be considered major factors in the development of Kenyan nationalism and the violence of the Mau Mau.

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Section III. Public Health Factors

by Thora W. Halstead, PhD

52. Introduction.

a. Traditional medicine. Folk medicine was an integral part of Bantu culture. Witch-doctors were a part of the day-to-day experiences and cultural environment from childhood to the grave (section I above). Many Africans, relatively untouched by education, had no other doctor to visit, but even those with some education and the opportunity to avail themselves of modern medicine were influenced considerably by the fear of witchcraft and sorcery. While witch-doctors were the "curers," sorcerers cast the evil spells and were the malicious mischief makers. In practice, however, it was found that every witch-doctor at times dabbled in sorcery. Sorcery actually increased with British rule, for the Government banned the effective African control of "kingole" (stoning sorcerers to death).¹⁹⁹

b. Modern medicine.

(1) Modern medicine was first introduced in Kenya by the Christian missionaries in the late 19th century, and in 1898 the first mission was established in Kiambu country.²⁰⁰ By 1903, one of the 15 Protectorate Government departments was medicine. The impact of both the church and the Government was minimal, however, in the field of medicine. As late as 1906, it was estimated that only about one-fourth of the African population fully accepted modern medicine, although this was a far greater percentage than accepted it in 1950.

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(2) The Government medical service was staffed with many men who recognized the medical needs of the country and even submitted proposals to solve the problems. In the 1960's many programs similar to those originally proposed were accepted, but during the 1930's and 1940's, insufficient funds, inadequate staff, and a serious shortage of Africans with sufficient education to train in medical fields drastically limited the department's scope both in area and in programs. The missionaries' impact was limited by their interference with traditional African practices (section I).

53. Vital statistics.

a. Birth rates and population.

(1) Population increase and trend. The first census of Africans in Kenya was taken in 1948; consequently all the vital statistics available for previous years are extrapolations made from that census. It has been interpreted to indicate the following: (1) a 2-percent per annum natural population increase with a birth rate on the order of 45-50 and a death rate of 25 to over 30 per 1,000 of the population; or (2) a 3-percent increase in the average annual rate of growth with a birth rate of 50 and death rate of 20 per 1,000 of the population, and life expectancy at birth of 45 years.²⁰¹

(2) Measures controlling the population. Neither the Government nor any other organization sponsored any program for population control. Heavy agricultural work undertaken by the African women, however, tended to induce abortion, while malnutrition caused many infant deaths. Disease too took its toll, and in 1948 it was estimated that

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two-fifths of all the children born died before reaching 14 years of age.²⁰²

(3) Cultural factors influencing population.

(a) Infanticide was practiced by the Kikuyu, Kamba, and Kipsigis in early times, but this practice had almost disappeared by the 1920's. Among the Kipsigis, before the turn of the century, girls were not initiated until they reached the age of 20 to 24, and any children born to them before initiation were killed. By the 1930's, the clitoridectomy ceremony was performed between the ages of 13 and 15. Since marriage was not allowed by any tribe before this initiation ceremony had been performed, it can be seen that if initiation occurred at an older age formerly in the other tribes as well, a real form of population control did exist.²⁰³

(b) The beliefs followed by the tribes during the 1930's and 1940's all encourage a high birth rate. Girls married as soon as they were capable of bearing children or even earlier. No woman could properly remain single, and the system of polygyny helped assure this. Polygyny also enabled men to have the many children they desired. Children represented both labor and wealth. Kenvatta²⁰⁴ said, "The breeding of children and the breeding of cattle, sheep and goats are regarded in the same moral scheme as natural activities to be encouraged for the public good."

(c) The intense desire for offspring has also been explained in two other ways: the family group came to an end when a man died without a male child;²⁰⁵ and children were expected to sacrifice to

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the spirits of their dead parents, so the ghost of one who had left
no posterity was in a piteous state.²⁰⁶

b. Mortality rates.

(1) The Kenya Medical Department Annual Report of 1950 stated:

No comprehensive system of births and deaths registra-
tion is kept in Kenya which is unfortunate as lack of
dependable figures has allowed the circulation of
figures representing population trends which can be no
more than guesses. Even in Nairobi and Mombasa where
systems of births and deaths registration for all races
are in being, figures are obtained from data whose
accuracy the respective medical officers of health would
be the last to defend.²⁰⁷

With this statement in mind, the following infant mortality rates per
1,000 live African births in Nairobi are submitted (table X).

TABLE X. AFRICAN INFANT MORTALITY RATES IN NAIROBI, 1940-51
DEATHS PER 1,000 LIVE BIRTHS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Infant Mortality Rate</u>
1940.	248
1941.	180
1942.	165
1943.	207
1944.	154
1945.	131
1946.	71
1947.	224
1948.	187
1949.	167
1950.	170
1951.	180

Source: Nairobi Annual Medical Reports, 1946 p 18; 1951, p 14.

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(2) Although the yearly fluctuations substantiate the inaccuracy of these rates, in toto they suggest a rather stable rate for the 12 years. This in turn suggests that public health conditions for the Africans in Nairobi remained relatively unchanged during this period. One more assumption might be made: since Nairobi offered the best medical services in the Colony, its infant death rates should have been lower than those elsewhere in Kenya. In 1947 it was estimated by the Aaronovitches--admittedly critical observers--that the infant mortality rate among the Kikuyu was 400 to 500 per 1,000 live births.²⁰⁸ Studies of survival rates calculated from the 1948 census results indicated an infant mortality rate of 184 for the whole of Kenya, 130 for the Central Province, and 228 for Nyanza Province.²⁰⁹

(3) Probably the most striking feature of the 1948 census results and the Kenya Medical Department (1931 and 1950) Reports was the recognition of the malnourished, wornout, debilitated condition of many Africans in their early 40's. In fact, only 8.7 percent survived past the age of 45.²¹⁰ Anemia and cirrhosis of the liver, products of malnutrition, were common as were chronic nephritis, ulcers, and dermatoses. By the age of 40, many women showed signs of exhaustion and frequently suffered congestive heart failure, probably due to malnutrition, child-bearing and strenuous activity combined with a lifetime of moderate ill health.²¹¹

c. Diseases of significance. Actual statistics of disease incidence in Kenya were unavailable; a rough general picture was, however, prepared for the years 1930 and 1950 by comparing the frequency of each

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disease (or disease group) with regard to the total number of disease cases treated in hospitals and dispensaries during each of these years. (tables XI and XII).

(1) Malaria and respiratory diseases, including bronchitis, bronchopneumonia, and lobar pneumonia were the major causes of ill health in Kenya; and the proportion of these diseases among the cases treated by medical personnel increased between 1930 and 1950. The frequent association of malnutrition, malaria, helminthiasis and other chronic diseases with the respiratory diseases contributed to the high mortality rates associated with the latter. Respiratory diseases killed more Africans than any other diseases in 1930 and in 1950. In the highlands, particularly among employed labor, acute pneumococcal pneumonia was frequent and virulent. In infants, upper respiratory infections tended to progress to fatal bronchopneumonia.

TABLE XI. PROPORTIONATE PREVALENCE OF DISEASES SHOWN AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL CASES TREATED AT HOSPITALS AND DISPENSARIES AND OF TOTAL RESULTING DEATHS

Diseases	% of total cases treated		% of total deaths	
	1930 (260,000=100%)	1950 (1,129,057=100%)	1930 (1,493=100%)	1950 (6,387=100%)
Respiratory. . .	15.05	21.74	27.65	26.15
Digestive. . . .	21.15	10.38	6.15	10.42
System				
Epidemic. . . .	21.74	21.77	39.25	36.28
endemic, and infectious				

Source: See table XII.

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TABLE XII. PROPORTION IN PERCENTAGES OF EPIDEMIC, ENDEMIC, AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES TREATED AT HOSPITALS AND DISPENSARIES

Diseases	% of total incidence		% of total deaths	
	1930 (56,618=100%)	1950 (245,873=100%)	1930 (586=100%)	1950 (2,221=100%)
Malaria	48.63	58.67	14.68	26.28
Tuberculosis	1.33	1.62	24.40	40.74
Typhoid and dysentery	1.60	4.33	8.02	10.59
Syphilis and gonorrhea	10.38	15.83	2.90	3.96
Yaws	18.26	4.00	1.19	0
Plague	?	?	23.04	0

Source: Kenya Colony and Protectorate. Medical Department Annual Report 1930, Government Printer Nairobi, 1931.

Kenya Colony and Protectorate. Medical Department Annual Report 1950, Government Printer Nairobi, 1952.

(2) Malaria, of all the communicable diseases in Kenya, was the most widespread and affected the largest number of people even in 1950. Statistics regarding the distribution and incidence of the disease had been collected for 20 years prior to that time, and in the late 1940's various methods of eradication, both antimosquito sprays and anti-malarial drugs, were tested for their efficiency. An epidemic was prevented in Nairobi in 1950, but in general the benefits from these studies were not felt until after 1950.

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(3) Tuberculosis was widespread among the Africans, but its actual incidence was not determined until a tuberculin testing survey was conducted in 1948-49. The percentage of positive reactors ranged from 27 among the Kikuyu living in the remote Highlands, to 58 in the coastal region villages, and 67 in Nairobi. It was estimated that there were probably 35,000 cases of active pulmonary tuberculosis in the colony, and that 11 of every 1,000 people were infected. The results of a separate 6-year study conducted at Fort Hall amongst the Kikuyu indicated in 1950 that tuberculosis was not increasing in that area, but the disease ran a more acute and fatal course in the Kikuyu than in the European. Seventy percent of the cases died within 2 years after leaving the hospital. Only a few beds were available for treatment of tuberculosis prior to 1951. In that year a 150-bed military hospital was converted into a Government chest hospital.

(4) Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers were endemic, and both bacillary and amebic dysentery were common. Acute bacterial intestinal infections were a leading cause of infant death. Africans were encouraged to build pit latrines throughout this period, and this undoubtedly had at least a limited effect in reducing the percentage of cases of digestive diseases.

(5) Between 1930 and 1950, plague and yaws were brought under control, but venereal diseases increased in prevalence. In 1950 an attempt was made to treat venereal disease on a countrywide scale employing penicillin.

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(6) Numerous other diseases including leprosy, relapsing fever, brucellosis, schistosomiasis, onchocerciasis and trachoma confronted the people. All of these conditions were complicated by malnutrition and helminthiasis which were both widespread.²¹²

54. Drug addiction and use of intoxicants.

a. There was very little drug addiction in Kenya between 1930 and 1951. The use of opium was exceedingly limited and confined almost entirely to the Asiatic population, who obtained their supplies from India. Indian hemp was both indigenous and illicitly cultivated, but was never produced in significant quantities. Permits for the use or possession of dangerous drugs were issued only to licensed druggists and to registered medical practitioners and dentists. Conviction for illicit use or possession of narcotics resulted in imprisonment.²¹³

b. Although beer was mentioned repeatedly in the writings about Kenya, alcoholism was never referred to as a problem. Beer had a social function and was served during ceremonial gatherings, during important business transactions, and when recruiting neighborly help in agricultural work.²¹⁴

c. The word beer was used to connote an alcoholic drink prepared from honey, sugar cane, malted or peek (eleusine grass).²¹⁵ While the Kikuyu understood the art of malting grain and manufacturing beer from cereals, they brewed beer mainly from sugar cane, and occasionally from honey. Kikuyu men and women were both involved in the production of beer and both drank it. Only adults, however, could properly drink the beer.²¹⁶

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d. Beliefs and practices concerning alcohol were undoubtedly different in Nairobi, however, even during the years between 1930 and 1951. This assumption is based on the results of a study of the average monthly expenditures of middle-income African workers in Nairobi in 1962. This survey indicated that 7 percent of the total income was spent for alcoholic beverages and tobacco. This exceeded the average expenditures for housing (6.7 percent), personal hygiene and medical care (2.6 percent) and education (1.1 percent).²¹⁷

55. Nutrition.

a. Diet and food habits. The different tribes in Kenya each had their individual food habits and taboos. The Masai and other pastoralists lived primarily on milk, meat, and blood. The great majority of the Africans, including the Kikuyu, were agriculturists, however, who ate mainly a vegetarian diet based on maize, millet and bananas, supplemented by peas, beans, green vegetables, cassava, sweet and white potatoes, yams, and honey.²¹⁸

(1) Although cattle, sheep, and goats were raised by the Kikuyu, they were rarely eaten by the men and never eaten by the women. These animals represented a man's wealth, and they functioned as money rather than food. Cows were never killed, except during a famine, while bulls, oxen, sheep, and goats were only slaughtered and eaten during various religious sacrifice and purification ceremonies. The only other times these animals were eaten were when they died a natural death.

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(2) The Kikuyu diet was further deprived of needed proteins by food taboos that forbade the eating of eggs,* fish, and wild birds and animals.** In addition, milk was rarely drunk. Goat's milk was drunk by women and children, while cow's milk was given to babies by the few who could afford it. Those people who lived near European towns, however, usually sold the milk from their cows.²¹⁹

b. Methods employed in raising, handling and storing food. In rural Kikuvuland, the bulk of the family food was produced in the family's own garden. In a polygynous homestead, each wife had a hut of her own and an allotment of the family land.

(1) Agricultural methods employed by the Africans were poor and primitive. Fertilizers and general farm implements including small steel plows were rarely used, instead the heavy hoe and the panga (a long curved knife, sharpened on one side) were the main farming implements. In earlier times, a surplus of land allowed a method of shifting cultivation whereby land was left uncultivated for considerable periods of time in order to regain its fertility; poor agricultural methods sufficed at that time.

(2) As the land available to the Kikuyu diminished, a state of overpopulation developed on Kikuyu held land, their farming methods

* Karori Njama (a Kikuyu) writes of eating boiled eggs by the dozen daily as a child in the early 1930's.²²⁰

** The Kikuyu were only allowed to eat partridge, pigeon, and hvrax before being circumcised. "Many will not eat wild game throughout their lives."²²¹ "The thick mountain forests . . . being full of game supported them (the Mau and Freedom Armies) for many months when their sources of supply were cut off by the security forces."²²²

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did not supply their needs, and their pastures were overgrazed. In addition, as the need for money to pay taxes grew, more land and effort had to be devoted to the production of cash crops and to earn salaries. As the African men left their homesteads to earn money working for Europeans, their portion of the family farm labor (normally the heavy and occasional work) fell as an additional burden on the women; poorer farming and accelerated erosion followed.²²³

c. Available food supplies.

(1) The Africans traditionally farmed on a subsistence basis. There were no provisions for crop failures or other emergencies; when such emergencies did arise, only Government aid alleviated starvation. Disease and famine decimated the population at frequent intervals. In fact, the disease epidemics and famine of the 1890's caused the unpopulated appearance that the British first observed in the area that became the highlands. In 1918, there was drought and famine and the reappearance of rinderpest; and again in 1928 and 1931 there was famine, this time caused by drought and locusts.²²⁴

(2) Little was written concerning native consumption of African agricultural products; in addition, the vast differences between the diets of the pastoral and agricultural tribes would have made total country food consumption figures almost useless. As a consequence it is difficult to ascertain change in food consumption during the 1930's and 1940's. The increased density of population per square mile in the African Reserve areas and the concomitant soil erosion, as well as the many districts in Kenya receiving famine relief in 1946, suggest a decline in available

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food supplies between 1930 and 1951. Studies conducted in 1930 and 1932, however, indicated the average African and Kikuyu diet was decidedly deficient both quantitatively and qualitatively even at that time (table XIII). The African agriculturalist's diet traditionally was, and remained, too high in carbohydrates and deficient in proteins, vitamins and fats.

TABLE XIII. AFRICAN DIET
(lb per year)

Food	Proposed adequate African diet--1943	Estimated Kikuyu diet--1932 ¹	Estimated African diet--1930 ²
Maize	274	121.5	92.4
Wimbi	91	20.25	106.0
Pulses	23	6.0	60.0
Roots	80	240.0	274.0
Vegetables	69	--	--
Bananas	--	240.0	28.0
Sugar	34	46.0	11.5
Ghee	23	--	--
Meat	91	--	--
Milk	40 gal	--	--
Calories per day	2,873	1,732	1,471

¹ This estimate was made by the Kenya Administration from a study of what the Kikuyu actually ate. When available milk and meat (.26 pints and 1.4 oz. per day, respectively) was added to this estimate, the daily calorie intake increased to 2,016. There were serious doubts, however, that these commodities were consumed in these quantities.

² Estimate based on available food, determined on the basis of African production in 1930. When possible milk and meat production estimates were added, the estimated daily caloric consumption rose to 2,246.

Source: S. and K. Aaronovitch. Crisis in Kenya, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1947.

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d. Malnutrition. The continuing inadequacy of the African diet was confirmed in the Kenya Medical Department reports. In 1931, they expressed the opinion that a considerable proportion of the African population was in a predeficiency state; in addition, the Medical Research Council found in a nutritional study (concerned mainly with the mineral constituents of the diet) that the Kikuyu suffered from a shortage of calcium.²²⁵ In 1951, the Kenya Medical Department reported malnutrition was producing serious results at all ages and was causing kwashiorkor in babies in certain tribes. These tribes were the Kikuyu, Meru and Bantu Kavirondo.

(1) Cirrhosis of the liver, occurring at an early age due to diet, was "distressingly common" in 1951.²²⁶ In Nairobi, nutritional diseases and rheumatism caused 2.5 percent of all the deaths, with a death rate of 0.32 per thousand people--almost the exact rate recorded in 1946.²²⁷ While cases of scurvy, beriberi and rickets were documented throughout the records, kwashiorkor and other symptoms of protein deficiency were the most prevalent and pressing nutritional problems.

(2) Generally, however, malnutrition manifested itself in a less frank manner by producing subnormal physical development and reducing resistance to disease. Much blindness was caused by vitamin A deficiency, while inadequate amounts of vitamin C contributed to the high incidence of respiratory disease. Protein deficiency in nursing mothers and infants not only retarded child development but was the principal cause of the high infant mortality rate.²²⁸

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e. Popular awareness.

(1) The Africans did not associate food, famine, diet or malnutrition with their land problems. Land and cattle were desired for their value as wealth rather than food, and cash crops gradually replaced food crops because of their cash reward. "Malnourished as they are, foods of high nutritive value are replaced by crops less nutritive but financially more rewarding."²²⁹

(2) Although the desire for agricultural aid and education was voiced by several Africans,²³⁰ the average native agriculturalist wanted land for its social and prestige value. Among the Kikuyu, "the visible symbol of this bond of kinship (the family) is the family land In an agricultural community the whole social organization must derive from the land"²³¹

(3) In many ways, land was to the Kikuyu what cattle were to the Kamba; the inept Government cattle practices had provoked the Kamba. A Government policy introduced in 1937 requiring compulsory destocking of the Reserves was met by Kamba opposition in the form of a march by 2,000 men, women, and children to Nairobi. The Government in that instance took steps to placate the Kamba.²³²

(4) It can only be concluded that, although land provided the emotional force that helped to unite the otherwise divided Kikuyu, the need for food was not part of this stimulus.

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56. Sanitation.

a. Water supply.

(1) By 1930, all of the more important towns had been provided with water supplies; however, the water was frequently contaminated. In the native Reserves the need for adequate water supplies had become urgent, and boring experiments were carried out in a few areas as a possible solution to the problem.

(2) Between 1947 and 1950, Nairobi received uncontaminated water for the first time. In 1950, the problem of supplying water to the rural African areas was a continuing one that had not been solved. Many African District Councils took an active part by supplying funds to protect existing water supplies from contamination and to develop new water supplies for Asian and African trading centers.

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b. Waste disposal.

(1) In 1930, Nairobi was the only town in Kenya with a water-borne sewage disposal system, and this was confined to the center of the town. Mombasa and the other towns of the Colony as well as the residential area of Nairobi relied upon septic tanks, soakage pits, and a bucket system of conservancy. Disposal of waste and storm water was difficult in the absence of proper drainage systems, and open concrete and earth drains were provided in all the larger towns. In 1950, Nairobi's sewerage system served only the commercial and a limited portion of the residential area, and Mombasa was without a city waste disposal system.

(2) In 1936, Kenya instituted a successful campaign for building of pit latrines, and this system was continued through 1950. By that year,

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the composting of refuse and night soil had proven successful in many small towns, but it was unexpectedly found that the end product was difficult to dispose of. Open latrines and unprotected waste-disposal sites served as breeding places for flies.²³⁴

c. Food. Sanitary inspections were carried out by city-employed inspectors in Nairobi and Mombasa and by Government inspectors in the other towns. Control of the handling and sale of food proved very difficult, and little was controlled outside the towns. In 1950, the consumption by Africans of meat from diseased carcasses in rural areas continued to cause concern. It was hoped at that time that new laws would be enacted under the African District Councils Ordinance to enforce food sanitation methods.²³⁵

d. Housing.

(1) In 1931, sanitary inspectors were actively involved in teaching the rural inhabitants to build ventilated wattle and daub huts with higher smoothly plastered walls. The Africans embraced the programs enthusiastically, and these new homes were credited with reducing the rat population and concomitantly the incidence of plague. The KCA was a strong supporter of this action. When the new Governor, Sir Edward Grigg, visited Fort Hall in 1925, the Kikuyu Central Association presented him with a list of their requests as well as grievances. They desired "compulsory rebuilding of unsanitary huts to prevent plague, hospital training facilities, a high school, a school for girls, permission to plant coffee and cotton, and the translation of the Colony's laws into Kikuyu."²³⁶

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(2) Urban African housing was crowded and unsatisfactory even in 1931, at which time municipal African housing projects had already been completed in both Nairobi and Eldoret. As the African urban population increased, available housing became less able to meet their demands. By 1951 the lack of housing and the cost of maintaining a family, when most of the food had to be bought for cash, prevented all but the highly trained men from bringing their families to Nairobi.²³⁷

57. Health facilities, personnel and programs.

a. Medical facilities.

(1) Until 1951, rural health services depended primarily upon dispensaries, small treatment centers providing simple and limited outpatient care for the people. There were 97 such dispensaries in 1930.²³⁸ The weakness of the dispensary service was the poor quality of its staff, for the average dispensary was under the care of a dresser who had had little training and dealt with curative rather than preventative medicine. The Development Reconstruction Authority suggested in 1946 in a 10-year plan that these dispensaries be replaced by rural health centers from which outpatient treatment, maternity and child welfare service, and rural sanitation and health education information could be issued. The first center opened in 1951.

(2) In 1951, there were the 600-bed King George Hospital in Nairobi, four provincial hospitals located in Mombasa, Kesumu, Nakuru and Nyeri, and 48 district hospitals for Africans containing a total of 4,430 beds. In addition, there were 196 beds maintained in dispensaries and 1,398 beds in various specialized hospitals and prison hospitals. Almost

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all of the special hospitals, with the exception of two leper settlements, were located in either Nairobi or Mombasa. These special hospitals did not limit their practices to Africans. There were also nine mission hospitals with 766 beds.

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(3) Unlike the Asians and Europeans, the African community had no general practitioner service; therefore, medical services were all supplied by either the central Government, missions, or local government authorities, in particular the African district councils. The central Government was responsible for the provincial and district hospitals in which free service was provided Africans. The Government also subsidized certain mission hospitals. The local governments, on the other hand, were responsible for maternity, dispensary and ambulance services. Combined, these agencies provided a little more than one hospital bed per 1,000 of the population in 1950. Although a greater proportion of the population received medical treatment in 1951 than had in 1930, the medical system was grossly inadequate (table XIV).

TABLE XIV. CASES TREATED IN GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS
(all races)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Inpatient</u>	<u>Outpatient</u>	<u>Total</u>
1930	---	---	209,373
1940	130,267	752,592	882,862
1951	178,164	1,095,232	1,273,396

Source: See table XV.

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b. Medical personnel. Medical personnel were consistently in short supply (table XV), and Government facilities were generally staffed below their meager authorized allotment. The salaries offered medical officers were too low to recruit many doctors from the United Kingdom, and very few Africans sought medical training. Kenya did not have a medical school, and Makerere University College in Uganda had in 1950 graduated an average of only one African from Kenya a year since the medical school had been in existence. Between 1940 and 1961 a total of 28 were graduated. The difficulty appeared to be the limited number of Africans who possessed the educational qualifications to enable them to undertake a medical course.

TABLE XV. REGISTERED MEDICAL PERSONNEL¹

<u>Year</u>	<u>Doctors</u>		<u>Dentists</u>	<u>Pharmacists</u>
	<u>Registered</u>	<u>Licensed</u>		
1938	319	37	32	--
1946	395	40	33	29
1951	582	51	60	49

¹Nurses and midwives were not registered until July 1952

Source: Colony and Protectorate of Kenya. Statistical Abstract 1955, Government Printer Nairobi, 1957.

Kenya Colony Protectorate. Medical Department Annual Report 1930, Government Printer Nairobi, 1931.

(1) Registration of medical practitioners and dentists began in 1910, but no provision was made for the removal of the names from the

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register of those persons who died or left the colony. Kenya did, however, publish a list of registered medical personnel in 1955 (table XV).²⁴⁰ Nurses and midwives were not registered until 1952.

(2) Before 1950, training of Africans was virtually confined to the higher grades of service such as hospital assistant, laboratory assistant, and health inspector. Hospital assistants were in practice assistant doctors whose training exceeded that given a nurse. These men helped to satisfy the need for doctors and eventually took charge of small hospitals.

(3) It is of interest that in 1948 Tom Mboya, later a prominent political figure, joined one of the first sanitary inspector courses the Kenya Medical Department offered to Africans. He chose this vocation because it was the only job that had an external certificate that would allow travel elsewhere in Africa and could lead to specialization later in Britain. In addition, it was a job where Africans and Europeans did the same thing and where there was no distinction between them.²⁴¹

(4) In an attempt to supply the personnel for the planned health centers, training was expanded in 1950 to teach Africans to serve as midwives, nurses, compounders (pharmacists), assistant radiographers, dressers, health assistants, and health visitors. In 1951, the Medical Department first undertook the training and education of African girls as nurses on any considerable scale (14 girls). In all, a total of 147 men had been trained as nurses in all the years prior to the end of 1951.²⁴² The successes and failures of these teaching programs were not felt until some years later.

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c. Voluntary agencies. While the missions filled a useful role providing medical services and hospital beds to Africans, their strong stand against female circumcision and their forceful attempts to change Kikuyu culture caused them to lose influence from 1923 onward.²⁴³

d. Public health education. The need to teach the Africans health habits was well appreciated in both 1930 and 1951, but the Health Education Division of the Medical Department of Kenya was not organized until 1953.²⁴⁴ In the interim years, the medical officers, nurses and health inspectors shouldered the full responsibility of teaching environmental sanitation. They can be credited with the development of and the popular demand for improved rural housing. Regardless of the zeal, however, their limited number and time prevented them from accomplishing much.²⁴⁵

58. Summary and conclusions.

a. A land shortage problem developed among the Kikuyu, but land represented wealth, not food, to them. The food habits and customs of the Kikuyu and other agricultural tribes foster malnutrition, and their past experiences had conditioned them to expect and accept food shortages as natural, consequently malnutrition and lack of food never aroused the people against the Government. Their spiritual beliefs, intimately connected with folk medicine through the witch doctor, dictated that crop failures, like illness, were the product of divine will or sorcery; thus, again the Government remained absolved of blame.

b. Illness was accepted by the vast majority of the Africans as due to and amendable to supernatural treatment. Modern medicine was accepted and sought in only a limited fashion, consequently there was only a

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limited demand for improved modern medical facilities. In addition, the Mau Mau movement called for a rejection of western ways and a reaffirmation of the tribal methods. The tribal beliefs in witchcraft were encouraged, and they were utilized by the Mau Mau to help unite and control the Africans through fear.

c. Narcotic drugs were not used in quantity, and alcoholic beverages were drunk primarily during tribal ceremonies. Neither were ever related to the conflict.

d. Neither lack of food, malnutrition, nor ill health played any obvious role in stimulating the African movement in Kenya; this appears to have been due to the association of these with the supernatural rather than the Government, and absence of higher expectations in any of these areas by the Africans.

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CHAPTER 5

MILITARY FACTORS

by Colonel Boyce R. Meers

Section I. The Military Establishment

59. Land forces. The first organized security force was created in Kenya in 1888 when two battalions of local constabulary were raised by the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) to protect the British trade route to the interior. These battalions were designated the East Africa Rifles and the Uganda Rifles.

a. Following the British Government takeover of control in East Africa from the IBEAC, the King's African Rifles (KAR) were organized in 1902 and continued to be active until Kenya gained independence in 1963. Led by British officers and British and African noncommissioned officers, the KAR had a long and honorable history. The KAR participated in numerous internal expeditions against the tribes, in border protection, and in World Wars I and II.

b. In World War I, the combat troops of the KAR were all Europeans and Asians. The African soldiers were used as auxiliaries with regular military units and as unarmed porters in the Carrier Corps. Of the approximately 350,000 Africans used by the British in their campaign against the Germans in Africa, approximately 150,000 were raised in Kenya. About 14,000 of these Kenyans were auxiliary combat troops, and the remainder were in the Carrier Corps. The auxiliaries lost 1,377 to combat actions and 2,923 to disease, and the porters lost 366 to combat actions and 41,952 to disease.

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c. The Africans in the Carrier Corps, as was the Armed Forces, were exposed to contacts with other tribes, the sight of Europeans shooting each other, Indian troops fighting for Europeans, and the great leveling effect of hardship and death endured together. Along with these new experiences, the Africans also gained some knowledge of the power of organization. Combined with other causes, it is probable that the growth of native political associations in the 1920's sprang from the Africans' experiences in World War I.

d. During the 1930's, Africans were gradually integrated into the KAR, as they had demonstrated their capacity for combat. Most of the KAR recruits came from the Kamba and Kalenjin tribes because of their adaptability. The 1935-41 war between Ethiopia and Italy resulted in thousands of Eritrean deserters and refugees crossing over into Kenya from Ethiopia. This caused the KAR to concentrate its activities on the outposts along the northern border of Kenya.

e. The Second World War did not seriously affect eastern Africa until 11 June 1940, when Mussolini joined forces with Germany and declared war on the Allies. By that time the strength of the military forces in East Africa had been built up in readiness to meet any threat from Italy. At the beginning of the War, the East African fighting forces consisted of about seven battalions. On 31 August 1939, the British War Office appointed Major General Dickerson commander of the troops in East Africa. He established his headquarters at Kinton College in Nairobi. Beginning in early 1940, he expanded the seven battalions to a total force of approximately 280,000. Kenya contributed about

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75,000 of these men. Kenyan Africans with UK forces participated in the campaigns to clear the Italian forces from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somaliland. Later, they were deployed outside Africa and participated in campaigns in Madagascar and Burma, and thousands saw service in India. World War II African soldiers had a smattering of elementary education and were more influenced by their experience and contacts with other people than were their fathers in World War I. Several African veterans of World War II became leaders of movements against the colonial Government in Nairobi.

f. After World War II, three battalions of the KAR were stationed in Kenya. Following declaration of the emergency on 21 October 1952, three additional battalions of the KAR were brought into Kenya from other parts of East Africa. Elements of the Lancashire Fusiliers battalion were sent to Kenya from the Suez Canal Zone on 21 October 1952. Assorted troop units continued to arrive in Kenya well into 1953. By August 1953, there were three types of units in Kenya: the King's African Rifles, ordinary British infantry battalions, and the Kenya Regiment which consisted mostly of young European settlers from Kenya.

60. Navy forces. Naval protection of Kenya was provided by the Royal Navy during the preconflict period. Kenya established its Navy on 12 December 1964 with one ship (a 120-ton, 100-foot submarine chaser on loan indefinitely from the Royal Navy) and approximately 75 men in training under the British. The Kenyan Navy is directly subordinate to the Commander of the Army.

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61. Air forces. The regular military air force elements that were in Kenya during the preconflict period were those of the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The British had the capability to deploy relatively strong air power to support their policies in Kenya. RAF strength in Kenya was increased during the Mau Mau emergency.

a. A Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) Air Wing, with a headquarters and three squadrons (transport, communications, and reconnaissance), was formed late in 1949. This force started with one aircraft and built to 14 Cessna 180 and one Chipmunk aircraft by December 1957. At first the pilots were ex-RAF and local air charter company pilots and a few settlers who flew their own aircraft. The KPR Air Wing was mobilized in October 1952 and was very active during the Mau Mau emergency. It became a part of the permanent police force of Kenya in January 1957.

b. During the preconflict period, military and police airpower was used primarily for reconnaissance and intelligence purposes. Military/police airpower did not seem to influence the growth of violence in Kenya one way or the other, especially during the 1946-51 period.

62. Paramilitary forces. A territorial unit called the Kenya Regiment was reactivated in 1937. It had earlier been disbanded because of concern that it might support the settlers' demands for independence. This unit was composed until 1961 exclusively of Europeans, most of whom had spent their whole lives with Africans. It was a national guard/reserve type of unit designed to train officers for the KAR and to provide a means for British subjects to fulfill their compulsory military service. The Kenya Regiment was one of the most formidable

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military forces facing the Mau Mau, but it had little influence on the rising violence in Kenya during the preconflict period. It was, however, one more exclusively white European organization among several which tended to polarize the white and black societies in Kenya. The only other elements in Kenya approaching paramilitary forces were the pseudo Mau Mau (loyal natives disguised as Mau Mau gangs) which were organized by the British and used in operations against the real Mau Mau.

63. Police forces. Prior to the arrival of Europeans in Kenya, most tribes had been ruled by groups of elders who were able to apply pressures and sanctions to enforce adherence to their laws and customs.

a. When the IBEAC took over administration of the area in 1888, it formed two battalions of local constabulary, called the East African Rifles and Uganda Rifles, to protect British commercial interests exploring and trading with the interior. The Indian laborers imported to construct the railroad to Uganda created control problems, and Indian police were imported in 1896 to serve in Mombasa. This force was organized into the Uganda Railway Police in 1901 and remained an independent unit until the British East African Police (BEAP) absorbed it in 1904.

b. The BEAP had been organized in 1902, when the British Government assumed control of Kenya and Uganda, to direct security activities throughout the British East African territories. It moved its headquarters from Mombasa to Nairobi in 1905, primarily because of the rapid growth of Nairobi and the white settlement in the highlands. The force was commanded by a British Commissioner, and key posts were filled by experienced European and Asian officers. Its select recruiting of

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Africans, coupled with its capable leadership, increased funds, and improved training, made it a competent organization. It became the Kenya Police when the area became a crown colony in 1920.

c. The police were a somewhat paramilitary organization in that they were active in World Wars I and II, cooperating with the Army in patrolling the borders and guarding installations. The police force was expanded during both Wars by sizable levies of Indian and African recruits. The police suffered numerous casualties and captured the first German flag taken in World War I in a skirmish on the Tanganyika frontier in 1914.

d. The Kenya Police developed rapidly during the ensuing years. In 1926 a mounted section was organized in Nairobi and later expanded to provide mounted patrols for all major police divisions. The Kenya Police radio net, started in World War II, was expanded to one of the best of its type in Africa. In 1948, the Kenya Police Training School was founded, and a crime laboratory and a canine program were started. The Air Wing, discussed under air forces, was organized in 1949, and in 1950 the police joined with other security forces in operations against the Mau Mau. Police strength rose from 1,800 men in 1905 to more than 13,000 during the Mau Mau emergency. During this emergency, the police suffered nearly 600 casualties--525 of them Africans.

e. The Kenya Police consisted of a headquarters in Nairobi, contingents for the capital, and contingents for each of the country's seven provinces. In addition, there were mobile units, the air wing, general service units, organized reserve units, and an auxiliary force

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designated the Tribal Police. The Headquarters was organized into an Inspection Department, Training Department, Criminal Investigation Department, Special Branch, Signals Branch. Supply Services, and Workshops. The chain of command extended from the Nairobi Headquarters to the seven regional contingents in the provinces. Each regional contingent headquarters had a varying number of subordinate division police units. The division police in turn were composed of the station police which was the lowest administrative unit in the structure. Although the central authority of the Police Headquarters at Nairobi was unquestioned, in practice the outlying rural units enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy in dealing with local police problems.

f. The Tribal Police operated exclusively in remote rural areas, and members of the force were recruited in the tribal districts where they were to be stationed. Posts were generally small, and the limited number of constables was expected to conduct area patrols and handle routine matters affecting law and order in their districts. In cases of major disorders, they were supported by the regular police. As most of the Tribal Police served in their home locations, they were subject to Mau Mau intimidation and bribery.

g. Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau by F. D. Corfield suggests or states that the Kenya Police had the following deficiencies during the 5 years immediately prior to the emergency.

(1) The Kenya Police Special Branch which was responsible for collection of political intelligence was too Nairobi-oriented and had little or no personnel in the provinces. Also intelligence was not disseminated downward adequately.

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(2) The Kenya Police were too thinly scattered in the Kikuyu areas to achieve what was expected of them. Police officers based at district headquarters were overburdened with correspondence, reports, and administrative matters.

(3) The Kenya Police were not assigned the responsibility for control of firearms until after declaration of the emergency in 1952.

h. The African and Indian members of the police were generally reliable and loyal, and there are many specific examples of individual African policemen having performed brave and courageous deeds. Apparently there was very little police corruption and the African police performed admirably even when pitted against Africans during the Mau Mau emergency.

64. Military equipment. The military forces in Kenya during the preconflict period were regular British forces and the King's African Rifles. These forces were, by and large, ordinary infantry-type units equipped mostly with armaments of British manufacture. Although most of the British forces in Kenya were light units, the British did have the capability to deploy to Kenya heavy armaments and any other elements of the British Armed Forces that might be needed. Even after Kenya became a sovereign republic in 1964, it looked first to Great Britain for military equipment. There was little or no capability to produce military armaments in Kenya, because there was an absence of coal, iron, and skilled labor. The Mau Mau did not receive significant arms support from outside Kenya and had to rely on stealing arms and ammunition from the security forces and private individuals in Kenya.

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Section II. Defense Policies and Strategy

65. Objectives. The British military and security objectives in Kenya during the preconflict period include the following:

- a. Maintain border security and territorial integrity.
- b. Maintain law and order and internal security; suppress inter-tribal fighting.
- c. Protect British trade and economic interests.
- d. Provide a base for British Middle East strategic reserve forces.
- e. Provide a means whereby British subjects in Kenya could fulfill their compulsory military training requirements and a means to train officers for British forces.
- f. Augment overall British military strength by training Kenyans to be effective combat troops.

66. Threat perceptions.

a. During 1930-34, no significant external threat existed to Kenya. A threat to Kenya was created when Italy declared war on Ethiopia on 3 October 1935 and subsequently deployed major forces in Ethiopia. This threat became serious in 1937 when the Italians and Ethiopians fought along or just north of the Kenya-Ethiopia border. By 1938, strong Italian forces in Ethiopia represented a real source of danger to Kenya. The war in Ethiopia resulted in a near constant state of tension along the border in the northern province. This threat and unrest along the northern border diminished, however, in 1941 with the defeat and surrender of the Italian forces in Ethiopia. Conditions in northern Kenya gradually returned to normal.

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b. Somali groups, known locally as shiftas, raided northeast Kenya off and on throughout 1930-51. This persistent problem required periodic reinforcement of police elements in northeast Kenya and deployment of military forces up to battalion size. The shifita raiding forays increased in 1950, at about the same time that the internal Mau Mau problem became acute. However, there apparently was no planned connection between the two threats. The shifita raids increased the burden on already overburdened Kenyan security forces. Other than the Somali raiders, there was no apparent major external threat to Kenya during 1946-51.

c. Although there were intertribal squabbles, raiding for cattle, labor problems, noisy politics, and considerable ordinary crime during 1930-45, there was no real threat to Kenya from internal sources until after World War II. However, early in World War II, the KCA extremists aided the enemy in hopes of throwing off British domination in Kenya. Leaders of the KCA collaborated with the Italians under a facade of loyalty to the Government. Homemade weapons were manufactured in the reserve areas by KCA cells. These weapons were to be used to resist conscription or to support an invasion of Kenya from the north. Militant politics and terrorism developed around and in the KCA during 1945-52. The Mau Mau terrorist movement, which often professed a desire to drive all the Europeans out of Kenya, grew out of the KCA. Kikuyu militant politics and terrorism grew and rose to a crescendo in October 1952. By this time the insurgency in Kenya represented a major internal threat to the central Government.

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d. The Government had received adequate warning of the rising threat and coming insurgency. First, the leaders of the KCA openly stated their goals and objectives, and, secondly, there were rising thefts of firearms and ammunition from the Army, police, and private sources. By the end of 1952, 399 arms and 133,465 rounds of ammunition had been stolen or lost. In spite of its knowledge of these losses, the Government did not appear to be unduly concerned or to realize the significance of what was occurring.

e. The Mau Mau headquarters evolved a complex system of forged passes, forged identity cards, and other papers that enabled fulltime Mau Mau operators to remain in Nairobi, ostensibly employed by respectable firms and apparently going about their lawful business. When screening operations were carried out, it was not possible to identify those with forged papers and credentials in a hurry.

f. Communism does not appear to have been a major threat to Kenya during the preconflict period, nor did the Communists provide significant equipment support to the Mau Mau. According to Corfield's Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, the Mau Mau had virtually no connection with communism, even though Kenyatta visited Russia in 1929-30 when he joined the Communist Party and again in 1933 when he attended the Lenin School. Communist support for Kenyatta was limited mainly to left wing press and left wing radicals in the United Kingdom.

67. Strategic appraisal.

a. The cooperation and coordination among the Kenya Police, the King's African Rifles, and the regular British forces within Kenya

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generally were good during the preconflict period. This was evidenced by Kenya Police training Ethiopian refugees in the late 1930's to assist in the liberation of their country, being used as guides and interpreters for British Army forces in the northern frontier provinces and during the British advance into Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland in World War II, acting as a screening force for the military in northern Kenya, and providing a special force to maintain law and order in the areas at the rear of the British military advancing into Ethiopia. The KAR and Kenya Police cooperated in guarding the Gilgil detention camp for the Jews during 1947-48. The police were responsible for the interior, and the KAR were responsible for the exterior, of the Gilgil camp. Cooperation of security forces in Kenya again was demonstrated during the Mau Mau emergency, when intelligence and security forces operated on an integrated basis.

b. Study of the command and control arrangements pertaining to the security forces (the Army, the Kenya Police, and the Tribal Police collectively designated the security forces) in Kenya reveals one major and several minor deficiencies that existed during the preconflict period.

(1) Early in the preconflict period, the Commissioner of Police had general overall responsibility for security and political intelligence. There was a Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), working under a Director of Civil Intelligence (later known as the Director of Intelligence and Security), responsible for the collecting and sifting of intelligence which emanated from the local

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police, the administration and similar sources. In 1945, Special Branch was separated entirely from the CID and made responsible to the Government for all matters pertaining to intelligence, security, and immigration control. It remained, however, a police force under the general administrative control of the Commissioner of Police. In 1947, two specialist officers were appointed in the Provinces. No further expansion of Special Branch into the Provinces was made until shortly before the declaration of the emergency.

(2) Following reorganization of the Government on 13 September 1946, the Attorney-General became responsible for law and order (internal security). The Attorney-General also was the Member for Law and Order of the Colony's Executive Council. As Attorney-General, his most important duty was administration of the criminal law and control of prosecutions. In this sphere he was wholly independent of the Government and was the final authority under law. It was to him and him alone that the police were responsible for carrying out their duties. As the Member for Law and Order of the Executive Council, he was the Governor's Chief Adviser on matters pertaining to the law, and also was a member of the council, collectively responsible with the other members for the decisions and policies of the Government. This individual thus had the quasi-judicial functions of an attorney-general and the executive responsibility for the internal security of the country, including the intelligence service. These latter matters, save in their strictly legal aspects, were outside the normal scope of training and experience of a lawyer. This arrangement was not wholly satisfactory;

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so a new post for a Secretary for Law and Order was created in 1949 to handle most routine matters connected with internal security, and an Internal Security Working Committee was appointed under the chairmanship of the Secretary for Law and Order in 1950. Apart from this committee, whose main function was to make periodical appraisal of defense schemes in light of the current security risks, there was no organized body to direct and control organization of intelligence and to assess the general import of intelligence reports. In effect, the final assessment of intelligence reports was left to the mainly unintegrated efforts of the Attorney-General and the Chief Native Commissioner. It was assumed that collection and collation of intelligence reports were sufficient. Therefore, a major deficiency in the intelligence operation in the pre-conflict phase was failure to make adequate political assessment of intelligence reports.

(3) Kenya may have had as good a security system at that time as most other colonial territories--perhaps even better than most. Its Special Branch was hard-working and efficient and continuously produced voluminous reports. However, they apparently were not properly analyzed and assessed. Special Branch's efficiency as an intelligence collecting machine was lessened by its lack of "roots" outside Nairobi and Mombasa. More precise details of Mau Mau activity might have been reported if Special Branch had had sections operating in Rift Valley and Central Provinces. Further, the importance of disseminating intelligence downward appears not to have been fully understood.

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(4) Command and control of the security forces in Kenya seems to have evolved gradually rather than to have been planned. Shortly before declaration of the Mau Mau emergency, the Attorney-General controlled the Kenya Police, the Governor exercised operational command over the military in Kenya, and the British Middle East Command (a small peacetime headquarters in the Suez Canal Zone) exercised administrative command over the military. Lacking was a headquarters or system to provide adequate logistic support to the military in Kenya. It was an early joke with the British regiments that if supplies were urgently needed between midday Saturday and Monday morning, it was necessary to discover which golf course the appropriate staff officer was patronizing.

(5) The Attorney-General had responsibility for security in Kenya, but the Police were in charge of security operations, and the military forces were in support, not in charge. It was the general policy of the British in emergencies to use Army units in support of civil police whenever possible. This policy was based on the belief that the police were better qualified to suppress insurrection than the Army, because they were closer to the people. In the early stages of the conflict, subunits of the military operated very much on their own. The military improvised methods of cooperating with their police opposite numbers, the District officers, and the settlers. The provincial security force command and control structure which evolved after declaration of the emergency is reflected in figure 2. Eventually, planning and coordination of military, police, and civil actions against the Mau Mau at each level were entrusted to triumvirate committees composed of the senior civil, military, and police official at each level.

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


Figure 2. Security Force Command and Control Framework

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(6) The Kenya Police radio net, which was installed prior to declaration of the Mau Mau emergency, was one of the best communicative systems of its type in Africa. It was supplemented by organic communications of the military, but communication with remote forest areas remained difficult. Dispersion of military units added to the problem of command, control, and communication. When the emergency was declared, the KAR and the Lancashire Fusiliers were widely dispersed about the danger area. One British battalion was spread over 400 miles, and one company commander had to travel 70 miles to tour three of his platoons. Thus, in October 1952 when the Mau Mau emergency was declared, the command, control, and communications systems and arrangements in support of security operations were largely improvised.

c. British and the Kenya Government long-range planning for security forces in Kenya does not appear to have been extensive. However, several specific actions did have a favorable long-range impact on internal security capabilities. Included in this category would be construction of airfields and roads, installation of a police radio net and other communications, establishment of a police training school in 1948, activities of the Kenya Regiment, and the continuous maintenance of three Army battalions filled with African enlisted men.

d. The only significant organizational changes in the Kenya security forces during the preconflict period were in the Kenya Police, which was gradually expanded, modernized, schooled, and trained until it was one of the best police forces in Africa. The Kenya Police acquired an air wing in 1949. The military remained basically three battalions of the KAR except during World War II.

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c. In summary, military and police forces were well trained and organized and worked well together. Conduct of the Kenya security forces cannot be attributed to being a major cause of the Mau Mau uprising. The single most outstanding weakness of the security arrangements in Kenya was the lack of an effective organization at the Government level to make timely political assessment of the intelligence reports submitted to high level Government officials. This general deficiency was largely overcome after declaration of the Mau Mau emergency.

Section III. Environmental Factors

68. Physical environment. Kenya, astride the equator on the east coast of Africa, lies between 5° north and 5° south latitude and 34° and 42° east longitude. It has a total area of 224,960 square miles, including more than 5,000 square miles of water. It has land boundaries with Sudan and Ethiopia on the north, with the Somali Republic on the east, with Tanzania on the south, and with Uganda on the west. On the southeast, Kenya has 250 miles of coast on the Indian Ocean. The country can be divided roughly into four geographical regions: the northern zone (the northern half) and the coastal belt, the highlands-plateau complex, and the lake region (the southern half). The three southern regions form three irregular longitudinal zones. The Rift Valley generally bisects the highland zone from north to south. Within the rift, drainage is into a chain of lakes, most of which have no outlets. The rivers west of the rift drain into Lake Victoria, and those east of the rift flow generally southeasterly into the Indian Ocean. Kenya's two largest rivers, the Tana and Galana, both rise in the vicinity of Mount Kenya and flow southeast to the Indian Ocean.

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a. The northern zone is a barren, waterless steppe, underlain by volcanic rock and strewn with lava boulders--a virtually uninhabited waterland. It is a region of poor soil, scrub thornbush, and minimal rainfall. Its annual rainfall is less than 10 inches, and some parts have none for years at a time. Its northern boundary is well defined by a rugged escarpment which marks the frontier with Ethiopia. The southern portion becomes the Rendille Plains which gradually blend into the central highlands. The northern zone is poorly suited for insurgent guerrilla operations, because of lack of adequate water, food, sources of supply, and cover.

b. The coastal belt extends some 250 miles along the Indian Ocean and northward approximately 250 miles along the Somali border. In the extreme south, the hills reach almost to the coast, and the coastal belt is a narrow plain varying from 2 to 10 miles in width except in the valleys of the principal rivers. Northeastward, it broadens into a width of more than 100 miles in the Tana lowlands. Coconut woodlands and bush are the most prevalent vegetation, but occasionally there are patches of dense forest, and mangrove swamps line most of the river valleys. The coastal belt rarely reaches an elevation of 500 feet and generally is hot and humid with erratically distributed rainfall averaging 48" a year. The mean temperature at Mombasa during February through April, the hottest months, is 82°F, and during June and July, the coolest months, it is 76°. January and February are the driest months, and April and May are the wettest. The climate, while not ideal, would not prohibit military operations. A narrow belt, about 20-40 miles wide,

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along the coast, has a climate more suitable for insurgent guerrilla operations than the remainder of the region.

c. The land rises gradually from the coastal plain in a series of well-defined steps which culminate in the highlands--most of the central and western part of the country. It first forms a broad plateau of grassy thorn-scrub plains at about 1,000 feet (the Nyika Plain). As the land rises, hill areas are interspersed with level areas at altitudes between 5,000 and 8,000 feet. The plains change abruptly to highlands as they reach the Aberdare Range, which forms the eastern rim of the Rift Valley and rises to more than 13,000 feet. The western highlands terminate with a fairly precipitous descent into the 3,000 to 4,000 foot levels of the shores of Lake Victoria. Mount Kenya, the second highest mountain in Africa, rises to 17,040 feet on the fringes of the Aberdare Range east of the valley. The Rift Valley runs roughly north and south through the middle of the highlands, varying from 30 to 80 miles in width and rising from 1,000 feet near Lake Rudolf in the north to above 7,000 feet at Lake Naivasha, then dropping back to 2,000 feet near the Tanzanian border. The Mau Escarpment on the western edge of the valley rises to nearly 10,000 feet. The floor of the valley is dotted with a chain of shallow lakes, and latently volcanic steam jets and hot springs are numerous. The varied topography (elevated plains, forest, valley, and lofty mountains) causes the climate, vegetation, and settlement patterns to change markedly in relatively short distances. The highlands area has the country's most productive soil, contains some of its most densely populated districts, and is the major area of European

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settlement. The climate is cool and bracing, a relative rarity in equatorial Africa. Mean temperatures vary from about 68°F at the 5,000 foot level to about 63° at 7,000 feet. Minimums rarely fall below 38°, and the occasional 90° maximum at 4,500 feet is dissipated rapidly by a cooling evening breeze. Nairobi temperatures vary from means of 56°-79°, with an average mean of 67°F. The rainfall may vary from 40 to 100-plus inches a year. Relative humidity in the highlands remains at 50-70 percent except during the rainy seasons of April-June and October-December. January and July-September are the driest months. The physical environment in this region is generally suitable for military operations and especially for insurgency or guerrilla operations. This region was where the Mau Mau gangs were most active in 1948-56.

d. The lake region, in the southwest corner of Kenya, forms part of the extensive fertile plateau of rolling savanna which surrounds Lake Victoria. Kenya shares the northeastern and eastern sections of this basin with Uganda and Tanzania. The Kavirondo Gulf extends approximately 50 miles inland from the east coast of the generally circular lake. Kisumu, on the northeastern corner of the gulf, is the principal lake port and handles most of the lake and rail traffic for all three countries. The gulf is the center of cotton and sugar production, agriculture, and animal husbandry. This region has a greater density of black residents than the highlands area around Nairobi. It has a semi-tropical climate with relatively high humidity and ample rainfall of 40-70 inches a year. Temperatures range between 60° and 85°, but the altitude prevents the heat from becoming oppressive. Day and night

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temperatures often vary as much as 20°. The two rainy seasons start in April and October and are separated by a 3-month hot dry period. The mountainous area north of the gulf has a single rainy season that lasts from April to August. During periods of maximum rainfall, the normal 65-percent humidity rises to more than 90 percent. The extended rainy seasons would inhibit conventional military operations, but guerrilla operations are feasible.

69. Manpower and demography. Manpower factors nonindigenous to Kenya have been considered only to the extent that they are related to the Kenya security forces and the Mau Mau uprising.

a. Near the close of the preconflict period there were approximately 8.6 million people in Kenya, almost 97 percent of them from indigenous African stock (see chapter 4, section I). Approximately 1.5 million African males were between the ages of 18 and 49, almost half of them qualified for military service.

b. During the peacetime, less than 1 percent of the able-bodied black males actually served in the military, because of the limited size of the indigenous KAR: three battalions. The withdrawal of such a small number of blacks from the society for the military had no appreciable effect on the economy and created no manpower shortages in agriculture or industry. The white colonists, though small in number, were strong in military experience. There was hardly a man among them who had not seen active service in the 6 years prior to the Mau Mau emergency. Many had served with the East African forces and were familiar with campaigning under local conditions. Among the settlers, approximately 450 were members of the Kenya Regiment and 1,000 or so were ex-soldiers.

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70. Political and legal constraints. The Village Headmen's Ordinance of 1902 provided for the appointment of tribal headmen charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order (see chapter 2, section I). Headmen powers were extended by Native Authority Ordinances of 1912 and 1937. It was the normal British practice to appoint headmen who had some traditional authority and local respect, and they were referred to as chiefs. They were not chiefs in the accepted tribal form of authority, as recognized among the Kikuyu; they were assisted in their duties by the Tribal Police. These arrangements were modified in 1937 by setting up local councils (under the Native Authority Ordinance) to which the headmen (or chief) and other local blacks were appointed. These councils were recognized formally in 1950 as ranking with municipal and district councils in the European areas.

a. During the preconflict period, the security forces were legally obliged to work with and through the local headmen and councils in dealing with the Mau Mau. The general British policy was to use the police as the primary force for controlling and suppressing civil disturbances. Thus, the Army units, by and large, supported the Kenya police. Prior to declaration of the emergency, the security forces operated under normal peacetime laws and legal constraints. As the Government remained effective and the insurrection was isolated, martial law was not declared during an emergency.

b. The British recognized that purely political matters could not be solved by military measures alone. This again was confirmed in late 1953 when General Sir George Erskine, Commander in Chief, East Africa,

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publicly announced that military measures would not solve the country's problem which was purely political.

71. Security force expenditures.

a. During peacetime in Kenya, the annual funds for defense amounted to approximately 4-5 percent of the Government's total expenditures. For example, in 1937 the Kenya Government spent L154,231 for defense which was 4.7 percent of total expenditures. Annual defense expenditures in 1951 through 1955 were L656,000, L759,000, L782,000, L397,000, and L16 million. These funds were 3.99, 4.02, 3.42, 2.12, and 4.14 percent, respectively, of total expenditures. The Mau Mau emergency took place during the least 3 years, 1953-55.

b. These figures do not necessarily reflect the entire cost of the defense establishment in Kenya. Expenditures for regular British military elements which were in Kenya at various times were not included in the Kenya budget. After independence, the Kenya Government's budget for defense in 1964-65 was about 5 percent of the total budget. This represented approximately 1 percent of the country's gross national product for the same period.

c. The expenditures for the Kenya police in 1948 amounted to L561,967 and rose to L900,735 in 1950. The 1950 expenditure supported a police establishment of 6,039 which was a little more than double the police force of 1940.

72. Social problems. A wide ethnic and class difference existed between the officers and enlisted men of the colonial security forces in Kenya during the preconflict period. The officers of the KAR were well educated

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white men, usually of British origin, and the enlisted men were poorly educated or uneducated black Kenyans. The officers and headquarters group of the Kenya Police also usually were of British or Indian origin, while the lower ranking policemen were black. This wide social and ethnic class gap continued to exist even after declaration of the Mau Mau emergency. It is to be expected that the nonindigenous officers in the security forces retained the attitudes, values, and aspirations of the leadership of the Kenya and British Governments, since they were from essentially the same social classes as the Government's leaders. There is no indication, however, that the social and ethnic gap was a major factor in the Mau Mau uprising.

a. Regular British military units were based in or moved through Kenya off and on during the preconflict period. These elite military units made favorable and lasting impressions on the Kenyans and apparently were not themselves a contributing cause to the Mau Mau uprising.

b. The enlisted men for the KAR were recruited on a voluntary basis during peacetime. Conscription was not necessary. The number of black applicants for the KAR usually exceeded the vacancies, and the British were rigidly selective in accepting volunteers. This established a standard of health and education in the KAR considerably above that of the country as a whole.

c. The British, through their recruiting teams, attempted to maintain a balanced representation of the various tribes in the KAR and Kenya police but were unable to attain this objective. Members of the Kamba and Kalenjin tribes proved most adaptable to service in the

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security forces and made up approximately 50 percent of the blacks in the Kenya security forces. The Kikuyu and the Luo, Kenya's predominant tribal groups, were represented only slightly in the security forces, and they showed little inclination to enter the services. The tribal imbalance in the security forces does not appear to have been a major problem, but it would seem that slight representation of the major tribal groups in the Kenya security forces would tend to aggravate old tribal animosities and hostile feelings of the Kikuyu toward the Government.

d. Training of black recruits for both the police and the KAR presented many problems. The average recruit had had little or no contact with modern urban life and usually could not speak English or Swahili, the two languages used for most contacts in public. The average black constable could not speak English. Early in the preconflict period, much of the training and instruction was in the form of practical demonstrations, as they nearly always conveyed a permanent impression to the blacks, who, for the most part, proved adaptable, keen, and eager to learn. In 1948, the Kenya Police Training School at Kiganyo was founded; and, subsequently, new recruits for the police normally received 6 months' training there prior to being assigned fulltime duty with the police. Recruits for the KAR underwent a 15-week basic training prior to being assigned full duty with the KAR. The term of a first enlistment in the KAR normally was for 9 years. The average recruit's complete lack of exposure to modern technology necessitated longer periods to train him as a technical specialist.

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e. Most blacks in the security forces had some elementary education. They were the products of an educational system which gradually expanded throughout the preconflict period (see chapter 4, section I).

f. Except for some among the Kikuyu and the Luo, the people's attitude toward the military and police was generally favorable. In view of the reluctance on the part of the Kikuyu and Luo to enter the military service and the Kikuyu's involvement with the Mau Mau, it must be concluded that the attitudes of these two tribes were less than favorable toward the Kenya security forces.

Section IV. Impact of Security Forces on Society

73. Relationships of the police with Government and nongovernmental

groups. The police worked closely with other Government agencies. During the early years, the Kenya Police assisted the Agricultural Department in visiting farms, assisted the Game Department, opened roads, repaired bridges, fought fires, and assisted in other various governmental functions.

a. The Kenya Police cooperated with the KAR and other British military forces, both during peacetime and wartime. Because the police acted in a paramilitary role during World War II, many of the Kenya Police officers were given local military rank.

b. Mostly through performance of their duties, the Kenya Police had contacts and relations with many and varied nongovernmental groups. Their duties brought them in contact with the whites, Indian laborers, frontier crossers, immigrants, strikers, cattle raiders, poachers,

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tribal warriors, and most blacks in Kenya. By 1950 the force was organized into 35 divisions, 92 stations, and 162 posts, of which 12 divisions and 31 police stations were in the African Reserves. Thus, by 1950, nearly all blacks in Kenya had been exposed to and influenced by either the regular Police or the Tribal Police. Black police were used, by and large, for preservation of law and order amongst blacks. By the end of World War II, certain sections of tribes in the Native Reserves wished the police to be withdrawn from those areas. However, relations between the police and the public on the whole were good. Headmen generally cooperated well and constantly called upon the police for assistance in their work.

74. Relationships of the military with Government and nongovernmental groups. The relationships of the military in Kenya with the Government were divided. During peacetime, the KAR was under the operational command of the Governor, and the regular British military stationed in Kenya were under command of the Middle East Command; both cooperated with the Kenya police both in peacetime and wartime. The relationships of the military in Kenya with nongovernmental groups usually were associated with expeditions against unruly tribes, war, and the suppression of insurrection. Apparently, the King's African Rifles did not participate in community projects or perform civil affairs functions. The major impact of the military on the populace was during World Wars I and II when 150,000 and 75,000 blacks, respectively, served in or with the British military forces. The peacetime KAR was small (approximately 4,000 men), and it touched the lives of only a small segment of the

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population. The overall conduct of the KAR in peacetime was generally good, and therefore, was not an aggravating factor in the Mau Mau uprising.

75. Military and police aspects of social control. At the turn of the century (1895-1919), the KAR participated in numerous expeditions against unruly tribes who were persistently attacking their neighbors or raiding caravans and the railway. By 1930, nearly all suppression of intertribal fighting and of stock and cattle raiding had been assumed by the Kenya Police. The introduction of police into the Native Reserves and the maintenance of civilized law and order in the Reserves also represented a type of social control.

76. Impact of security forces on society. The military and police suppression of intertribal fighting and cattle raiding changed the fundamental way of life and customs for some tribes. Although security was welcome, the principal responsibility of the warrior class was virtually eliminated, and life became more sedentary. Service in modern military units affected attitudes and life styles.

a. Establishment and enforcement of the Native Reserve system forced some tribes to give up a purely pastoral type of life and to accept a more settled life based on agriculture.

b. Military service and experience of the black Kenyans in World Wars I and II accelerated development of political awareness among the Africans. Many experienced increased contacts with whites and Asians during World War II, acquired new skills and knowledge, and returned with a desire to improve their positions. World War II and the service

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of many blacks in that War can be accredited with accelerating nomination of the first black Kenyan, E. W. Mathu, to the Legislative Council in 1944.

c. At the end of World War II, large numbers of Kikuyu, the majority of whom had been batmen, drivers, or laborers, were discharged from the Army and paid considerable sums in gratuities. The Government trained many of them for employment in industry, commerce, and Government service, but openings were very limited. Some invested their gratuities in commercial undertakings, but most of them failed because of inexperience, speculation, and overambition. Although much of their loss could have been avoided if they had followed Government advice, they elected to ignore the free advice and to cheat each other. After failure, many of the Kikuyu Army veterans refused to accept the fact that their mistakes had been of their own making, and turned bitter against the Government in general.

d. Some former KAR members became members and leaders in the Mau Mau. Dedan Kimaihi, who at the age of 20 entered the Army, saw service against the Japanese in World War II, and attained the rank of corporal, became one of the toughest leaders in the Mau Mau. Known as General China, he commanded all the Mau Mau in Mount Kenya forest. He was 33 years old when captured by the security forces.

e. The country and society as a whole profited somewhat from the service experience of those who had been in the regular forces. Many blacks were able to advance their schooling, improve their health, and acquire skills that helped them upon return to civilian life.

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i. No outstanding black military leaders emerged from the KAR during the preconflict period. This may be attributed to the fact that all officers in the KAR during the period were white.

Section V. Foreign Factors and Influences.

77. Military assistance programs. During the preconflict period, the King's African Rifles were the product of British guidance and design. The officers and some of the noncommissioned officers were British, and nearly all the material and equipment for the KAR came from British sources. Although several offers of military assistance were received from non-British sources, including the Soviet Union, the Kenya Rifles formed after independence in 1963 continued to use British guidance, and nearly all equipment was obtained from British sources. The United States did not provide military assistance to the KAR during the preconflict period. No evidence was found to indicate that foreign sources were assisting the Mau Mau with either military equipment or instruction.

78. Impact of foreign ideologies. Evidence does not support existence of Communist infiltration of the Mau Mau, but its development cannot be considered without reference to Kenyatta. He visited the Soviet Union in 1929-30 when he joined the Communist Party, and again in 1933 when he attended the Lenin School. He returned to Kenya in 1946, became a leading figure in the KCA, and was credited by the British with being the architect of the Mau Mau movement. Other than Kenyatta, there were no Mau Mau leaders with a definite Communist background.

a. Articles in the British and US press suggested that the Mau Mau received support and direction from the Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa.

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but no evidence was found to support these allegations. During the critical portion of the preconflict period, 1945-52, there was no evidence that the Mau Mau received significant external military aid from any source. The Mau Mau movement was fundamentally a Kikuyu subversive movement stemming from the Kikuyu Central Association.

b. Although the USSR and its satellites were unable to keep in touch with the situation in Kenya, the British Communists were more vocal. The British Communists wrote numerous articles for the Daily Worker insisting that the Mau Mau was a figment of British imagination, and that the fighting in Kenya consisted of brutal attacks by the British on the Africans. In this way the Communists gave spiritual and moral support to the Mau Mau movement.

c. The general attitude of the United States toward colonialism provided moral support to the Kikuyu. To the Americans, colonies were bad. Americans were the friends of colonial peoples seeking freedom. America as the first colony to achieve independence could expect support in the world from newly independent countries. America could help new, independent countries to recover from the effects of colonial rule. The effects of basic American attitudes were pressures on Great Britain to grant independence on a large scale.

d. There was no evidence of significant foreign penetration of the FFR or other British security forces in Kenya, especially during the 1945-52 period.

79. Conclusions. The following tentative conclusions concerning situations and actions leading to low intensity conflict were reached.

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a. The single most likely factor in the Mau Mau uprising was the alienation of land from the African tribes, especially the Kikuyu. Suppression by the security forces of intertribal fighting and cattle raiding brought about fundamental changes in the way of life of many tribes and created discontent. However, Crown Land Ordinance No. 27 and the Native Lands Trust Ordinance, both passed in 1938, are strong candidates as the immediate foundation of the insurgents' "cause."

b. All the officers in the KAR and the top officers in the Police were white, and the Kenya Regiment was exclusively white. Enlistment in the KAR amounted to less than 1 percent of the total black population, and the Kikuyu tribe was represented only marginally in that percentage. The regular British forces periodically stationed in Kenya were not a causative factor of the Mau Mau uprising, nor was Communist penetration of the indigenous security forces a problem.

c. The long-standing general attitude of the United States toward colonialism provided moral support to the Kikuyu movement and placed additional pressures on the British. The latter recognized early in the situation that Kenya's problems were purely political and could not be solved by military measures.

d. It was general British policy, prior to declaration of the Mau Mau emergency, to use police as the primary force for controlling and suppressing civil disturbances. The Kenya Government, however, failed to make adequate and timely political assessment of intelligence reports received from the police and other security forces.

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e. The single military factor that contributed most to the Kikuyu uprising and the Mau Mau movement probably was the exposure of thousands of black Africans to foreign cultures and societies during their overseas military service in World War II.

f. Primary indicators of imminence of conflict were the aid given the enemy by some KCA extremists in World War II, the open expression of their goals and objectives by KCA and Mau Mau leaders, and the large increase in thefts of weapons and ammunition from both Government and private sources in 1945-52.

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